

Reference and Quantification

THE PARTEE EFFECT

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Airport '86 Revisited: Toward a unified indefinite *any*

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Awaiting a flight at Boston's Logan Airport on September 2, 1986, Barbara Partee jotted down some thoughts on the age-old question "Is there a way to unify negative polarity *any* and free choice *any*?" Reflecting on the relation of the two *any*'s to the distribution of *almost*, Fauconnier (1975) superlatives, comparatives and equatives, she asked semi-rhetorically:

[I]s it possible that both *any*'s are instances of a single *any* which has an interpretation something like a minimal existential, and/or like an 'arbitrary' existential (here I'm searching for a way to unify 'minimal' as 'arbitrarily small' and 'free choice' as 'arbitrarily selected'), and the differences in the constructions derive from the differences in the implicature-generated scales that go upward from or downward to this arbitrarily chosen or arbitrarily small existential point? (Partee 1986: 3/2003: 236-237)

As suggested by the form of her question and by work subsequent to and partially inspired by the Airport Squib, such a unified approach is as possible as it is desirable. But how do we get one?

8.1 How many *any*'s? The unitarian-universalist credo
As related in Horn (2000a,b), the debate between the ambiguity and monoguis on the nature of *any* in sentences like (1) and (2)

- (1) I didn't see any pigs. (Negative polarity item [NPI] *any*)
Can any pigs fly?
- (2) I can catch any raven. (Free-Choice [FC] *any*)
Can V ANY raven fly?

has been raging at least since De Morgan (1861, 1862) squared off against Hamilton (1858). The burden of proof must be borne by the ambiguists, given the Modified Occam's Razor (Grice 1989: 47): "Senses are not to be multiplied beyond necessity". Whence the unitarian-universalist approach of Reichenbach (1947: §21) and Quine (1960: §29), on which *any* is a wide-scope universal – on later accounts (see e.g. Horn 1972: Chap. 3, Lasnik 1972, Kroch 1972, LeGrand 1975, Eisner 1994) an *V* determiner taking immediate wide scope with respect to its trigger, whether \sim , \diamond , or GEN.

While admirably parsimonious, this approach has proved empirically flawed, especially for polarity *any*. The existential character of NPI *any* has been supported by considerations ranging from Fauconnier's observation (Fauconnier 1979: 297–298) that *I wonder if Susan married anybody* cannot be understood as $\forall x$ ('I wonder if Susan married *x*') but only as 'I wonder if $(\exists x)$ (Susan married *x*)' to the distribution of *absolutely* and *almost*, which tend to consort with universals while excluding existentials (Dahl 1970, Lakoff 1972, Horn 1972, LeGrand 1975, Carlson 1981, Hoeksema 1983). As seen in (3)–(5), adapted from Horn 1972 and Carlson 1981, FC *any* but not NPI *any* appears to be compatible with these A-adverbs, as I shall call them.

- (3) a. Absolutely {everybody/nobody/*somebody} can win.
b. Absolutely {all/none/*some/*many/*few} of your friends can come.
c. Almost {everybody/nobody/*somebody} made it on time.
- (4) a. Absolutely anyone can cook Peking duck.
Can absolutely anybody swim the Channel? (FC *any* reading only)
b. *Sam didn't see absolutely anyone.
*If absolutely anyone leaves, Sam will commit suicide.
- (5) a. I could solve almost {all/none/any/*some} of the problems.
b. *Did almost anyone just walk into the room?
c. I didn't talk to (*almost) anyone.

Correspondingly, *there*-insertion, notorious for its affinity with existentials and indefinites and its antipathy toward universals and definites, smiles on NPI *any* while spurning FC *any*, as seen in (6) and (7), from Horn 1972:

- (6) a. There is {somebody/*everybody} that can swim the Channel.
b. There isn't anybody that can swim the Channel.
c. *There is anybody that can swim the Channel.
- (7) a. If anybody can swim the Channel, I can do it. (NPI or FC)
b. If there is anybody that can swim the Channel, I can do it. (NPI only)

The pattern of A-adverbs and existential *there* helped motivate the ambiguous view positing two distinct operators – existential NPI *any*, universal FC *any* – whose adherents include De Morgan (1861, 1862), Klima (1964), Horn (1972: Chapter 2), Ladusaw (1979), Carlson (1980, 1981), Linebarger (1981), and Dayal (1998), inter al. For the ambiguists as for the unitarian universalists, the *any* of (2), whatever its relation to the NPI *any* of (1), is itself a straightforward (if distributionally restricted) universal:

In its Free Choice (FC) incarnation, [*any*] is licensed in modal and characterizing statements where it is interpreted as a wide scope universal. (Dayal 1998: 434)

Unfortunately, a closer examination of the evidence from the full range of diagnostics has tended to point in various directions at the same time, leading one desperado to endorse a two-*any* theory in one chapter of his 1972 UCLA dissertation (written under the supervision of B. H. Partee) only to embrace a unified analysis in the very next chapter. In particular, contra De Morgan, Horn, Carlson, Hoeksema, Dayal and their cronies, FC *any* may not be as universal as it first appears. To begin with, it has been recognized for some time (see Horn 1972, LeGrand 1974, Carlson 1981) that *any* occurs without universal force in free-choice imperatives that function as requests, suggestions, or invitations rather than commands:

- (8) a. Pick any card.
b. Promise her anything, but give her Arpège.

These instances of imperative-licensed *any* fail to map directly onto a true universal or a simple existential; (8a) is not a request to pick EVERY card, but it is more generous than a command to pick SOME card. As for the vintage commercial in (8b), the viewer could comply with the suggestion without actually making ANY promises; the sense is close to "It doesn't matter what, if anything, you promise her, so long as you produce the Arpège." Both the not-mattering and the lack of existential commitment are critical to the proper understanding of FC *any*.

8.2 The indefinite analysis

But if FC *any* is NOT a universal after all, what is it? And whither then the NPI/FC "ambiguity"? In recent years, a number of scholars have converged on the suggestion in Partee 1986 that both *any*'s must be regarded as existentials or indefinites (cf. Heim 1982; Haspelmath 1993, 1997) of one sort or another. In particular, there must be some semantic property that unites the two *any*'s while distinguishing them from other operators that lack this property, as brought out by the distribution of postnominal *whatsoever* and *at all* in examples like (9)

- (9) a. I didn't see {anybody/*everybody/*somebody} whatsoever.
 b. I saw {*everyone/*someone/no one} at all.
 c. {Anybody/*Everybody/*Somebody} whatsoever can come to the party.
 d. If {anybody [NPI or FC]!/*everybody/*somebody} at all can swim the channel, I can.

As has been noted (cf. Horn 1972, Zwarts 1995), it is especially problematic for ambiguity analyses that these adverbs reinforce both NPI and FC *any*, while no other operator — universal or existential — can be so modified (other than *no*, the neg-incorporated alter ego of *any*). These facts can be taken to follow from what Hamilton (1858) calls the quodlibetic character of *any*¹, as explicated in terms of Vendler's (1967) blank warranty, Kadmon and Landman's (1993) widening and strengthening (cf. Krifka 1995), Lee's (1996) notion of concession, Fine's (1985) arbitrariness (cf. Tovena 1998, Tovena and Jayez 1999), or related notions. Following Fauconnier (1975, 1979), I have argued elsewhere in (Lee and Horn 1994, Horn 2000a,b) that both *any*'s are end-of-scale indefinites (= 'a', even the Xest'), where indefiniteness is treated non-quantificationally as in Heim 1982. (See Davison 1980, Haspelmath 1997, and Lahiri 1998 for related views.) NPI *any* is a minimal element on a quantity scale, FC *any* an indefinite occurring in generic or non-episodic contexts associated with a kind scale.

The impossibility of appending *whatsoever* or *at all* to a simple indefinite generic ({Any/*A} *linguist whatsoever can follow this argument*) is attributable to the non-quodlibetic character of indefinites lacking the even-like properties of scalar endpoints. Similarly, {absolutely/almost} *any man* (vs. *{absolutely/almost} *a man*) = *a man*, it {absolutely/almost} *doesn't matter which*.

¹Our English "*any*" (aenig, anig, Ang.-Sax.) is of a similar origin and signification with the Latin "*ullus*" (unulus), and means, primarily and literally (even) *one, even the least or fewest*. But now...it is of quodlibetic application, ranging from the least to greatest.' (Hamilton 1858: 615, emphasis added.)

As Jespersen (1933), Bolinger (1960), and Carlson (1981: 13) observe, the two *any*'s often appear in the same grammatical frame but with a characteristic prosodic distinction. Thus Jespersen (1933: §17.9) distinguishes *I can't do anything* (= 'I can do nothing') from *I can't do ANYthing* ('pronounced emphatically and with...falling-rising intonation', conveying 'There are some things I can't do'); Bolinger (1960: 379) differentiates the normal pronunciation of *I don't want to go anywhere* from the version 'with rise-fall-rise pitch accent on the last word, meaning "I don't want to go just anywhere"'.²

On the account in Lee and Horn (1994), the two *any*'s will be distinguished by which scalar endpoint they invoke. Thus consider the superficially ambiguous sentences in (10) and (11).

(10) If she can solve any problem, she'll get a prize.

- a. ('existential') If there is any problem she can solve...
 b. ('universal') If she can solve every problem...

(11) Can anyone pass that test?

- a. (existential/NPI reading) = Is there anyone who can pass that test?
 b. (universal/FC reading) ≈ Can everyone pass that test?

Explicitly following Fauconnier (1975, 1979) (and implicitly echoing Partee 1986, as quoted above), Haspelmath (1997: 117) unravels the "ambiguity" of (10) on scalar lines: *any* in each case signals a scalar endpoint: the reversed scale in (10a) (= the simplest problem) and the non-reversed scale in (10b) (= the most difficult problem):

Thus we can capture both the insight of the univocal universal *any* theory that the two uses of *any* are closely related, and at the same time account for the ambiguity of sentences like [(10)] which motivated the two-*any* theory.

Intonation and discourse context help determine which of these understandings is more plausible in a given utterance of (10) or (11).²

Summarizing the related scalar approach in Lee and Horn (1994), we can informally represent the two scales invoked in (11) as in (12a)

²Elsewhere, Haspelmath (1993: 91) remarks that "one is well advised to be skeptical that universal quantification in the standard logical sense is involved in free-choice indefinites at all". He notes (1993: 52–55) that free-choice indefinites tend to be prosodically prominent and are invariably (as opposed to the corresponding ordinary *some*-series indefinites) non-specific; it is when the non-specifics are contextually ruled out (as in past perfectives or present progressives) that FC *any* and its cross-linguistic analogues are generally impossible. As Jayez and Tovena (to appear) and the discussion below makes clear, however, not all non-specific contexts rule out *any*.

and (12b) respectively, where the elements in each scale proceed from stronger to weaker as determined by informational content.

- (12) a. <all n can pass, ..., 3 of the n can pass, 2 of the n can pass, 1 n can pass>
 b. <a. [the least likely to pass] can pass, b can pass, c can pass, ..., z [the most likely to pass] can pass>

"Polarity" *any*, restricted to in downward-entailing (scale-reversing) contexts, induces an inverted quantity scale, where the extreme (strongest) nominal value is *not (even) the least number/amount*; thus, (11a) amounts to (13a), requiring a choice between <someone can pass, no one can pass>. "Free choice" *any* induces a non-inverted qualitative or kind scale, where the extreme value is *the least likely NP to VP*; (11b) amounts to (13b), requiring a choice between <even z can pass, ~[even z can pass]>, where z is presupposed to be the least likely individual in the domain to be able to pass.³

- (13) a. Does [$\exists x$ x can pass] hold even for as few as 1 individual in the domain?
 b. Does [$\exists x$ x can pass] hold even when x is the least likely candidate in the domain to pass?

The Lee & Horn and Haspelmath scalar accounts represent just one attempt to reconcile the two *any*'s and to acknowledge the non-universal character of free-choice *any*. On a variety of recent analyses, FC *any* is an indefinite-plus whose use is bound up with some aspect of the hearer's unrestricted freedom to choose from a set of alternatives in identifying referents or witnesses to fill out the speaker's proposition. As documented in Horn (2000a,b), the indefinite approach to FC *any*, however implemented, is anticipated in sources ranging from the OED to Jespersen (1924: 203), for whom the generic singular indefinite *a* ('A cat is not as vigilant as a dog') is 'a weaker *any*', in which 'one ("a") dog is taken as representative of the whole class'. The relevant conditioning factors for free choice items have ranged from genericity and non-episodicity to such overlapping notions as contextual vagueness, non-existence, and inherent modality (Dayal 1995, 1998, Sæbø 2001), intensionality, attributivity, and non-veridicality (Zwarts 1995, Quer 1998, 1999, Giannakidou 1998, 2001), scalarity and arbitrariness (Tovena and Jayez 1999), or non-referentiality and non-individuation

³Crucially, ~[even z can pass] must be taken here as the negation of *even z can pass* rather than as the equivalent of *Not even z can pass*, in which the negation is inside the scope of *even* (as in *Even z can't pass*) and z is presupposed to be the MOST likely individual to pass. The fact that *Not even NP VP* can't be read as the negation of *Even NP VP* is discussed in Horn (1971).

(Jayez and Tovena (to appear)). I cannot attempt to distinguish among these related proposals, nor will I address the problems posed by "sub-triggering" contexts in which an otherwise unacceptable free choice *any* nominal is facilitated by a relative clause associated with that nominal (cf. LeGrand 1975, Dayal 1998, Giannakidou 2001, Jayez and Tovena (to appear)). Instead, I turn to an overlooked construction featuring FC *any* that reinforces its status as an indefinite(+plus) rather than a universal.⁴

8.3 Indiscriminativity and supplementary *any*

The evidence surveyed here and elsewhere indicates that FC *any* is a non-specific scalar indefinite whose semantics involves not only attributivity or non-episodicity but also a property I have called indiscriminativity. This is not a new idea; indeed, the single entry for *any* in the OED, encompassing both NPI and FC examples, emphasizes the central semantic role of 'indifference as to the particular one or ones that may be selected'. Similarly, for Bolinger (1960, 1977), *any* expresses 'whatsoever, no matter which', which he dubs its "whateverness" property.⁵ This notion of indiscriminativity is reinforced by *just*, especially in the context of the anti-indiscriminative *not just any* construction where it often serves as a disambiguator. Note that (contra Carlson 1981) the *any* appears here in its free choice incarnation; this can be seen in (14a), where the absence of *just* would turn Marta's free choice manifesto into the NPI credo of celibacy in (14b).

- (14) a. I don't want to go to bed with just anyone anymore. I have to be attracted to them sexually. (Marta, in 1994 Whit Stillman film "Barcelona")
 b. I don't want to go to bed with anyone anymore.

Along the same lines, compare the significantly distinct contents of the renunciations in (15):

- (15) a. I wouldn't marry anyone. [renounces CONNUBIALITY]
 b. I wouldn't marry everyone. [renounces POLYGAMY]
 c. I wouldn't marry just anyone. [renounces INDISCRIMINATIVITY]

⁴See Quer (1999) and Giannakidou (2001) for additional evidence that even if we admit a polysemy for *any*, the free choice reading cannot be reduced to a universal, nor can the distinction between NPI and FC *any* be attributed to a difference in quantificational force. The latter point is also made in Sommers (1982) and Jayez and Tovena (to appear).

⁵Horn (2000b: 101-107) argues that *wh-ever* free relatives (*whoever, whatever*) are free-choice indefinites rather than definites or universals as claimed in other treatments.

In these examples, an unnegated (*just*) *any* would emphasize 'not-mattering', as in the French series of *n'importe* forms (*n'importe qui/quoi/comment/...*).

Some additional attested examples of such anti-indiscriminatives (a.k.a. anti-depreciatives, as in Haspelmath 1997: 189–192) are given below. While a disambiguating *just* is useful in the vicinity of a DE licenser to clarify the orientation of the relevant scale, it is not obligatory, especially when prosody or diacritics (as in (16d)) can accomplish the same effect; where no disambiguator is present, the result is the garden path NPI reading induced in (16e).

- (16) a. This isn't just ANY sport utility vehicle. (from an Acura commercial)
- b. When our spirits most need a lift, just any old frock won't do. (Yale Herald, 1/26/96, courtesy Ton van der Wouden)
- c. He disapproves that I allow just anyone to come into my building. (Susanna Moore (1995), In the Cut, p. 100)
- d. I use "coke" to mean any cola-based soft drink (coca cola, pepsi cola, RC), but I would never use it to refer to *any* soft drink (coke = 7-up). I'm amazed that anyone would say coke, when they mean 7-up. (posting on American Dialect Society e-mail list, Re: pop and soda, 6 Dec. 1995)
- e. Don't labor under the impression that money can buy anything. (Horoscope for Taurus in San Francisco Chronicle, 23 May 1974)

Unlike other uses of *any* in both downward-entailing and unnegated free-choice contexts, anti-indiscriminative *not (just) any* in object position may signal commitment to the corresponding existential: as an anonymous referee for this paper points out, a negative episodic predication like *I didn't talk to just anyone* conveys that I did talk to someone. Similarly, in a singular predication like (16a), the Acura in question IS an SUV, just not any-old, *n'importe quel SUV*; cf. *She didn't marry just ANY royal; she married the crown prince of the realm*. Such anti-indiscriminative assertions respond to propositions salient in (or accommodated to) the common ground, namely that the corresponding positive existential holds ("I talked to someone", "This is an SUV", "She married a royal") AND that the specific identity of the objects in question (among the set of talkees/SUVs/royal grooms) is largely immaterial. It is this latter assumption that the anti-indiscriminative *any* claim refutes.

The indiscriminacy of FC *any* that *not just any* rejects is especially salient in an unusual construction that Jennings (1994) terms supplementary *any*. Citing the examples in (17),

- (17) a. I think she went to Lake Chapala deliberately to find a man. Any man.
(from Ross MacDonald)
- b. Suddenly she hoped that someone, anyone — man or woman — would see her...
(from Joseph Wambaugh)
- c. I am standing here only until a policeman, *any* policeman, turns up.
- d. I am looking for a bicycle, *any* bicycle, that works.

Jennings (1994: 191) accommodates this construction to the scalar framework developed by Fauconnier (1975, 1979) and exploited in the Lee and Horn (1994) treatment of FC *any*:

What this use illustrates...is a general feature of 'any'...that to use it is to warrant an expectation that a certain sort of challenge will receive the reply 'even that one.' Consider whatever scale you please (some scale may have been situationally suggested) on which to place policemen: slovenliness, fastidiousness, brutality, ineffectualness, dishonesty, scrupulousness. Consider the policeman that you would place at the extreme of the chosen scale. That one will do... A bicycle howsoever rickety? What about this penny farthing that I'm taking to the museum? That will do.

Supplementary *any* illustrates that the apparent universal qualities of FC *any*, if they are present at all, are indeed epiphenomenal.⁶

The universality of 'any'...does not always entail representation as a universal quantifier and is derivative in character, deriving by monotonicity along all chosen scales. If even the oldest (least comfortable, most perilous, etc.) bicycle will do, then a bicycle in less extreme position (newer, more comfortable, safer) will also do. (Jennings 1994: 191–192)

In such cases a particularizing indefinite — *a* or *some* — primes the generalizing *any* in a non-veridical but non-DE context, while no priming by a universal (**everyone...someone*) is possible. I have elsewhere

⁶Cf. the on-line OED entry for *any*, I.I.c.:

In affirmative sentences [*any*] asserts concerning a being or thing of the sort named, without limitation as to which, and thus constructively of *every* one of them, since every one may in turn be taken as a representative: thus 'any chemist will tell you'...

(Horn 2000a: Appendix 5.2) referred to this process as dilation; it is in effect the syntagmatic counterpart of Kadmon & Landman's paradigmatic widening.⁷ Additional examples are given in (18), with relevant operators highlighted:

(18) "You're supposed to publish. No one will read what you've published...So what every professor wants is time to research and write a **book-any book**."

(Amanda Cross (2000), *Honest Doubt*, p. 55)

How much longer will Glen Sather, the Rangers' general manager, wait before he makes a **deal, any deal**, in an attempt to shake his overpaid team out of its funk?

(NYT 1/30/01, D2, "Rangers Hit a New Low In a Season Full of Them")

Baltimore manager Mike Hargrove was pleased that his team had won a **game, any game**, whether it was on the road or not. "When you've lost [nine] in a row," said Hargrove, "you're happy to win anytime." (Boston Globe, 6/28/00, F1)

As my mother began to seriously decline, I called Scott Rudin, the producer of "The Hours," and told him I didn't think my mother would get to see the finished film but I'd like to be able to show her **something, anything**. (Michael Cunningham, author of the book *The Hours* on which film was based, NYT 1/19/03, 22)

"Please", he said, "what can I do for you? You must let me give you **some-anything** ...anything I have." (Robert Tanenbaum (1994), *Justice Denied*, p. 307)

[B]eing nominated to be president of Harvard is much like being nominated for a Pulitzer Prize—all it means is that **somebody, anybody**, has written a letter putting forward a name. (Carey Goldberg, "Wanted: One President For Famous University", NYT 11/6/00, A18)

I want to be good at **something-ANYthing**. (Janet Evanovich (2002), *Full House*)

Especially striking as a model of indiscriminacy is an example in which the scalar endpoint (the 'even that one will do' of Jennings 1994) is overtly instantiated rather than just tacitly invoked:

⁷As an anonymous referee points out, the effect of *at all/whatsoever* in (9) can be seen as a similar instance of dilation or syntagmatic widening applied to unmodified *any*; cf. *If he drinks anything, anything [at all/whatsoever], please let me know at once*.

(19) All she could think was that she would rather be someone, anyone, else: the skinny Oriental woman rocked to a nap across from her, or the woman further down dressed in dirty animal skins and reeking of urine. (Lorrie Moore (1998), *Anagrams*, p. 215)

Unsupplemented *any* in the same frame would be either ill-formed or wrongly interpreted. While we do occasionally encounter cases of what we might call auto-supplementary *any*, the effect is typically a self-conscious one of metalinguistic game-playing, resulting in a heightened indiscriminacy. For the *any CN* couple in (20), the narrator's wife might (as well) have been *n'importe quelle femme* to him, and he *n'importe quelle homme* to her.

(20) We made love, fiercely, in the dark, out of our estrangement, as strangers. She was faceless to me, she closed her eyes and masked her face, so that she seemed any woman, nameless and multitude. And I knew she closed her eyes so that I was any man, in the dark....

(Marilyn Sides (1996), "Kites!", from *The Island of the Mapmaker's Wife and Other Tales*, p. 63)

8.4 "Universal" *any* and the diagnostics

We have explored a variety of contexts in which no analysis of FC *any* as a universal can be sustained and we have argued that an account of both FC and NPI *any* as instances of indefinites offers a more natural account of the distribution of these elements. We turn now to three constructions in which free choice *any* initially appears to pattern with universals, but where this appearance proves misleading. The first of these is the *there*-insertion paradigm of (6)-(7), revisited in (21), which can now be seen as excluding FC *any* not because it's universal but because it's generic/non-episodic; while NPI *any* patterns with existentials and simple indefinites in allowing *there*, FC *any* patterns with other generic indefinites in excluding it.

(21) a. There isn't {a cat/any cat} that eats peaches.

There isn't {a thing/ANYthing} you can do about it.

(≠ 'You can't do just anything about it')

b. There is a cat that eats meat. (≠ generic 'A cat eats meat')

There are beavers that build dams. (≠ generic 'Beavers build dams')

*There is any cat that eats meat. (cf. 'Any cat eats meat')

*There are any beavers that (can) build dams.

*There is anything you can do around here.

Similarly, while nominals headed by FC *any* pattern with universals in licensing NPI items in their (DE) restrictors, this is a property shared by non-scalar indefinites taken generically:

- (22) {Any/Every/*Some/A} dog that has any self-respect never befriends a cat.

It is thus not the putative universal character of *any*-NPs that triggers such DE restrictors but rather their status as generic or characterizing nominals (cf. Krifka et al. 1995: 13-14).⁸

Next, consider NP-adjoined exceptive phrases. It is often claimed (see e.g. von Stechow 1993, Moltmann 1995, Dayal 1998, Szabolcsi 2004) that exceptives introduced with *but*, *save*, *except*, and their analogues can only be hosted by universals: {*everything/nothing/*something/*much*} *but the kitchen sink*. This restriction on exceptives — the quantifier constraint of Moltmann (1995: 227ff.) — has in fact been recognized since the Middle Ages:

An exceptive word [e.g. *preter*] indicates a relationship of a part actually existing in a whole to its whole.
(Peter of Spain, *Synkategoremata*, Tract. IV, 7; de Rijk 1992: 171)

An exceptive proposition is never properly formed unless its non-exceptional counterpart is a universal proposition. Hence, 'A man except Socrates is running' is not properly formed.
(Ockham 1980: 144-5; *Summa Logica*, II:18)

But both *anys* host well-formed exceptives —

- (23) a. I'd vote for anyone but Arnold. (FC *any*)
Any owls but very infirm ones hunt mice.
b. I wouldn't vote for anyone but Arnold. (NPI *any*)

— suggesting (contrary to the results derived from the other diagnostics) that not only FC *any* but NPI *any* is a universal! Dayal (1998) and others have taken the grammaticality of (23a) as evidence for the universal status of FC *any*, without acknowledging the fact that NPI *any* would also have to be reckoned as a universal by the evidence of (23b).

But how viable is the Quantifier Constraint? In fact, as pointed out in (Horn and Bayer 1984: 408), *but*-clauses, excluded from ordinary

⁸Similarly, while we must distinguish the "universal" character of *Any cat eats meat* from the non-universal character of *Pick any card*, as an anonymous referee points out, the same distinction holds for the non-scalar counterparts of these sentences, *A cat eats meat vs. Pick a card*. Thus, as Jennings (1994) notes, the universality inference is not a fact about FC *any* per se.

wh-questions, are at home in rhetorical "declaratives" (Sadock 1971), i.e. interrogatives standardly used to convey universal negatives. Thus (24a) is impossible, but (24b) is fine, since it induces a short-circuited implicature that nobody other than W. could have attempted such a move.

- (24) a. #Who but Chris will be coming to your party?
b. Who but W. could defend such a tax cut at this time?

Another class of semantic non-universals hosting exceptives is illustrated by the thousands of annual hits Nexis provides for constructions of the form *little but/except*, sampled in (25):

- (25) Landowners could do little but accept their fate.
With little except morbid thoughts to occupy his time,...
...leaving little but mangled bodies in his wake.
...an artful yet provocative cover for her all-Bach CD in which she appears to be wearing little except her violin.

On the basis of such facts and others⁹, I suggested in Horn (2000b: 78) that the appropriate generalization, pace Ockham, Moltmann, Dayal, and Szabolcsi, is that an exceptive proposition is licensed only when its non-exceptional counterpart is conventionally used to express a universal proposition, a formulation that extends to the well-formedness of (23b), given its conventional use as a means for signalling a universal negative.

- (26) I wouldn't vote for anyone but Arnold = I would vote for no one but Arnold

In fact, however, even this constraint proves too strong. Not only do exceptives co-occur naturally with free choice *any* in imperatives, where as we've seen no universal analysis is plausible, but they also appear in the supplementary *any* cases that clearly involve dilated existentials/indefinites rather than universals:

⁹Lest the data in (25) seem to reflect mere conventionalization, consider this related case:

- (i) Does poetry matter? Few but other poets may read it.
(Martin Arnold, "Poets pit pens against swords", NYT 2/6/03)
Another variety of a universal-negative-implicating host is on view in (ii),
(ii) I wonder whether any Western political leader but Romano Prodi would discuss the works of Bertolt Brecht with President Khatami.
(Anthony Lewis, "In the Premier League", New York Times op-ed, 7/13/98, A17)

where the reader is invited to draw the inference that no relevant head of government other than the Italian Prime Minister would shmooze Brecht with the President of Iran.

(27) Pick any card but the Ace of Spades.

Go into any store except this one. Ask the salesclerk to help you. Eat anything but carbohydrates. In a month you'll lose 50 pounds. Think of a number, any number but zero. Divide it by 2... A doctor, any doctor but that quack, will tell you that Stoptoneez helps.

We need a Democrat, any Democrat except Lieberman.

Note that ordinary (non-episodic) indefinites are impossible in the same frames — *Pick a card but the Ace of Spades, *We need a Democrat except Lieberman, *(Any) owls but very infirm ones catch mice — indicating that exceptives are sensitive to the scalar endpoints evoked by *any* but cannot be licensed by simple genericity.

As indicated by the examples in (28), culled from google.com (with emphasis added), the unambiguously FC indiscriminative indefinite *n'importe qu-* is equally capable of exception in French:

(28) *http://www.angelfire.com/music3/lestudio/djbil.htm*

Avis, avant de passer un commentaire au DJ ou de faire une demande spéciale... Ne demande pas "je veut [sic] entendre quelque chose, n'importe quoi sauf ça" Ok, allez au bar et dites "je veut [sic] boire quelque chose, n'importe quoi sauf ça." une plainte ne vaut pas grand chose si elle est vague, demandez quelque chose de spécifique, comme un titre et un artiste...

[Warning: Before passing a comment on to the DJ or making a special request, don't ask "I wants to hear something, anything but that." OK, go up to the bartender and say "I wants to drink something, anything but that!" A demand isn't worth much if it's vague — ask for something specific, like a title and artist.]

http://www.quebecoislibre.org/000219-7.htm

Bref, c'est la faute à n'importe qui, n'importe quoi, sauf moi.

[In short, I blame it on anyone, anything, but me.]

http://www.cyberpresse.ca/reseau/chroniqueurs/

npetrowski/npet_02020065419.html

Leur mandat? Improviser ensemble pendant un an et demi selon une méthode mise au point par le cinéaste britannique Mike Leigh... Mais improviser sur quoi? se sont écriés les acteurs avec effroi. Ce que vous voulez. Vous avez carte blanche. Vous pouvez faire n'importe quoi sauf discuter entre vous de vos personna-

ges.

[Their mandate? Improvise together for a year and a half according to a method developed by the British filmmaker Mike Leigh. But improvise on what? the actors exclaimed with fear. Whate-

ver you want; you have carte blanche. You can do anything but discuss your characters among yourselves.]

Like *there* existential sentences and restrictor clauses, exceptives thus prove no impediment to a unified indefinite analysis in the spirit of the Airport Squib. But what of the A-adverbs?

8.5 A-adverbs revisited: *almost* a problem

As pointed out by Horn (1972), free choice *any*, like other universal determiners, may be modified by adverbs like *almost* or *nearly*. (Hoeksema 1983: 409, emphasis added)

We know that in general, FC-*any* can be modified by *almost* (just as other universal quantifiers can). Crucially, such modification... is rejected in downward entailing contexts like negation. (Zepter 2003: 234, emphasis added)

The reliability of *almost* as a diagnostic for FC (as against NPI) *any*, and more specifically for the purported universality of the former, is generally accepted as scripture by the ambiguity sect. Moltmann (1995: 277, fn. 36) sees the co-occurrence of *almost* with FCI but not NPI *any* as a problem for Kadmon and Landman (1993) and, by extension, other unified accounts of *any*, and other recent work concurs in taking the restriction against the co-occurrence of *almost* with NPI *any* for granted. For Tovena and Jayez (1999: 40), the grammaticality of sentences like *I could solve almost any of the problems* in our (5a) above constitutes a prima facie argument against the indefinite analysis of such instances of FC *any*. Similarly, Dayal (1998: 449) echoes legions of scholars dating back to Horn (1972) and his fellow-travelers in taking the modifiability of FC *any* but not NPI *any* by *almost* and *absolutely* as evidence for an actual universal quantifier in the representation of the former.

But just how reliable is this evidence? Lee and Horn (1994) propose an intervention constraint ruling out (certain) sequences of the form [NPI licenser...A-adverb...*any*NPI], on the model of similar constructs advanced for related purposes by LeGrand (1974) and, independently, Linebarger (1980). In its most recent version (Horn 2000a: 165), this constraint has the form "No adverb with quantificational force may intervene between a polarity item and its trigger if it semantically combines with the NPI in question." Essentially (although see the above work for complications), the intervention constraint is designed to distinguish (29a,b).

(29) a. *I don't like {absolutely/almost} anyone here.

- b. I like {absolutely/almost} no one here.

It predicts that if NPI *any* is licensed by an approximative adverb with negative force, such an item must be interpreted with the approximative element taking wide scope with respect to negation. Thus (30a) is possible because, as noted by Partee (1986), *hardly* is analyzable as *almost NEG*, not as *NEG almost*.

- (30) a. I like hardly anyone here. (= 'I like almost no one here')
 b. %I don't like hardly anyone here.

Note also that while some speakers accept the negative concord-type structure in (30b), this is not the contradictory negation but rather the logical equivalent of standard (30a). Since it is the *hardly* (= *almost not*) that licenses negative polarity *any* here, the intervention constraint is not violated as it is in (29a).

But even with this modification it is by no means obvious that the usual understanding of *almost* and *absolutely* as diagnostics for FC (and against NPI) *any* can survive.¹⁰ Nor are these two adverbs on all fours. Notice first that (as noted in Partee 1986) the actual restriction on the occurrence of *almost* and *nearly* is that the modified determiner be interpretable as a precise value, either in a relative set-inclusion sense (as in the case with universals and other 'exact' partitions) or in a more absolute sense (as with cardinals):

- (31) a. I could solve almost {all/any/half/none/50/*many/*most/*few} of the problems.
 b. Coors Extra Gold is brewed for nearly 52 days. [radio commercial]

As for *absolutely*, it modifies not just the universals of (30a,b) but scalar endpoints in general, as seen in (30c-f) (and discussed in Lakoff 1972: 632-633 and Horn 1972: §2.3):

- (32) a. Absolutely {everybody/nobody/*somebody} can win.
 b. Absolutely {all/no(ne)/*some/*many/*few} of them can go.

¹⁰ Doubts about the reliability of the *almost/absolutely* diagnostics in fact creep into the work of the card-carrying ambiguity Greg Carlson (1981: 13), who notes that while the *any*'s in (i)

- (i) a. For (almost) anyone to leave the room now would be a disaster.
 a'. For anyone to (ever) leave this room (yet) would be a disaster.
 b. Bob is unlikely to kick anyone.
 c. Shooting at anyone ought to be illegal.
 d. For Bob to eat anything now would be impossible.

appear to be existential, licensing the presence of NPI *ever* and *yet*, they are also curiously compatible with *absolutely/almost* and yield 'no detectable ambiguity' between NPI/FC senses.

- c. It's absolutely {necessary/certain/impossible/*possible/*likely}.
 d. You absolutely {must/can't/mustn't/*may/*can} go.
 e. He absolutely {always/never/*sometimes/*often/*seldom} eats meat.
 f. I absolutely {adore/love/loathe/*like/*dislike} you.

As we have seen, FC *any* lacking universal force occurs in imperative contexts; when it does it may be modified by *absolutely*, *almost*, or *virtually*, as in the "Pick any number" cases:

- (33) a. Take almost any member of Congress. You're likely to find an adulterous, amoral perjurer.
 b. Pick up almost any article on polarity. You'll find grammaticality judgments with which no sane English speaker will agree.
 c. Go into {absolutely/almost/virtually} any restaurant in San Francisco. A "Thank You For Not Smoking" sign will be prominently on display.

Such apparent imperatives may lend themselves to an analysis as protases of implicit conditionals, so that e.g. (33c) is read as (33'):

- (33') If you go into {absolutely/almost/virtually} any restaurant in San Francisco, a "Thank You For Not Smoking" sign will be on display.

If so, we would appear to have a case of NPI *any* (licensed by the limited DE-hood of such protases; cf. Heim 1984), where A-adverb modification is nevertheless quite at home. Indeed, with true imperatives like those of (34), where the conditional paraphrase is impossible, modification by *absolutely* is still possible (despite the lack of universal force) but — as noted by Hoeksema (1983: 409), citing J. McCawley — approximatives tend to be ruled out on pragmatic grounds.¹¹

- (34) a. Pick a card, {absolutely/#almost} any card.
 b. Take absolutely any number from 1 to 100. Multiply it by 2, ...
 Indeed, the very claim that A-adverbs are excluded from NPI *any* neighborhoods has been directly challenged on occasion, as early as the observation of LeGrand (1974: 394) that "contrary to Horn's predictions" the sentences of (35) are accepted by "most speakers."

¹¹ Even this mild restriction may be too strong as it stands, judging from the following suggestion from Tom Ferrelli's "Eat Streets" column on how to transport oneself to the international culinary cornucopia that is Brooklyn's Montague Street:

- (i) To dine on Montague, take almost any train to Borough Hall station: 2, 3, 4, 5, M, N or R.

(New York Times 11/10/96, Sophisticated Traveler Magazine, p. 10)

- (35) a. If there's absolutely any noise, I'll clear the courtroom.
 b. If almost anyone has a cold, I catch it.

Supporting this point are the sentences of (35'), where (as in (35a)) the existential *there* rules out any free choice, much less universal, interpretation.

- (35') a. "You let me know if there's absolutely anything I can do, OK?"
 (from WB situation comedy, "Seventh Heaven", spring 1998)
 b. If there's absolutely anything you need, please don't hesitate to ask.

Along the same lines, notice that the A-adverb *absolutely* is possible in both (36a) and (36b), although predictably only the former allows a *there*-inserted paraphrase:

- (36) a. If you eat absolutely ANY meat, you're not a vegetarian. (NPI any)
 b. If you eat absolutely VANY meat, you're not a kosher Jew. (FC any)

- (36') a. If there is absolutely ANY meat you eat, you're not a vegetarian.
 b. *If there is absolutely VANY meat you eat, you're not a kosher Jew.

The same possibilities can be found with approximative modifiers like *almost* or *virtually*:

- (37) a. If you go to bed with almost ANYone_{NPI}, you should use a condom.
 b. If you go to bed with almost VANYone_{FC}, you better use two.

In the examples of (35)-(37), the NPI licenser is the protasis of a conditional; more to the point, it is not an adjacent negation. Thus consider (38a), where it's the distance of the neg-raised licenser from NPI *any* that favors the appearance of the A-adverb; compare the less acceptable (38b).

- (38) a. I don't think there's a jury almost anywhere in this country that would convict the President on this if he would come clean... (Sen. Orrin Hatch [R-Utah] on Larry King Live, CNN, 12/11/98, on why Clinton should have acknowledged having lied to the grand jury, emphasis added)
 b. There's no jury (?almost) anywhere in this country...

Similarly, the licenser in (46) is a sentential negation outside the PP environment containing the NPI and its A-adverbial modifier.

- (39) I've never been a part of anything like this. I am not a rabid fan of almost anything.

(Jennifer Watson, Channel 3 News, Hartford, covering celebration for University of Connecticut's NCAA men's college basketball championship, March 1999)

Besides remoteness (as in (38a) and (39)) and covertness (as in the conditionals of (34)-(37)), another variable conducive to the acceptability of *almost any* in downward entailing contexts is partitioning. Speakers I have surveyed agree in finding (40a,b) preferable to (40c), although perhaps not entirely impeccable. (Not that (40c) is entirely impossible either, as we shall see.)

- (40) a. It was so windy, the quarterbacks couldn't complete almost any of their passes.
 b. She doesn't like almost any of her teachers.
 c. ?*She hasn't taken almost any syntax.

We conclude, then, that it is not NPI *any* that is incompatible with *almost* and *absolutely*, but (at least certain instances of) adjacent negation per se. This conclusion is buttressed by the evidence from Nexis hits summarized in (41),

- (41) Nexis cites of structures with negated A-adverbs and *any*:

not almost any: 0

not virtually any: 0

not absolutely any: 1 (in a statement from the President of Honduras)

vs. not just any: 100/month (e.g. in Oct. 1998)

wasn't almost any: 0

vs. wasn't just any: 765

wasn't almost: 79¹²

(cf. wasn't exactly: 175-200/month (e.g. 187 in Oct. 1998))

demonstrating that cases in which overt negation immediately precedes *almost* and *absolutely* are vanishingly rare (but see below). In the terminology of van der Wouden (1996), the A-adverbs are weak positive polarity items. (See Klein 1997: 87 for a similar observation and a proposed explanation.) Thus if *not almost any* is ruled out, this tells us less about the incompatibility of *almost* and NPI *any* or that of

¹²Virtually all these involve metalinguistic or multiple negation or irrelevant data in which a sentence boundary intervenes between the negative and *almost*; see Horn 2000b: 88 for details.

negation and FC *any* (cf. Partee 1986 and Dayal (1998)) than about the incompatibility of *not* and *almost*.¹³

Despite the rarity of negated *almost* (*any*) in copular constructions as indicated in (41) and the perceived infelicity or awkwardness of non-participle cases like (29a) or (40c), it should also be noted that, as is the case with many PPI violations, the data here is somewhat nugatory. Google searches of such sequences as "doesn't {know/have} almost any X"¹⁴ or "don't like any Y" run far-from dry:

(42) he **doesn't know almost anything** about computers
 he **doesn't know almost anything** about programming
 Newbie = Person Who Is New To IRC, And Doesn't Know
 Almost Anything About It.

What about the man who wrote the review of CDs??? He **doesn't know almost anything** about [Kim] Carnes' career [sic].
 Vana's mother died shortly after she was born. Vana **doesn't know almost anything** about her.

How many users would switch to an operating system that **doesn't have almost any** software written for it?
 Microsoft as usual **doesn't have almost any** documentation on that issue

Admittedly, the DVD **doesn't have almost any** "extras" As can be seen, approximately 25% change of the beam waist **doesn't have almost any** influence on the overall cross appearance. What really bugs me is that Compaq **doesn't have almost any** information related to this computer.
 FPX **doesn't have almost any** of the proprietary MS crap in it, it's too simple for that.

Borland's Pascal (since version 5.5, that was back in the early 90's or earlier) **doesn't have almost any** of the mentioned problems that Brian is speaking about
 New Zealand has VAT system, which **doesn't have almost any** exemptions and special treatments

¹³Especially striking in the data in (41) is the contrast between the freely occurring *not just any* and the virtually non-occurring [*not A-adv any*] sequences, where A-adv = a member of the set {*almost, practically, virtually, absolutely*}. This contrast is particularly clear in subject position:

- (i) Not ^VANYbody could have done this.
 Not just anybody could have done this.
 *Not absolutely anybody could have done this.
 *Not {almost/virtually/practically} anybody could have done this.

See Horn (2000a) for more on the *not just any* construction.

¹⁴Prompted by an occurrence of the following observation by Polly Jacobson (p.c., 7/10/03): "He doesn't know almost any semantics."

I agree alcohol is way much better as it **doesn't have almost any** bad side effects.

Needless to say that this movie **doesn't have almost any** blood

... Eminem is trash too and I **don't like almost any** rock because they all sing about their problems and how bad they want a girl they can't have

... Whether this is "normal trance" or psy, I don't know, but I **don't like almost any** club trance, while I do like this I don't like watching most sports. Maybe gymnastics and figure skating.

And I **don't like almost any** movie that glorifies [sic] infidelity. I'm such a dork - I **don't like almost any** boybands, but ...

I **don't like almost any** fish. I try, because I know it's good for me, but I really don't.

I **don't like almost any** of the food that is traditionally served on Thanksgiving, so I won't eat too much!

Whatever the ultimate account may be of the distribution of *almost* and its cousins across the range of data surveyed here¹⁵, it is evident that the testimony they offer for distinguishing between "existential" NPI *any* and "universal" FC *any* is anything but secure.

In addition to the difficulties discussed here for the putative pro-ambiguist and universalist diagnostics, other constructions provide direct support for the kinship between the two *any*'s within the indefinitist family. Besides the pattern of post-nominal *at all* and *whatsoever* surveyed in Section 10.2 above, we can briefly note two additional considerations. First, we find that in English, as well as Spanish (Quer 1999) and Greek (Giannakidou 2001: §3.2.1), indefinites and (other) free choice items but not universals are felicitous within predicate nominals:

- (43) a. Robin {is(n't) a friend/isn't any friend/*is every friend} of mine.
 b. He could be {anybody/*everybody}.
 c. He's not just anybody.

¹⁵It may appear from the data in (42) that the constraint on *not almost any* is weaker with stative predicates. But even classic examples of *almost* exclusion like (*)*John didn't eat almost anything* (from Partee 1986) turn up in google attestations, some of which include exceptions as well:

- (i) I already knew she was pregnant. She paid no attention to her body. She **didn't eat almost anything** except pills and drunk [sic] alcohol.
 (<http://www.ruigerhauer.org/stories/03aug30.php>)

(44) No está { una/*1a/*toda/*cada } revista cualquiera.

not is a the all each magazine FC-any

'This is not just any magazine' (Quer 1999: (4))

Along the same lines, it is noted in Lee and Horn (1994: (49)–(52)) that FC *any* patterns with indefinites and existentials but not universals in allowing unselective binding in donkey conditionals. Again, the same holds for Spanish and Greek free choice items.

(45) If { a/any/*every/*each } farmer_i owns a donkey, he_i kisses it.

(46) Si llama cualquier cliente_i, le_i diré que no estás. (Quer 1999: (5))

If call-3SG FC any client him tell-FUT.1SG that not be-2SG

'If any client calls, I will tell him that you are not here'

(47) a. I fitites pu aghorasan { ena/*kathe } vivlio₁, na mu to₁ diksun.

the students that bought-3PL a/every book SUBJ me it bought-3PL

'The students that bought { a/*every } book₁ should show it₁ to me'

b. I fitites pu aghorasan opjodhipote vivlio₁, na mu to₁ diksun.

FC any

'The students that bought any book₁ should show it₁ to me'

As with the earlier discussed diagnostics collected within Table 1, it is difficult to reconcile these facts with a universalist account of FC *any* or with an ambiguity line distinguishing the two *any*'s by quantificational force, but they fall out naturally from a unified indefinite analysis of the kind so presciently sketched out near the Logan tarmac in Partee 1986.

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Construction	∃ anyNPI	∀ anyFC	comments/codicals
there-insertion	✓	*	diagnostic for weak/simple indefinites; generics & strong values ruled out
predicate nominals, donkey conditional licensing	✓	*	true universals excluded but FC/NPI <i>any</i> possible
exceptives (<i>Q</i> but/except NP)	*	✓	OK if proposition conventionally used to convey universal or represents scalar endpoint
heads with DE restrictors (Det N <i>wh...</i> NPL...)	*	✓	generic indefinite heads also license NPIs
<i>whatsoever</i> ; <i>at all</i>	*	✓	diagnostic for indiscriminacy (end-of-scale indefinites)
<i>absolutely</i>	*	(*/%) ✓	diagnostic for end-of-scale values; variably blocked by adjacent overt neg.
<i>almost</i>	*	(*/%) ✓	diagnostic for end-of-scale or exact values; weak PPI

TABLE 1

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