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Edited by:
Mary Andronis
Erin Debenport
Anne Pycha
Keiko Yoshimura



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Assertoric inertia and NPI licensing

Laurence R. Horn
Yale University

This study focuses on three scalar particles for which competing but ultimately imperfect analyses have been offered in the semantic literature. I will propose a new account that seeks to explain why scalar orientation, as reflected by negative polarity licensing and related diagnostics, is at most parasitic on, rather than identifiable with, the entailment-based notion of downward monotonicity. I will close by briefly revisiting the phenomenon of metalinguistic negation from the perspective offered by the framework developed here.

We begin with the mirror-image approximative adverbs *almost* and *barely*. As seen in (1),

- (1) a. Gore almost won the election. > a'. Gore didn't win the election.
b. Bush barely won the election. > b'. Bush won the election.

almost is in part semantically negative—from (1a) it follows that (1a')—while *barely* is correspondingly in part positive—from (1b) we conclude that (1b') is true. (I will assume, as do Ducrot 1973, Fillmore et al. 1988, Sevi 1998, and others, that the two adverbs are interdefinable: If Bush barely won, he almost didn't.)

The most straightforward account of the meaning contributed by *almost* and *barely* is the conjunctive analysis in (2):

- (2) Conjunctive analysis: PROXIMAL component + POLAR component (Sevi 1998; cf. Hitzeman 1992, Atlas 1997 [for (2b)])
a. Gore almost won.
a'. Gore "came close to" winning & Gore did not win
b. Bush barely won.
b'. Bush "came close to" not winning & Bush won

Rapp & von Stechow (1999: 159) offer the variant in (2'); note the difficulty of stating the proximal component without unfortunate circularity.

- (2') Let w be any world; $F(\text{fast 'almost'})(w)(p) = 1$ iff (a) and (b) hold
a. There is a world w' which is almost not different from w and $p(w')=1$
b. $p(w)=0$

The analytic paradox arises from the fact that it's not the adverb with the negative polar component, *almost*, but the one with the positive polar component, *barely*, that licenses NPIs (cf. Horn 1996):

- (3) a. #She almost {budged/slept a wink/touched a drop/spoke to anyone}.
 b. She barely {budged/slept a wink/touched a drop/spoke to anyone}.

This result is problematic for Linebarger's (1987, 1991) theory of indirect polarity licensing, given the fact that (4a) entails, if it is not logically equivalent to, (4b) (though see Atlas 1984 for a different view); as seen in (5), however, the intimate semantic relation between almost doing something and not quite doing it fails to account for the distribution of NPIs:

- (4) a. I almost finished my homework.
 b. I didn't quite finish my homework.
 (5) a. I almost finished {some/*any} of my homework.
 b. I didn't quite finish any of my homework.

Does the Ladusaw (1980) downward entailment theory fare any better? That depends. In previous work (Horn 1996: §7), I noted that the set-to-subset inference doesn't exactly go through in (6a), given that to be completely bedridden is to be alive while not (even barely) ambulatory, or in (6b), given that her entire exposure to linguistic study may have come from one course in OT historical phonology.

- (6) a. He's barely alive. -?-> He's barely ambulatory.
 b. She barely studied linguistics. -?-> She barely studied syntax.
 (7) a. He's almost alive. -/-> He's almost ambulatory.
 b. She almost studied linguistics. -/-> She almost studied syntax.

On the basis of the marginality of (6a,b) and the fact that the inferences in (7a,b) appear to be even less sound, I suggested that *barely* is DOWNWARD QUASI-ENTAILING, but this seems to be something of a desperate move. Atlas (1997) supports the non-monotonicity of *barely VP* by observing that if John is barely six feet tall, it doesn't follow that he's barely six-feet-tall-and-blond, and we might add along the same lines that to be totally naked is not to be barely dressed.

So where does that leave us? If *barely* is (partly) positive and *almost* (partly) negative, why don't they act that way? And if they're conjunctive... well, just what ARE the conjuncts, anyway, and how can we characterize the proximal components of the approximatives? This question arises for all accounts. Two classic asymmetric treatments of the semantics of these approximatives are provided by Ducrot and Sadock, as given in (8):

- (8) Ducrot (1973): [presque p] has a positive assertion (p is 'non loin' from being true) and a negative presupposition (p is false), [à peine p] the reverse.
 Sadock (1981): [almost p] is true iff p is true in a world not very different from the real world; it conversationally implicates (rather than entails) ~p.

Now, it's not clear that the proximal component can really be given in possible world terms, despite the tradition represented by Sadock. Consider:

- (9) a. Planets travel in almost circular orbits. (Atlas 1984: 357)
 b. 961 is almost a prime number. (Sadock 1981: n. 2; Sevi 1998: 18)
 c. 0.333 almost equals 1/3. (Sevi 1998: 18)

Does (9a) really invoke a world in which planets do have circular orbits? Is there a world just like ours except for 961 being prime? And what of (9c): is there a neighbor world in whose mathematics .333 is indeed one third? Noting these cases, Sevi (1998: 32ff.) proposes the revised quasi-asymmetric analysis in (10):

- (10) •[Almost P] asserts that P is true at the closest index to the index of evaluation, [Barely P] asserts that P is false at the closest index to the index of evaluation (where 'closeness' may involve scalar strength, possible world, time interval, or standard of precision)
 •[Almost P] entails/asserts [not P] and [Barely P] entails/asserts [P], **but**
 •This polar assertion is 'somehow "backgrounded" or less "prominent" than the proximal assertion (p. 32)

Sevi acknowledges that '*almost* is "positive" and *barely* is "negative" in some sense' (1998: 34). But in what sense, given the facts of (1)? In particular, just what is the nature of the \succ relation in (1a,b)? Is it entailment, as Sevi maintains? If so, why IS *almost* more positive than *barely*? In particular, besides the NPI data already surveyed, there is a wide range of evidence attesting to the pragmatic or rhetorical negative force associated with *barely*, but not with *almost* (cf. Ducrot 1973, Lundquist & Jarvella 1994, Horn 1996, Sevi 1998).

Like other negative adverbials, *barely* (and its cousin *hardly*) can be fronted, triggering inversion, while *almost* can do neither:

- (11) a. Hardly ever will you see such a thing.
 b. {Barely/*Almost} had we arrived when an unearthly scream rang out.

Evidence from argumentative scales supports this impression. If the tank of our car is almost half empty we'd better stop to fill it, even though it contains more gas than if it's barely half empty (in which case we can relax and blithely drive on). Similarly, in (12) I am delighted if my printer almost works and concerned if it barely does, even though it's in the latter case that it can actually be used.

- (12) a. Good news: My printer is almost functional!
 b. Bad news: My printer is barely functional!

Similarly, as noted by Anscombe & Ducrot (1983: 20ff.) (cf. Ducrot 1973, Lundquist & Jarvella 1994), the negativity of *à peine* 'barely' is rhetorically harmonic with the negative *peu* 'few' and thus excludes *mais* 'but', while the adversative is required by the clash between downward-oriented *peu* and upward-oriented *presque* 'almost':

- (13) a. *Peu d'automobilistes dépassent le 120, mais {presque/#à peine} 20%.*
 'Few drives exceed 120 [k.p.h.], but {almost/#barely} 20% [do]'
 b. *Peu d'automobilistes dépassent le 120, {à peine/#presque} 20%.*
 'Few drivers exceed 120 [k.p.h.], {barely/#almost} 20%'

Other diagnostics for scalar orientation include the suspension paradigm in (14a) (Horn 1972) and the contrast in (14b) (Ziegeler 2000) in which the negative (polar) component of *almost* is too weak to support a causal link (I can only provide a reason for my coming close to P-ing, not my reason for failing to P).

- (14) a. He's {barely/only/#almost} 16, if that.
 b. I almost cancelled because {I was ill/#I would have felt too guilty}.

Another illustration is provided by a pattern adapted from Dayal (1998: 472), who observes that (15) "brings into focus" the existential ($\exists x$)(Fx & $\sim Gx$), whence the negative exemplification in (15a) as against the negative counterexemplification in (15b):

- (15) Every cat doesn't like mice.
 a. For example, Felix doesn't.
 b. *But Felix doesn't.

Correspondingly, we have the contrast between (16) and (17):

- (16) Almost every cat likes mice.
 a. For example, Felix {does/#doesn't}. [EXEMPLIFICATION]
 b. But Felix {doesn't/#does}. [COUNTER-EXEMPLIFICATION]
 (17) Barely {any/two out of ten} cats like dogs.
 a. For example, Felix {doesn't/#does}. [EXEMPLIFICATION]
 b. But Felix {does/#doesn't}. [COUNTER-EXEMPLIFICATION]

The distribution of *but* in (13a), (16b), and (17b), is especially telling. Note also:

- (18) a. almost {but/#and} not quite (cf. Sadock 1981)
 b. Gore almost beat Bush {but/#and} he didn't (beat him).
 c. Bush barely beat Gore {but/#and} he did (beat him).

For Sadock (1981), *not P* derives from *almost P* as a generalized conversational implicature, so that (19a) scalar- (quantity-) implicates (19b). This predicts that (19c) should be good as an instance of implicature cancellation.

- (19) a. Bill almost swam the English Channel.
 b. Bill did not swim the English Channel.
 c. (#)Not only did Bill ALMOST swim the Channel, in fact he SWAM it.
 d. #Bill almost swam the English Channel, and (in fact) he DID swim it.

The acceptability of (19c) has been much (but inconclusively) discussed in the literature (Sadock 1981: 263, Atlas 1984: 352, Horn 1991: 318, Rapp & von Stechow 1999: 159), beginning with Sadock's concession that it is "admittedly a bit odd." Outside the *not only* construction, cancellation appears to be much worse, as seen in (19d) (see again Sadock 1981, as well as Hitzeman 1992, Sevi 1988, Tanaka 1998, and Ziegeler 2000).

Faced with the equivocal evidence of (19c,d), Sadock (1981: 263) draws on the felicity of (20) to support the conversational line on *almost*.

- (20) Bill almost but did not quite swim the English Channel.

The crucial assumption is that an inference can be non-redundantly reinforced just in case it can be cancelled without contradiction, viz. when it is a conversational implicature. But in fact, contra Sadock, concession/affirmation structures can be felicitous even when they are informationally redundant, as long as the two clauses involved are rhetorically opposed—whence the adversative *but* connective (see Horn 1991 for details):

- (21) a. It's (#not) odd that dogs eat cheese, but they do.
 b. I #(don't) know why I love you, but I do.
 (22) a. Bush barely won the presidential election, but win it he did.
 b. #Hillary easily won the senatorial election, {and/but} win it she did.

If semantically inferrable (entailed) material is felicitously reinforceable, the acceptability of (20)—or of (22a)—cannot serve as a diagnostic for the status of the polar component associated with the meaning of *almost* or *barely*.

But if a Sadock- (or Ziegeler 2000-) style implicature-based analysis of *almost* and *barely* is ultimately problematic, this doesn't resolve the problem posed by the asymmetry of the meaning components. Nor is this simply a problem for the analysis of English approximatives; besides the analogue we have noted in French (*presque* 'almost' vs. *à peine* 'barely'; cf. Ducrot 1973, Anscombe & Ducrot 1983), comparable pairs have been investigated in Dutch (*vrijwel* 'almost' vs. *nauwelijks* 'hardly'; cf. Klein 1997) and Hebrew (*kim'at* 'almost' vs. *beko'ei* 'barely'; cf. Sevi 1998). Other studies have focused on the French, Danish, and Finnish counterparts of 'almost' and 'only'; see Lundquist & Jarvella (1994), Jarvella & Lundquist (1994), and references therein.

It is time to take stock, which we proceed to do with the table of particulars in (23), on which virtually all possible polar positions (from asymmetricalist to intermediate to full symmetricalist) are instantiated.

(23) Source	<i>almost</i> $\Phi \triangleright$ <i>not</i> Φ .	<i>barely</i> $\Phi \triangleright$ Φ	comments
Ducrot 1973; Anscombe & Ducrot 1983 (et seq.)	presupposition	presupposition (<i>barely</i> = <i>almost</i> <i>not</i>)	<i>almost</i> has up- ward, <i>barely</i> downward argumentative orientation
Sadock 1981	generalized conversational implicature	[not discussed]	$\sim p$ not part of convent. content of <i>almost</i> P
Atlas 1984	not quite entailment (or presupposition, or implicature)	[not discussed]	[x <i>almost</i> F 's] implicates [x does not quite F]
Fillmore et al. 1988	"limiting seman- tics" for <i>almost</i>	[not discussed]	<i>barely</i> = <i>almost</i> <i>not</i>
Hitzeman 1992 (cf. also Rapp & von Stechow 1999)	entailment	[not discussed]	Argues vs. Sadock and Atlas
Lundquist/ Jarvella 1994 and vice versa	no semantic inference	suggest non- entailment line	psycholing. evidence for scalar orient.
Horn 1996	inference to be accommodated; status left open	inference whose status is left open	<i>barely</i> is "quasi- DE"
Klein 1997	<i>almost</i> has neg. meaning but <i>almost</i> P is com- patible with P	cancellable implicature; <i>D. nauwelijks</i> 'hardly' is DE	<i>almost</i> is non- mon., neg. meaning and positive inferences
Atlas 1997	not quite entailment (or presupposition, or implicature)	entailment: [x <i>hardly</i> Φ] [x Φ & x <i>almost not</i> - Φ]	<i>hardly</i> VP is non- mon. but <i>hardly</i> <u>any</u> is DE
Sevi 1998	entailed/asserted (but "somehow backgrounded")	entailed/ asserted but backgrounded	Most de-tailed study of <i>almost</i> / <i>barely</i>
Ziegeler 2000	conversational implicature	[not discussed]	Neo-Sadockian account

One more factor in the characterization of the polar inferences is the nature of the predicate. The contrast between (24a) and (24b,c) is presumably attributable to the fact that the difference between being dead and not dead is typically more significant than that between dinner being ready or not.

- (24) a. A: Is dinner almost ready?
B: ?Yes, it's ready.
Yes, (in fact) {it IS ready/it's COMPLETELY ready}
- b. A: Is Fredo almost dead?
B: #Yes, (in fact) he's TOTALLY dead.
- c. A: Did you almost kill Sollazzo at the restaurant?
B: #Yes, (in fact) I DID kill hiim.

It is also worth noting that if dinner is almost ready in the actual world, it will be ready soon in all the inertia worlds determined in the context (cf. Dowty 1979: 148), while death is not similarly projectible as a default future. Thus *almost* P is sometimes (virtually) compatible with P and sometimes incompatible with P , depending on the significance of (as the waggish Paul Grice might have put it) the distinction between P -ing and not P -ing.

Putting aside the evanescence of the polar inference from *almost* P to *not* P in contexts like (24a), is there any reason to reject the entailment analyses of Hitzeman, Sevi, or Rapp & von Stechow? Putative arguments against such an entailment are less than convincing; thus Atlas (1984) offers the compatibility of the two conjuncts in (25a),

- (25) a. Moore almost understood "material object" and he understood it.
b. He is almost ready, if not completely ready.

but two separate sequenced events are involved here, as Sevi notes, while Klein's (1997) suspension datum in (25b) doesn't demonstrate the pragmatic nature of the inference, hinging as it does on the filtering properties of conditionals. We can certainly find naturalistic data like (26), but the parenthetical is attached here with an *tacit* or rather than *and*.

- (26) It is **almost certainly** (perhaps quite certainly) wrong to reject as false, absurd, or linguistically incorrect some class of linguistic statements if this rejection is based merely on philosophical grounds. (Grice 1989: 172, emphasis added)

For Atlas (1997), *barely any*, unlike the non-monotonic *barely* VP , is downward entailing, whence the contrast in (27).

- (27) a. #It {hardly/barely} rained and (in fact) it didn't rain.
b. {Hardly/Barely} anyone came to the party—in fact no one came.

The DE-ness of quantificational *barely* is supported by the fact that, as Steve Anderson points out (p.c.), *Barely 100 people came to the meeting* is judged true by many (though not most) speakers if 97 people came. But even if Atlas is right on *barely any*, the non-monotonicity he and others impute to *barely VP* remains problematic, as we are left with no explanation for its NPI licensing and other “negative” characteristics.

To obtain such an explanation, I will draw on the notion of assertion, as explicated by Stalnaker (1978). For Stalnaker, an assertion is a proposal to change the context: a potentially controversial move to reduce the context set—the set of possible worlds constituting the “live options”—or equivalently a proposal to add the content of what is asserted to the common ground. (A presupposition, on the other hand, is a proposition the speaker treats as being non-controversially part of the common ground, although it may acquire this status only through accommodation; cf. Lewis 1979.) Against this background, we shall adopt this proposal:

- (28) Semantically entailed material that is outside the scope of the asserted, and hence potentially controversial, aspect of utterance meaning counts as **ASSERTORICALLY INERT** and hence as effectively transparent to NPI-licensing and related diagnostics of scalar orientation.

On this account, the polar component of the meaning of *almost VP* and *barely VP* is **entailed but assertorically inert**, whence the quasi-monotonic behavior of the relevant clauses. A particularly dramatic illustration of the contrast between asserted and non-asserted entailments comes from the contrast between *almost* and *not quite* (cf. Sadock 1981: 264), two approximatives that are equivalent at the level of what they entail while differing as to what they assert:

(29) *almost* vs. *not quite*

	Entailed	Asserted
Proximal Component (<i>almost</i>)	+	+
Polar Component (<i>almost</i>)	+	-
Proximal Component (<i>not quite</i>)	+	-
Polar Component (<i>not quite</i>)	+	+

Thus, while a Republican and a Democrat would have agreed that Gore came close to winning without actually getting there, the former might have vouchsafed the sentiment *It's unfortunate that Gore almost won* (with a concern for the breadth of President Bush's mandate), where the latter would have subscribed instead to the

proposition that *It's unfortunate that Gore didn't quite win*. Along the same lines, consider the prima facie contrast between (30a) and (30b):

- (30) a. It's too bad you almost died in the accident
 [—now you'll need therapy]
 b. It's too bad you didn't quite die in the accident
 [—now I'll have to finish you off]
- (31) I {never quite/*almost} made it to any of your parties.

The NPI licensing facts, as seen in (31), follow accordingly. What is relevant for NPI licensing is **DOWNWARD ASSERTION** rather than downward entailment per se.

Further evidence for the assertoric asymmetry of approximatives is provided by a set of constructions in which the proximal component is retained but the polar component effectively flip-flops depending on the context of utterance and interpretation. Thus consider the Mandarin particle variously transliterated as *cha-yidiar/chadianr* and literally glossed as ‘miss-a-little’ (Li 1976, Biq 1989). While its ordinary interpretation is ‘almost’, when it scopes over a negative predicate it can be rendered as either ‘almost not’ (= ‘barely’) or as ‘almost’, with the negation essentially pleonastic:

- (32) *Wo chadianr mei chi.*
I almost not eat
 a. ‘I almost didn't eat’, ‘I barely ate’
 b. ‘I almost ate’ [= *Wo chadianr chi le*]
- (33) *Wo chadianr mei zhuangdao qiang.*
I almost not bump-to wall
 a. ?‘I almost didn't (=barely) bumped into the wall’
 b. ‘I almost bumped into the wall. [= *Wo chadianr zhuangdao qiang*]

Depending on the predicate, the (b) reading may be virtually the only one available, as when we shift from ‘eat’ to ‘bump into’ to ‘die’.

The same is true for the parallel *por poco (no)* in Spanish (data from Dwight Bolinger via Li 1976):

- (34) a. *Por poco me ahogo.* ‘I almost drowned’
 b. *Por poco no me ahogo.* ‘I almost/?barely drowned’

As Schwenter (2000) observes, the standard Spanish approximative *casi* can be analyzed along the lines we have sketched for *almost*:

- (35) *María casi terminó la cena* ‘Maria almost finished dinner’
 PROXIMAL COMPONENT = She approximated finishing it.
 POLAR COMPONENT = She did not finish it.

As in English, the polar component is ordinarily uncancellable but also transparent to the positive rhetorical force of the *casi* statement (Schwenter 2000):

- (36) #*María casi terminó la cena y (de hecho) lo terminó (del todo).*
'Maria almost finished dinner and (in fact) she finished it (all)'
- (37) A: *¿Está casi lista la cena?* 'Is dinner almost ready?'
B: No. [= it has a way to go; □ it's completely ready]
- (38) a. *Vamos a sentarnos (ya), está casi lista la cena.*
'Let's sit down (now), dinner's almost ready.'
b. #*No vamos a sentarnos (todavía), está casi lista la cena.*
'Let's not sit down (yet), dinner's almost ready.'

There is a clear rhetorical contrast between *casi* and *apenas* 'barely' parallel to that of (12) above, so that (39b) is possible only on an ironic reading. Further, parallel to the NPI licensing asymmetry in English, some Spanish speakers allow negative concord with *apenas*, as seen in (40), while it is never licensed by *casi*:

- (39) a. *¡Qué bien! Casi funciona el teléfono.*
'Great! The phone almost works.'
b. #*¡Qué bien! Apenas funciona el teléfono.*
'Great! The phone barely works.'
- (40) a. **Juan casi comió nada ayer.* 'Juan almost ate *nada* yesterday'
b. %*Juan apenas comió nada ayer.* 'Juan barely ate anything yesterday'
c. *Juan casi no comió nada ayer.* 'Juan almost ate nothing yesterday'

Thus, Schwenter (2000) concludes, we have the analysis in (41); in each case, the the proximal ("closeness") component is both entailed and asserted, the polar (negative) component entailed but not asserted.

- (41) *Casi (p)*: entails ~p but rhetorically oriented toward p
Apenas (p): entails p but rhetorically oriented toward ~p (= *Casi no p*)

Against this background, consider the "inverted" *casi* in Valencian Spanish explored by Schwenter (2000). One speaker is trying to exit her car after parking on a narrow street, but is forced to wait as many cars go past. When she's finally able to slip out, she sighs "*¡Casi salgo!*"—literally, 'I almost get out', but meaning 'I barely/finally got out.' A second speaker, impatiently awaiting his friend at the auditorium door, sees her arrive a minute before the session starts and exclaims *¡Casi llegas!* 'You just barely made it!' (lit., 'You almost arrive!'). In such cases, all restricted to simple present tense and utterance-initial occurrence, *casi p* clearly does not entail ~p, since the truth of *p* is obvious in the context. Instead, *casi p* = canonical *casi* + *NO (p)*: *¡Casi no salgo!*; *¡Casi no llegas!*

Nor are Chinese and Spanish alone in sponsoring such constructions. Swiss German *fasch* is akin to standard *fast* 'almost', but also has an "inverted" sense, and English *near miss* is analogous. For airplanes and golfers, a near miss is

still a miss (either a fortunate or unfortunate non-achievement), but for at least one champion curler a near miss was nearly—but luckily not quite—a miss:

"Greg Norman, best known for his massive collapse in '96 and his other **near misses**"—Bill Pidto on ESPN SportsCenter, 24 Aug. 2001

[Headline:] Martin's **near miss**

...Great Britain curling skip Rhona Martin almost missed the Winter Olympics because of a stomach problem. The gold medallist, who delivered the stone of destiny, spent time in hospital a week before the Salt Lake City Games began.

(<http://news.bbc.co.uk/winterolympics2002/hi/english/curling>)

If the polar component is more peripheral to the force of *almost* sentences than is the proximal component, it should not be too surprising to find such cases of inversion; what we never find is the reverse, when *almost P* retains the *not P* entailment while jettisoning its better (proximal) half.

For one last illustration, we turn to an innovative construction that references an item's proximity to a category boundary, while remaining flexible as to which side of the boundary it falls on. We are dealing here with the UN-NOUN (Horn 2002), the bastard offspring spawned when the seminal contribution of the copywriter who promoted 7-Up as the un-cola fertilized the ovum donated by Humpty Dumpty and his "un-birthday present."

Simplex un-nouns fall into two classes. CLASS A un-nouns of the form unX do not satisfy the structural criteria for the category X but share its function, evoking a superset category encompassing both X and unX. As a carbonated soft drink, 7-Up was a better candidate for an un-cola than chocolate milk or herbal tea would have been, and we can similarly assume that Tabla's ginger citrus snap counts as an unmartini by virtue of being an aperitif served in a martini glass, just as Now & Zen's vegan creation—a turkey it's not—qualifies as an unturkey through its destiny of consumption by a large gathering at Thanksgiving.

- (42) **Class A un-nouns** [here and below, emphasis is added]

un-hit

Un-hit of the week: Cardinals pitcher Garrett Stephenson came into last Saturday's game with Atlanta 1 for 36 at the plate. Then he lined what looked like a single to right. But Brian Jordan charged, fielded it and threw him out at first. (Baseball "Week in Review" column by Jayson Stark at espn.com, 11 Aug. 2000)

unmartini

Photo caption: **UNMARTINI** -- A Ginger Citrus Snap, with pomegranate seeds, at Tabla. (NYT 20 Jan. 1999, F1, "The Aperitif Moment: Sip or Flinch")

unpotato

Photo caption: THE UNPOTATO: Jerusalem artichokes are roasted with thyme at Craft.

(NYT 14 March 2001, F3)

unpublications


The main **unpublications** of H. P. Grice

(Heading for column in bibliographic addendum to *PGRICE* [Grandy & Warner, eds., 1986: 495], facing page with listing of 'The publications of H. P. Grice'.)

unturkey (and unbird)

The Great **UnTurkey**. Let One of Now & Zen's featherless friends be the centerpiece of Your Holiday table! This impressive creation is completely vegan and offers 5 solid pounds of boneless eating (enough for 8 hungry adults)! Made of delicately flavored tender seitan, dressed in a delectable "skin" made from yuba (beancurd skin), ...this innovative creation will delight vegetarians and non-vegetarians alike. This frozen "**unbird**" comes fully cooked, and needs only reheating to be enjoyed. (ad for Now & Zen, San Francisco, November 1999)

A CLASS B un-noun of the form unY, on the other hand, IS a member of the category Y, but a peripheral or non-prototype member (cf. Rosch 1978), one lacking a functionally significant (but not criterial) property associated with the category in question. This is schematized in (43):

(43)¹

Class B un-nouns are exemplified in (44); note that even an un-place like New Jersey must nevertheless count as a place, and that unvegetarian Deborah Madison is indeed a vegetarian, though not the "vegetarian vegetarian" associated with bland, unimaginative, and definitely un-chic meatless meals.

(44) **Class B un-nouns****uncollege**

Even though many Mids [= Midshipmen, i.e. students at the U. S. Naval Academy] refer to their school with bemused affection as "the **uncollege**", it remains one of the great bastions of "old college spirit" in its pristine form. (Washington Post, 22

¹The XX at the core of the category structure represents a LEXICAL CLONE or DOUBLE, which typically (although not invariably) represents the prototype instance of a category member: a *dog dog* may be a retriever or German shepherd but not a chihuahua, a *salad salad* is based on lettuce and not tuna or rice, and crucially a *college college* has a high-powered football team and a drinking problem, features an *uncollege* lacks. Thus an unX is at the opposite pole from the XX:

Undesign: Moving Away from Aggressive Décor
(NYT headline, 2 June 1988, C6)

"Nothing is 'design designed'. Nothing has a signature."
—New York architect Diana Agrest

Nov. 22, 1977, D1, "Navy Revives College Spirit For The Game; Mids Rally 'Round for The Game")

un-place

[Referring to E.B. White's essay "Here is New York"]

And what he made just as clear was that any place else was just, well, any place else. Or perhaps an **un-place**. The closest of these is New Jersey. (Charles Strum, "Garden State? The Image is Closer to Crab Grass", NYT Arts Section, 27 Oct. 1996, p. 33)

unsheets

Now that the big names in bedding—Cannon, Fieldcrest and J. P.. Stevens—are bringing out their own versions of **unsheets**, suggestible types can go see natural [unbleached, untreated cotton sheets] displayed...in department stores around town. (Liz Logan, "New Bed Linen," NYT 10 Oct. 1991, Home p. 1)

unvegetarian

"the **Unvegetarian**": Headline of article by Charles Perry profiling Deborah Madison, whose restaurant and gourmet cookbooks "have made meatless cooking chic" but who "hates being called a vegetarian" (Los Angeles Times, 5 July 1990)

unwoman

label for women in Margaret Atwood's *The Handmaid's Tale* (1985) who, because they are not fertile, are shipped to the colonies as slave labor

And now we are prepared to recognize why Class A and Class B are so-called: a Class A un-noun *unX* is ALMOST a member of Category X, while a Class B un-noun *unY* is BARELY a member of Category Y.

We have accepted that the polar component of *almost* does constitute an entailment, although an entailment that (being unasserted) does not enter into distributional patterns associated with *almost* clauses. If this is right, it cannot be the case that there is an informativeness scale <NP VP, NP almost VP>, so that *p-ing* is like *almost p-ing* only more so. Certainly, there is a contrast in cancellability with respect to true scalar implicature contexts, as we have seen, although that contrast is subtle at best in narrow focus *not only* environments:

- (45) a. Lil swam some of her laps, and in fact she swam all of them
 b. #Bill almost swam the English Channel and in fact he did swim it.
- (46) a. Not only did Lil swim some of her laps, she swam all of them.
 b. (?)Not only did Bill ALMOST swim the Channel, in fact he SWAM it.

Rapp & von Stechow (1999: 160) assimilate the behavior of *fast* 'almost' in contexts like (45b) and (46b) to that of other quasi-scalar elements. Commenting on the contrast in (47), they observe that "'Sick' and 'dead' are scalar in some sense, but the two properties are incompatible."

- (47) a. Sie ist nicht nur krank, sondern sie ist tot. 'She is not only sick but dead'
 b. #Sie ist krank und sie ist tot. 'She is sick and she is dead'

If incompatible pairs like *sick* and *dead*, or doing something and almost doing it, are "scalar in some sense", it is not the sense of true scalar terms but rather of rank orders (Lehrer 1974; Hirschberg 1991; Horn 1989, 2000). Unlike the *nicht nur...sondern* construction in German, *not only* in English typically distinguishes true scales from rank orders, as seen in the ill-formedness of the gloss for (47a). *Not just*, on the other hand, is less discriminating (Horn 2000: §2):

- (48) a. They're not {just/only} living together, they're engaged. [can be both]
 b. They're not {just/#only} engaged, they're married. [can't be both]
 c. I'm not {just/#only} a lieutenant, I'm a goddamn general!
 d. This is not {just/#only} a one-night stand, it's true love.
 e. She isn't {just/#only} an assistant professor, she's a full professor.
 f. Bill didn't {just/(#)only} almost swim the Channel, he did swim it.

In a scale of the form <Y,X>, ...Y... unilaterally entails ...X...: if it's hot, it's warm. In a rank order <<Y,X>>, ...Y... unilaterally entails ...~X...: if they're married, they're NOT engaged; if he's a colonel, he's not a lieutenant. Similarly, if she's a full professor, it's false that she's an assistant professor—but it's true that she's AT LEAST an assistant professor. Thus also:

- (49) a. They're #(at least) engaged, and probably married.
 b. Bill #(at least) almost swam the Channel, and maybe he DID swim it.
 c. "Her brazen acceptance of herself had always attracted Greg. For a while, she'd felt like home to him. Or at least almost home."
 (Siegel 1998: 55)

Examples of elements inducing true scales and those inducing rank orders appear in (50); note in particular the boldfaced items with which we have been concerned.

- | | | |
|------|--|-------------------------------|
| (50) | SAMPLE SCALES: | SAMPLE RANK ORDERS: |
| | <all, most, many, some> | <<felony, misdemeanor, tort>> |
| | <ertain, likely, possible> | <<win, place, show>> |
| | <must, should, may/can> | <<dead, moribund, sick>> |
| | <adore, love, like> | <<A, B, C, D, F>> |
| | <loathe, hate, dislike> | <<not VP, barely VP >> |
| | <none, barely any , few, not all> | <<VP, almost VP >> |

If assertoric inertia offers a way to characterize the semantic symmetry and pragmatic asymmetry of *almost* and *barely*, we would expect the same approach to be applicable to other particles that have received unsatisfactory conjunctive analyses. The first place to look for a confirmation is in the behavior of the analogues of *almost*:

- (51) Gore {almost/nearly/practically/virtually/all but/%liketa} won the election.

Indeed, the evident parallel seen in the quasi-conjunctive nature of each of these approximatives—entailing and asserting closeness to success and entailing but not asserting failure—underlines the need to devise a general solution rather than an ad hoc patch invoking conventional implicature or a comparable notion. But what of other particles, in particular the classical explicable par excellence, *only*?

For Peter of Spain, (52a) entails the conjunction of (52b) and (52c) and thus entails each of them singly.

- (52) a. Only God can make a tree.
 b. God can make a tree.
 c. No one distinct from God can make a tree.

The Latin 'only' particle, *solus* or *tantum*, is an EXPONIBLE to be expounded or unpacked into "an affirmative copulative proposition whose first part is the same proposition without *only*"—the "PRAEVIACENS" or PREJACENT—"and whose second part is a negative proposition denying the predicate of all others apart from the subject" (*Tractatus Exponibilium* 21ff., in Mullally 1945: 106-7). Similarly, for Ockham (1980: 132-42), "Every exclusive proposition has two exponents: one affirmative and the other negative. For example, 'Only a man is an animal' has these exponents: 'A man is an animal' and 'Nothing other than man is an animal'."

This symmetricalist analysis has been co-sponsored, endorsed, or independently reached by a wide range of medievals and moderns², from Burley (cf. Pimborg 1981), William of Sherwood (cf. O'Donnell 1941, Kretzmann 1968), Ockham (1980: 133), Billingham and Alnwick (cf. de Rijk 1982) to Kuroda (1969: 348), Lakoff (1970), Taglicht (1984), Keenan & Stavi (1986), Krifka (1992), Burton-Roberts (1993), von Stechow (1993), and especially Atlas (1991, 1993, 1996).

As I argued many a CLS ago (Horn 1969; cf. Horn 1992, 1996), however, if we analyze *only* statements into two equal conjuncts, one conjunct is clearly more equal than the other. Simple symmetricalist theories cannot readily explain why the positive component of *only* sentences is at least marginally suspendable while the negative component is not (cf. (53)), why *only*-initial phrases trigger negative inversion (cf. (54)), or why the nuclear scope of *only* should license negative polarity expressions (cf. (55), from Klima 1964).

- (53) a. (#)Only Ann will pay her taxes on time, and maybe even she won't.
 b. #Only Ann paid her taxes on time, {and/but} maybe someone else did.

²I am indebted to Victor Sánchez Valencia for directing me to many of the medieval sources. The earliest one we have located in this connection is Abelard (1079-1142), whose analysis of (i) into the conjunction in (ii) appears in *Tractatus III (Topica)* of his *Dialectica* (Abelard 1970: 332-33).

(i) Socrates tantum est Socrates.

'Only S. is S.'

(ii) Socrates est Socrates et nulla alia res est Socrates. 'S. is S. and nothing else is S.'

- (54) a. Only in stories does a dropped glass betray agitation. (Graham Greene)
 b. Only one new feature did I notice in the landscape, a large white villa.
 (55) a. Only young writers **ever** accept suggestions with **any** sincerity.
 b. Only his sister will expect him to write **any** more novels.

Such evidence appears to motivate an asymmetricalist analysis, on which the prejacent of the *only* sentence is not entailed but rather semantically presupposed (Horn 1969, König 1991), or perhaps conventionally implicated or pragmatically presupposed (Horn 1979, Rooth 1985, Krifka 1993), or maybe just conversationally implicated (McCawley 1981: 227)—or perhaps we could get away with ignoring it altogether (Geach 1962: 187).

While I'm sympathetic to the spirit of such proposals—and not just because I've endorsed most of them at one time or another—I would now concede that they are flawed in the letter. Both liberal and radical asymmetricalist approaches fall afoul of Atlas's observation (1991, 1993) that simple cancellations of the prejacent in contexts like (56a,b) are unsalvageably bad.

- (56) a. #Only Hillary trusts Bill, and (even) she doesn't.
 b. #I love only you, but I don't love you either.

And in response to my contention (Horn 1992: 182) that (57a)

- (57) a. I love only you.
 b. I love you.

"is not a declaration of love" and that its recipient, rather than being entitled to semantically infer (56b), is at most "pragmatically licensed to hope for the best", Atlas (1993: 314, 317) retorted:

[This] consequence strikes me as so outrageously counter-intuitive as to be a *reductio* of the theory. The idea that simultaneously *I love only you* could be true while *I love you* is false just seems crazy to me...I just have a very hard time with Horn's theory about the truth-conditions of *I love only you*.

Well, I sorta do too—and I agree with Atlas that *only NP* cannot be a classical downward monotone (DE) operator, given the lack of entailment from (58a) to (58b).

- (58) a. Only Socrates entered the race.
 b. Only Socrates entered the race early.

Indeed, Peter of Spain (*Tract. Syncat.*, in Mullally 1964: 33) had observed eight centuries earlier a similar lack of entailment either way between (58'a) and (58'b).

- (58*) a. Only Aristotle moves
b. Only Aristotle runs

But unlike the future Pope John XXI, an English language symmetricalist has the NPI-licensing property of *only NP* to explain, or at least explain away, and I find Atlas's attempts to wave off the polarity facts as unpersuasive as my own theory of love. Atlas (1993: 313) begins by distinguishing examples like (55) above or (59a) from (59b,c) to support his argument that "*only* is not, in general, a trigger for Negative [Polarity] Items" or indeed a negative item.

- (59) a. Only John **ever** suspected David Alexander.
b. *Only Bill wants Sam to finish the report **until Friday**.
c. *Only Phil will **give** Lucy a red cent.

In fact, though, *only* licenses not just weak NPIs (*any, ever*) but minimizers:

- (60) a. (Of all her friends,) Only Phil would **lift a finger** to help Lucy.
b. Only your wife **gives a hoot** about what happens to you.
(McCawley 1981: 83)
c. My nose and my lungs are only alive **at all** because they are part of my body and share its common life. (C. S. Lewis, *Mere Christianity*)
d. Only Greg Monarch **has a prayer** of getting him off.
(Siegel 1998, back cover)

Nor is this surprising, given the long-established converse relation between 'only' and 'all' (see Horn 1996 for extensive documentation):

- (61) ONLY (A,B) [i.e. only As are Bs] ↔ all Bs are As ↔ B⊆A

Indeed, the predicate of *only CN* licenses NPIs just as does the restrictor of \forall :

- (62) a. **Only** philosophers **ever** have **any** problems with this.
b. **Everyone** who has **ever** had **any** problems with this is a philosopher.

Atlas (1996: 285-86) is willing to concede that *only CN* is DE, while continuing to maintain that *only* with NP focus is non-monotonic and hence not a polarity licenser (nor a "negative item"): it only SEEMS to license NPI minimizers because it's a focus operator. Whence the (putative) parallel with *even*:

- (63) {Only Phil/Even Phil} would lift a finger to help Lucy. (Atlas 1996: (22k))

To which my response is: Parallel? What parallel? Unlike *only NP*, which as we've seen above, licenses a wide range of NPIs (although not those of the

strictest variety, e.g. *in weeks, until midnight*), *even NP* comes up spectacularly short, even with the most trigger-happy polarity items:

- (64) a. {Only Phil/*Even Phil} ate any of the squid.
b. {Only Phil/*Even Phil} could sleep a wink with all that noise.

We are at a familiar impasse: as with *almost VP* and *barely VP*, the distribution of *only NP* seems to be compatible with neither a purely symmetrical nor a semantically asymmetrical analysis; in particular, as with *barely*, the positive component of *only* is transparent to the negative and DE-like behavior of the particle. The situation is ripe for an invocation of the same analytical tool: the *only NP* statement can be taken as **entailing** both conjuncts, only one of which is, however, **asserted** (the other being **assertorically inert**).

Curiously, this result was partially foreshadowed in a remark of the arch-conjunctionalist Atlas (1991: 139): "[I]n asserting *Only a is F*, we do not thereby **assert** *a is F* ... What we do assert **entails** *a is F*, but it does not 'say' it" (emphasis in original). Partly because his account, unlike the current one, requires that *Only a is F* does "say" that exactly one thing is F, Atlas does not draw the same conclusions from his assertoric asymmetry (e.g. for NPI-licensing properties of *only NP*) that we have drawn from ours, but the parallel is interesting nonetheless.

A natural move now open to us is to redefine the classic Karttunen & Peters (1979) scopal diagnostics for conventional implicature as diagnostics for non-assertion. Essentially, "presupposed" or conventionally implicated material—on our account, non-asserted material—scopes out of factives. Thus, (65a) is understood as reporting that I just discovered that my cat came close to antedating Andrew Wiles, not that she didn't succeed, and in (65b) I am lamenting that you came close to death, not that you didn't arrive there.

- (65) a. I just discovered that my cat almost proved Fermat's Last Theorem.
b. It's too bad that you barely recovered.

Similarly, in (66), the proposition that home loans are deductible, i.e. the prejacent of the *only* clause, is outside the assertive scope of the higher factives:

- (66) a. I just discovered that only home loans are tax-deductible.
b. It's too bad that only home loans are tax-deductible.

When the model contains the prejacent, the *only* statement can be asserted (or questioned), but when it contains the exclusion, it can't be:

- (67) a. I know home loans are deductible, but are ONLY home loans deductible?

- b. #I know no loans besides home loans are deductible, but are ONLY home loans deductible?
 c. I know that no loans other than home loans are deductible, but I just realized (#only) home loans are deductible.

As the contrasts in (67) indicate, material already entailed in the model can be asserted, but asserted material cannot be questioned or (re-)asserted. In conclusion,³

- (68) •K/P diagnostics demonstrate what's outside the scope of assertion, but not (necessarily) what's presupposed or conventionally implicated.
 •NPIs are sensitive to DOWNWARD ASSERTION, not DOWNWARD ENTAILMENT as such, hence the licensing properties of *barely VP* and *only NP*.

One tempting approach to representing the scope effects we have surveyed would adapt a device patented by Grice (1989, Chapters 4, 17), the use of brackets constituting "a syntactical scope device" that provides "a conventional regimentation" of a pragmatic distinction (Grice 1989: 282). The bracketed expression A[B]C rewrites via erasure as ABC if the context does not contain a "denominated term T", but via extraction as BAC if the context does contain such a denominated term. For our purposes, let us suppose that the bracketed expression corresponds to the (non-asserted) polar component of an approximative and the (non-asserted) prejacent of an exclusive:

- (69) a. *Robin almost passed*: [\sim Robin pass &] C(Robin pass)
 b. *Robin barely passed*: [Robin pass &] C \sim (Robin pass)
 [where C ϕ is true iff ϕ is true at the closest world
 or index of evaluation to the actual world/index]
 c. *Only Robin passed*: [Robin passed &] $\sim\exists y(y \square \text{Robin} \ \& \ y \text{ passed})$

Among the denominated terms would figure the emotive factives (e.g. *It's too bad that*) and, crucially, the assertion operator (|-) itself:

³The claim here has its analogues in the current and older literature. Consider, for example, the title of Abbott (2000), "Presuppositions as Non-Assertions." Following Kent Bach, Abbott rejects "OSOP", the One-Sentence, One-Proposition thesis; rather, any expressed thought typically involves multiple atomic propositions, only one of which will normally be asserted; there is a functionally motivated tendency to limit assertion to one atomic proposition per root sentence. For Geurts (2000), the bulk of information in an utterance will float up to the main context and act as though it's presupposed, while only the subpart the speaker is focusing on will stay "where it is", within the scope of assertion or other illocutionary force operators. Other relatives of assertoric inertia include the neo-presuppositional STRAWSON-ENTAILMENTS of von Stechow (1999) (see Giannakidou's paper in this volume for critical commentary) and the earlier anti-presuppositional treatment in terms of ORDERED ENTAILMENTS by Wilson & Sperber (1979). Space precludes any cross-construct comparison here.

- (70) *It's too bad that Robin almost passed* →
 { \sim (Robin passed) & |- It's too bad that C(Robin passed)}
It's too bad that Robin barely passed →
 {Robin passed & |- It's too bad that C \sim (Robin passed)}
It's too bad that only Robin passed →
 {Robin passed & |- It's too bad that no one other than Robin passed}
[I assert that] Robin almost passed →
 {Robin didn't pass & |- C(Robin passed)}
[I assert that] Robin barely passed →
 {Robin passed & |- C \sim (Robin passed)}
[I assert that] only Robin passed →
 {Robin passed & |- $\sim\exists y(y \square \text{Robin} \ \& \ y \text{ passed})$ }

As for "non-denominated terms", there do appear to be contexts in which the tendency toward extraction is overridden in favor of simple erasure. Thus when sports columnist Bob Ryan explained the burdens of the favorite's role as applied to the Los Angeles Lakers (on WFAN radio, 6/7/00), "You can't almost win anymore," the sense is clearly that of (71), with both proximal and polar components within the scope of the modal assertion after bracket erasure:

- (71) {|- $\sim\Diamond(\sim \text{you win} \ \& \ C(\text{you win}))$ }
 = 'You can't (come close to winning and not win)'

Another illustration is (72), taken from Horn (1992: 182-83),

- (72) Mary will be upset if only Bill makes it to her dinner party.

with the gloss that "Mary may just be apprehensive about an evening alone with Bill; if no one shows up at all she will happily pop a meal into her microwave and a tape into her VCR." Both prejacent and exclusion fall within the scope of Mary's apprehension here. The local context evidently plays a role in determining when brackets will be erased rather than bracketed material extracted.

While we cannot fully explore the rich territory of "presuppositional phenomena" outside the realm of scalar particles, it is worth touching briefly on the case of universally quantified statements, which as we've seen are the converses of *only*-exclusives. On the modern view, universals with empty subject terms are vacuously true, but this yields notoriously counterintuitive results:

- (73) A: All John's children are bald.
 B: #Yes, (but only) because he doesn't have any.
 #That's true, because he's childless.
 (?)That's false—he doesn't have any children.

On the standard classical view on existential import (see Horn 1997 for capsule history), *All F is G* (like *Only G is F*) is taken to entail (and assert) the existence of Fs while denying the existence of non-G Fs.⁴ But it's not clear that existence is really asserted here; indeed, one tradition, usually associated with Strawson (1952) but actually well antedating him, characterizes it as a presupposition:

In translating categorical universals into existential negatives, part of the meaning is dropt by the way...In an ordinary proposition the subject is necessarily admitted to exist...When we say *no stone is alive*, or *all men are mortal*, we presuppose the existence of stones or of men.
(Land 1876: 290-91)

For Husserl too (cf. Frege 1906), (empirical) universals, like singular expressions, presuppose a non-null subject class: "The form containing 'all' is normally so understood that the existence of objects falling under the subject...is part of what is meant and is presupposed as having been admitted. In response, Frege (1906: 306-7) averred, "I use expressions containing 'all' in which a way that existence is neither part of what I mean nor something I presuppose as having been admitted ...It must be possible to express the main thought without *Nebengedanken*." But it's precisely such *nebengedanken* or "side-thoughts" that offer themselves up to a suitable non-presuppositional treatment in the current framework. In categorical universal statements, the existential proposition is entailed but not asserted; in thetic universals, it's neither. The relevant bracketing yields:

(74) $\vdash \{\exists x Fx \ \& \ \forall y (Fy \supset Gy)\}$, "rewriting" as $\{\exists x Fx \ \& \ \vdash \forall y (Fy \supset Gy)\}$

Checking in briefly at one more way-station on the presuppositional highway, the complement of an adversative can also be treated as assertorically inert, thereby finessing the problems with the traditional DE approach to this class of NPI-licensors based on the non-entailment of (75b) by (75a) (cf. Linebarger 1987, 1991, von Stechow 1999):

- (75) a. I'm surprised that Robin bought a car.
b. I'm surprised that Robin bought a Honda.

Borrowing the representation suggested by Grice (1989: 280), we have:

- (76) a. *I'm surprised you passed*: \vdash [you passed &] I expected \sim (you passed)
b. *I regret that you passed*: \vdash [you passed &] I am ANTI (you passed)

⁴Following Strawson (1952) and Moravcsik (1991), I have argued (Horn 1997) that we need to distinguish CATEGORICAL (empirical) universals (and other quantified statements) with existential import from THETIC (lawlike) universals without it, e.g. *All violators will be prosecuted*. The latter are not vacuously true either; emptiness of the subject set here would be simply irrelevant to the truth conditions. The present discussion focuses on the categorical (non-lawlike) universals.

Finally, we turn to the phenomenon of METALINGUISTIC NEGATION, taken in Horn (1989: 377) to be "a device for objecting to a previous utterance on any grounds whatever—including the conventional or conversational implicata it potentially induces, its morphology, its style or register, or its phonetic realization." Carston (1996) argues that while MN has been characterized variously as a **rejoinder** to a previous utterance, by the fall-rise or "contradiction" **contour**, by occurrence in **garden-path** sentences necessitating double processing by the addressee, by yielding **logical contradiction**, by requiring **rectification**, etc., the true generalization is that "the representation falling in the scope of the negation operator is **implicitly echoic**" (Carston 1996: 320-21, emphasis added). Working within a relevance theoretic framework, Yoshimura (1994, 1998) has argued that metalinguistic or echoic negation involves PROCEDURAL rather than CONCEPTUAL meaning, whence its failure to license NPIs (cf. Horn 1989: §6.4.2). Similarly, Predelli (to appear) sees MN as rejecting the ATTACHMENT rather than the MESSAGE. But how can we characterize the target of echoic negation? Some samples from the specimen table (Horn 1989):

(77) **conventional implicata**

He didn't MANAGE to win the election—he was awarded the office.

(78) **conversational implicata**

a. **scalar cases**

Around here we don't LIKE coffee—we LOVE it

She's not patriotic OR quixotic—she's patriotic AND quixotic.

b. **non-scalar cases**

Ms. X didn't produce a series of sounds that corresponded closely to the score of "Mañana", damn it—she SANG "Mañana."

Mozart's sonatas weren't for violin and piano, they were for piano and violin.

c. **non-cancelable cases** (involving R-based strengthening implicature)

He wasn't able to solve the problem.

(\square 'He was ABLE to solve it but he didn't': cf. Horn 1989: 387-92)

(79) **register**

It's not stewed bunny, honey, it's *civet de lapin*.

Grandma isn't feeling lousy, she's indisposed.

(80) **connotative focus**

I'M not HIS brother; HE'S MY brother.

Ben Ward is not a black police commissioner but a police commissioner who is black.

(81) **morphological or syntactic form**

I didn't trap two monGEESE—I trapped two monGOOSES.

Non, je n'ai pas "coo-PAY luh vee-AND", j'ai coupé la viande.

(82) **phonetic form**

We don't serve [t'meɪ'dz], we serve [t'mA:toz]
I didn't call the PO-lice, I called the po-LICE.

Yoshimura (2001) has recently proposed that if we put aside PROPOSITIONAL DENIAL (Foolen 1991, Geurts 1998)—e.g. *The cat is NOT on the mat, She DOESn't live in Chicago*, where no rectification is required—we can take the target of the metalinguistic use of negation to be “what is necessarily accompanied but not communicated by the...attributed utterance” (Yoshimura 2001: 123). This extends not only to the cases of (79)-(82), but also to entailments that are not communicated, e.g. the classic “presupposition” cancellation in (83) or presumably the negation of the assertorically inert polar component in (84)

(83) The king of France is not bald—there is no king of France.

- (84) a. Gertrude didn't ALMOST swim the channel—she SWAM it!
b. I didn't ALMOST kill Sollazzo, I DID kill him.

but not to implicature as in (77)-(78), which does, however, qualify as a legitimate target of MN. Revising Yoshimura accordingly, we arrive at a modified schema:

Part of what is
communicated?

		Yes	No
Part of explicit content?	Yes	<i>descriptive negation</i> <i>proposition-denial</i> A (Asserted)	non-asserted content denial, including “presupposition” <i>denial</i> B (83), (84)
	No	<i>implicature denial</i> C (77), (78a,b)	<i>form denial</i> D (79)-(82)

(italicized categories adapted from Geurts 1998)

In this four-cell matrix, the one potential target off limits to MN is A, the site for ordinary descriptive negation. MN does target non-communicated entailments (à la Yoshimura) in B, communicated but implicit material in C, and aspects of form

in D. The target of “classical” MN is **what is not asserted**: material that is not part of explicit content and/or not communicated. The patterns of metalinguistic negation respect and thereby ratify the distinction between the asserted and the (merely) entailed, a distinction we have tried to establish in the present study.

We are now prepared to recognize why Boar's Head Brand of deli foods finds it necessary to remind us that “Almost Boar's Head Isn't Boar's Head”, as well as why (as Scott Schwenter notes) the “Almost Family” vans for seniors in Columbus are not labeled Barely (or Not Quite) Family. Finally, I hope I've shown why in principle it's really better if you **almost** filed your taxes on time two weeks before the CLS conference than if you **barely** made the deadline. How to convince the IRS of this fact will be left as an exercise for the reader.

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Indefinite Nouns Plus Two Types of Conjoiners

Youngjun Jang & Yung-Hye Kwon
 Chung-Ang University

1 Introduction

One of the basic facts about language is that you need at least two items in order to use such coordinators as *and* and *or*. Based on this fact, we provide answers to the following pervasive and difficult questions: (i) Why does Korean *amwu-to* 'anyone' necessarily become a negative polarity item (NPI, hereafter)? And (ii) why should *amwu-na* 'anyone,' which is closely correlated to the NPI *amwu-to*, be invariably interpreted as free choice *any*? A couple of assumptions will be made for this purpose. First, the NPI *amwu-to* is best characterized if decomposed to be [*amwu + to*], of which [*amwu*] is an indefinite and [*-to*] is a conjunctive. Second, the morpheme *amwu* is placed on the bottom of a pragmatically defined scale which represents significance, degree, and/or amount, along the line of study conducted by Fauconnier (1975). Given that *-to* is a conjunctive coordinator and *-na* is a disjunctive coordinator, we show that the semantics of *amwu-to* (negative polarity) and *amwu-na* (free choice) are fully predicted from the compositional meaning of their constituents, thereby offering a uniform analysis of them. In particular, we show that Lee and Horn's (1995) claim that *any* is an indefinite + *even* is too strong. Instead, we claim that *any* (and its Korean counterpart) is an indefinite plus conjunctive/ disjunctive coordinator and that the pragmatic scale is presupposed by the role of these coordinators.

2 Polarity Scale and Polarity Item Licensing in English

Analyzing superlatives, Fauconnier (1975) proposes a scalar theory of NPI licensing.¹ Section 2.1 discusses cases of positive polarity item licensing and section 2.2 deals with cases of negative polarity item licensing in English.

2.1 Positive Polarity Items

First, consider the following examples:

- (1) a. John can solve the most difficult problem.
 b. John can solve an easy problem.

If someone can solve the most difficult problem, then he can naturally solve an easy one. This is the situation that we see in sentences given in (1). Negation of the sentences in (1) does not pose a special problem for our purpose.

¹A scale approach to the polarity phenomena is found in various previous works including Israel (1996), Fillmore, Kay and O'Connor (1988), Kadmon and Landman (1993), Lee and Horn (1995), and references cited therein, among many others. Readers are referred to these works.