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any and *(-)ever*: Free choice and free relatives

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I. *How many* any's? *Unitarians and universalists*

In this study I will seek to defend and reinforce the arguments for a unified analysis of *any* as an indefinite (Lee & Horn 1994; cf. Kadmon & Landman 1993), to reply to some recent critiques of this approach, and to extend the free-choice indefinite line on *any* to its cousin, the *wh-ever* free relative. Our point of departure is the relation between the occurrences of *any* as a negative polarity item (NPI) in the downward-entailing environments of (1) (cf. Ladusaw 1979, 1996) and the so-called free-choice (FC) *any* occurring in the environments of (2).

(1) I didn't see any pigs.   (Negative polarity item [NPI] *any*)
     Can any pigs fly?

(2) I can catch any raven.   (Free-Choice [FC] *any*)
     Can $^\text{V}$ANY raven fly?

One classical approach, advanced by Reichenbach (1947) and Quine (1960), assumes a unified account of *any* as a wide-scope universal (see also Horn 1972, Lasnik 1972):

(3) The (extended) Quine line: Both NPI *any* and FC *any* are universals taking wide scope with respect to their licenser (~, ◊, GEN, etc.)

     a. $\forall x, x \in$ {pigs}: ~ (I saw x)

     b. $\forall x, x \in$ {ravens}: ◊ (I catch x)

While admirably parsimonious, this position, subscribed to in one guise or another by the gang in (4), had the unfortunate flaw of empirical disconfirmation,

(4) The UNIVOCAL WIDE-SCOPE-UNIVERSALISTS

Reichenbach (1947: §21)	Lasnik (1972)	Eisner (1994)
Quine (1960: §29)	Kroch (1974)	
Horn (1972: Chapter 3)	LeGrand (1975)	

ranging from Fauconnier's observation (1979: 297-98) that (5) cannot be understood as (5a) but only as (5b),

(5) I wonder if Susan married anybody.

     a. ≠ $\forall x$ (I wonder if Susan married x)

     b. = I wonder if ($\exists x$)(Susan married x)

to the distribution of the A-adverbs *absolutely* and *almost*, which elsewhere consort largely with universals, while excluding existentials (Dahl 1970, Lakoff 1972, Horn 1972, LeGrand 1975, Carlson 1981, Hoeksema 1983),

(6) a. Absolutely {everybody/nobody/*somebody} can win.

b. Absolutely {all/none/*some/*many/*few} of your friends can come.

c. Almost {everybody/nobody/*somebody} made it on time.

and which, as seen in (7) and (8), modify free-choice but not NPI *any:*

(7) a. Absolutely anyone can cook Peking duck.

Can absolutely anybody swim the Channel? (FC *any* reading only)

b. *Sam didn't see absolutely anyone.

*If absolutely anyone leaves, Sam will commit suicide. [but see below]

(8) a. I could solve almost {all/none/any/*some} of the problems.

b. Nearly anyone can ride a bicycle.

c. *Did almost anyone just walk into the room?

d. They didn't talk to (*almost) anyone.

At the same time, *there*-insertion, notorious for its affinity with existentials and indefinites, and its antipathy toward universals and definites, smiles on NPI *any* while spurning FC *any*, as seen in (9) and (10) (sentences from Horn 1972):

(9) a. There is {somebody/*everybody} that can swim the Channel.

b. There isn't anybody that can swim the Channel.

c. *There is anybody that can swim the Channel.

(10) a. If anybody can swim the Channel, I can do it. (NPI or FC)

b. If there is anybody that can swim the Channel, I can do it. (NPI only)

c. If absolutely anybody can swim the Channel, I can do it. (FC only)

d. *If there is absolutely anybody that can swim the Channel, I can do it.

The distribution of the A-adverbs and existential *there* served as scripture for the ambiguist sect, on which there are two distinct operators—existential NPI *any* vs. universal FC *any*. Subscribers to this creed include those in (11):

(11) The AMBIGUISTS:

De Morgan (1861)	Ladusaw (1979)
Lees (1960) [implicitly]	Carlson (1980, 1981)
Klima (1964) [implicitly]	Linebarger (1981)
Horn (1972: Chapter 2)	

The burden of proof borne by the ambiguists (cf. the Modified Occam's Razor of Grice (1989: 47): "Senses are not to be multiplied beyond necessity") is traditionally shouldered by an annotated display of lexico-grammatical diagnostics favoring one *any* or the other (see Dahl 1970, Horn 1972, Lakoff 1972, LeGrand 1974, 1975, Carlson 1981), beginning with the "A-adverb" data sets in (6)-(10). Based on such data, it is standardly assumed and occasionally argued that the *any* of (2), however its relation to the NPI *any* of (1) is characterized, is itself a universal:

In its Free Choice (FC) incarnation, *[any]* is licensed in modal and characterizing statements where it is interpreted as a wide scope universal. (Dayal 1998: 434)

As pointed out by Horn (1972), free choice *any*, LIKE OTHER UNIVERSAL DETERMINERS, may be modified by adverbs like *almost* or *nearly*.

(Hoeksema 1983: 409, emphasis added)

Unfortunately, the full range of evidence has tended to point in various directions at the same time, leading one authority to the desperate move of endorsing a two-*any* theory in one chapter of his UCLA dissertation only to embrace a unified analysis in the very next chapter.

This perennial how-many-*any*s debate first flared up over a century ago as one of many fronts (see Horn 1990) in the global philosophical conflict between Sir William Hamilton of Edinburgh and Augustus De Morgan:

Our English *"any"* (aenig, anig, Ang.-Sax.) is of a similar origin and signification with the Latin *"ullus"* (unulus), and means, primarily and literally *(even) one, even the least or fewest*. But now...it is of **quodlibetic application**, ranging from the least to greatest; and (to say nothing of extra-logical modes of speech, as interrogation, doubt, conditioning, extenuation, intension, &c.) is exclusively adapted to *negation*.

(Hamilton 1858: 615, emphasis added)

The word 'any' is affirmed by Hamilton to be exclusively adapted to negatives. This cannot mean that *any* is unfit to be used in an affirmative: surely *any* one knows better than that...The word *any*, when used in a negative, may have either a universal or a particular meaning...A person who has just dined heartily need not take *any* food

(universal): a convalescent ought not to take *any* food (particular: beef tea, but not pickled salmon). Some will perhaps make it depend upon the verb used...some will make it a question of emphasis...: but the ambiguity is there, let the grammarian and rhetorician treat it as they will... Hamilton implicitly maintained that *any* is always universal. Accordingly, he asserted that 'No X is Y' is properly expressed by 'any X is not any Y'... 'Any fish is not any fish' is false or true, according as the second *any* is universal or particular. Choose what fish you please, it is not *any* fish: turbot is not trout. (De Morgan 1862: 275)

There is a prime ambiguity, it strikes one, about the meaning of any: is-not-any fish and is-not any-fish mean to differ in meaning. (De Morgan 1861: 88-89)

(11') A whale [is-not- **any**] fish (is no fish) vs. (11") A trout [is-not] [**any** -fish]
          NPI   **FC**

Contra De Morgan, Horn, Hoeksema, Dayal, and their cronies, however, there is evidence from other diagnostics than the distribution of A-adverbs that suggests FC *any* may not be as universal as it first appears. It has been recognized for some time (see Horn 1972, Le Grand 1974, Carlson 1981, among others) that *any* occurs in free-choice imperatives without universal force:

(12)   a. Pick any card.
       b. Promise her anything, but give her Arpège.

These instances of imperative-licensed *any* are requests rather than commands and fail to map directly onto a true universal or a simple existential; (12a) is not a request to pick EVERY card, but it is more generous than a command to pick SOME card.[1] As for the vintage commercial directive in (12b), my intuition is that the viewer could have complied with the suggestion without actually making ANY promises; the sense is close to "It doesn't matter what, if anything, you promise her, so long as you fork over the Arpège." Both the not-mattering and the lack of existential commitment are crucial to the understanding of FC *any*.

Secondly, FC *any*, like NPI *any* but unlike true universals, has never learned to float. What we can call A-class determiners *(all, both,* sometimes *each)* float off object or subject

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[1]Unlike Quine's (1960: 138) celebrated minimal pairs invoked as evidence for his universalist wide-scope analysis of *any,*

(i)   I do not know {any/every} poem.

(ii)   If {any/every} member contributes, I'll be surprised.

there is no obvious operator in (12a) whose scope can naturally be taken to vary with respect to that of the determiner.

NPs, while E-class determiners *(some, either, many,* and cardinals) do not; both *any*'s pattern with the E-class operators:[2]

(i) OBJECT POSITION: I {didn't/can} see [DET of them] _____:
                                 |_____/

(13)   a. I didn't see them {all/both}.
       b. *I didn't see them {some/any/either/six}.

(14)   a. I can see them {all/both}.
       b. *I can see them {some/any/either/six}.

(ii) SUBJECT POSITION: [DET of them] ___ {didn't/can} ___ see me:
                 |_____/_____/

(15)   a. They didn't {all/each/both} see me.
       b. *They didn't {some/any/either/six} see me.

(16)   a. They can {all/each/both} see me.
       b. *They can {some/any/either/six} see me.

(17)   a. They {all/each/both} can see me.
       b. *They {some/any/either/six} can see me.

Even more significantly, as shown in (18), post-nominal modifiers *at all* and *whatsoever* reinforce both NPI and FC *any*, but (save *no,* the neg-incorporated alter ego of *any*) no other operator, universal or existential (cf. Horn 1972, Zwartz 1995) can be so modified:

(18)   a. I didn't see {anybody/*everybody/*somebody} whatsoever.
       b. I saw {*everyone/*someone/no one} at all.
       c. {Anybody/*Everybody/*Somebody} whatsoever can come to the party.
       d. If {anybody [NPI or FC!]/*everybody/*somebody} at all can swim
           the channel, I can.

II. The indefinite analysis

But if FC *any* is NOT a universal after all, what is it? And whither then the NPI/FC "ambiguity"? In recent years, a number of scholars have converged on the suggestion that both *any*'s must be regarded as indefinites (cf. Heim 1982; Haspelmath 1993, 1997) of one sort or another. In particular, given the data in (18), there must be some semantic property unifying the two *any*'s while distinguishing them from other operators that lack this property.

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[2]Other factors, including syntactic ones, are involved here; note that the undisputed champion of the universals, *every,* is also a non-floater, and that the quasi-parenthetical phrase *Det of them* is often available regardless of the semantics of the determiner: *They can, {all/some/any/every one} of them, come to the party.*

We can take *whatsoever* and *at all* to favor QUODLIBETIC contexts à la Hamilton, explicating this in terms of Vendler's (1967) notion of a blank warranty, Kadmon & Landman's (1993) operation of widening, Fine's arbitrariness (cf. Tovena & Jayez, to appear), or a related notion. Following Fauconnier (1975a,b, 1979), I have argued elsewhere in joint work with Young-Suk Lee (Y. S. Lee & Horn 1994, Horn & Y. S. Lee 1995a) that both *any*'s are end-of-scale indefinites (= 'a ___, even the Xest'), where indefiniteness is treated non-quantificationally as in Heim (1982). NPI *any* is a minimal element on a quantity scale, FC *any* a generic indefinite associated with a kind scale.[3] The impossibility of appending *whatsoever* or *at all* to a simple indefinite generic (*{Any/*A} linguist whatsoever can follow this argument*) is attributable to the non-quodlibetic character of ordinary generics that lack the *even*-like properties of scalar endpoints. Similarly, we can take *{absolutely/almost} any man* (vs. *{absolutely/almost} a man*) as representing *a man, it {absolutely/almost} doesn't matter which*.

The indefinite analysis of FC *any*, however it is to be implemented, is not precisely novel. For Jespersen (1924: 203), the generic singular indefinite *a* ('A cat is not as vigilant as a dog') is 'a weaker *any*', in which 'one ("a") dog is taken as representative of the whole class'. Perlmutter (1970) independently proposes to co-derive *any* and generic *a*, and while Burton-Roberts (1976: §4) correctly rejects his argument in the light of the different distribution of the two determiners, the key point is that *any* cannot be EQUATED to generic *a* precisely because it is a STRONGER *a*, one incorporating the end-of-scale meaning paraphrasable by *even*.

The *there*-insertion pattern, revisited in (19), can now be seen as excluding as excluding FC *any* not because it's universal but because it's generic; while NPI *any* patterns with other existentials and indefinites in allowing *there*, FC *any* patterns with other generic indefinites in excluding it.

(19) a. There isn't {a cat/any cat} that eats peaches.
   There isn't {a thing/anything} you can do about it.
   (≠ 'You can't do just anything about it')
 b. There is a cat that eats meat. (≠ generic 'A cat eats meat')
   There are beavers that build dams. (≠ generic 'Beavers build dams')
   *There is any cat that eats meat. (cf. 'Any cat eats meat')
   *There are any beavers that (can) build dams.
   *There is anything you can do around here.

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[3]See now Israel (1999) for a parallel treatment of indefinite *some* in terms of quantity and kind scales. Israel convincingly defends a "responsible polysemy" for both *some* and *any*.

On the other hand, exceptive clauses introduced with *but, save, except*, and their analogues can only be hosted by universals:

(20) {everybody/nobody/*somebody} but Kim
   {all/*most/*many/*three/*some/none} of my friends but Chris...
   everything but the kitchen sink
   No man but a blockhead ever wrote except for money. (Dr. Johnson)

This constraint on exceptives has in fact been recognized since the Middle Ages:

An exceptive word [e.g. *præter*] indicates a relationship of a part actually existing in a whole to its whole.
(Peter of Spain, *Syncategoreumata*, Tract. IV, 7; de Rijk 1992: 171)
An exceptive proposition is never properly formed unless its non-exceptive counterpart is a universal proposition. Hence, 'A man except Socrates is running' is not properly formed.   (Ockham 1980: 144-5: Summa Logica, II:18)

But both *any*s host well-formed exceptives—suggesting that (contrary to the results derived from the other diagnostics surveyed here) not only FC *any* but NPI *any* is a universal!

(21) a. I'll vote for anyone but Bill.   (FC *any*)
 b. I wouldn't vote for anyone but Bill.   (NPI *any*)

Dayal (1998) has recently cited the participation of (21a) in the pattern of (20) as evidence for the universal status of FC *any*, without acknowledging the fact that NPI *any* would also have to be reckoned as a universal by the evidence of (21b).

I would maintain, however, that what renders (21a) acceptable is the fact that the assertion of a free-choice predication of this type typically conveys the truth of the corresponding universal. That this is not an ad hoc stipulation to rescue a particular analysis of *any* is demonstrated by the observation (cf. Horn 1989: 346) that *but*-clauses, excluded from ordinary wh-questions, are at home in rhetorical "queclaratives" (Sadock 1971), i.e. interrogatives standardly used to convey universal negatives. Thus (22a) is impossible, but (22b) is fine, since it induces a short-circuited implicature that nobody else could have pulled off this feat.

(22) a. #Who but Bill is supporting Al's candidacy?
 b. Who but Al Gore could have delivered such a boring speech?
   ($+>_{SCI}$ Nobody but Al Gore...)

Another class of examples in which exceptives are hosted by semantic non-universals is illustrated by the thousands of annual hits Nexis provides for constructions of the form *little but...* or *little except...;* the sense is essentially that of 'nothing but/except...' A sampler appears in (23):

(23) Landowners could do little but accept their fate.
      We are achieving little but the increased and forced evacuation of the ethnic Albanians.
      With little except morbid thoughts to occupy his time,...
      ...leaving little but mangled bodies in his wake.
      ...while bank and building society deposit accounts offer little except safety.
      ...an artful yet provocative cover for her all-Bach CD in which she appears to be wearing
           little except her violin.

The appropriate generalization, pace Ockham and Dayal, is that an exceptive proposition is never properly formed unless its non-exceptive counterpart is CONVENTIONALLY USED TO EXPRESS a universal proposition. This also explains why (21b) is well-formed, given its conventional use as a means for signalling a universal negative.[4]

(24) I wouldn't vote for **anyone** but Bill = I would vote for **no one** but Bill.

Another potential argument for the universal character of FC *any* is worth heading off at the pass here. FC *any*-headed NPs line up with universals in introducing downward entailing contexts that host NPIs:[5]

(25) a. {Any/Every/*Some} dog that has any self-respect never befriends a cat.
      b. {Any/All/*Many} modern linguists who have ever read any Jespersen will be familiar
           with this argument.

But, as we would expect, the same property is shared by non-scalar generic (but not specific) indefinites[6]; (26b) expresses a true proposition, but not one that can be expressed that way:

[4]Another instance of a universal-negative-implicating host is the attested example in (i), where the reader is to draw the inference that no Western leader other than the Italian Prime Minister would shmooze Brecht with the President of Iran.

(i) I wonder whether any Western political leader but Romano Prodi would discuss the works
        of Bertolt Brecht with Persident Khatami.
      (Anthony Lewis, "In the Premier League", New York Times op-ed piece, 13 July 1998, A17)

[5]As discussed by LeGrand (1975), Dayal (1995, 1998), the appearance of a relative clause in an *any* nominal will often tend to increase the acceptability of FC *any* in a context lacking an overt modal, a phenomenon LeGrand dubbed SUBTRIGGING. Cf. also Giannakidou & Horn (in prep.) for a different approach to the subtrigging effect.

(26) a. A dog that has any self-respect never befriends a cat.
      b. *A dog I once owned that had any self-respect befriended my cat.
      c. Linguists who have ever read any Jespersen will will be familiar with this argument.
      d. Persons who have ever had a surgical implant may be affected by the
           Dow Chemical Bankruptcy.   (Public service announcement, 9/243/96)

It is thus not the putative universal character of *any*-NPs that is responsible for their DE-ness and NPI licensing but rather their status as generic or characterizing nominals (cf. Krifka et al. 1995: 13-14).

We have secured a location squarely within the camp of what we can label the QUASI-UNIVOCAL EXISTENTIALISTS, or more accurately (if less colorfully) the INDEFINITISTS. On this view, *any* is an indefinite-plus, whose use is bound up with some aspect of hearer's unrestricted freedom to choose from a set of alternatives in identifying referents or witnesses to fill out the proposition.[7] While Vendler is the patron saint of this sect, some of its other adherents appear in (27), annotated in brutally truncated form in the hope that interested readers will hunt down the original sources for the insightful details.

(27) (QUASI-)UNIVOCAL EXISTENTIALISTS:

      Hamilton (1858) (*any* is a "QUODLIBETIC" operator that "means, primarily and literally *(even) one,*
         even the least or fewest")
      Jespersen (1933) (*any* "indicates one or more, no matter which")
      Bolinger (1960), (1977) (across the board, *any* expresses 'whatsoever, no matter which'; modifying
         clauses may serve to "restrict THE 'WHATEVERNESS' OF *ANY*")
      Vendler (1967) (*any* as signal of non-presuppositional context, indicating CHOICE or
         "a BLANK WARRANTY FOR CONDITIONAL PREDICTIONS")

[6]Anastasia Giannakidou points out that generic indefinites like (26a) also share with *any* nominals the lack of the veridical or existential premise associated with specific indefinites like (26b), viz. that a dog with the identified property does in fact exist.

[7]As noted above, the "plus" component in Y. S. Lee & Horn (1994) is the end-of-scale semantics associated with *even;* in Kadmon & Landman (1993) it is a combination of their notions of contextual widening and logical strengthening. More recently, Rullmann (1996) has noted that these two proposals, while conceptually related, are crucially distinct; he suggests that they are appropriate for characterizing what he terms *even*-NPIs and *wh*-NPIs respectively. Space precludes a more detailed consideration of Rullmann's provocative paper here, for the purposes of this paper the similarity between the Kadmon & Lee & Horn (1994)

Fauconnier (1975a,b, 1979) (*any* is a marker of endpoints on contextually derived pragmatic scales; NPI *any* defined via scale-reversal)

Davison (1980) (*any* is a univocal existential that may convey a generic meaning through conversational implicature)

Sommers (1982) ("*any* is not a word of quantity in its own right but a distribution indicator that goes proxy for either 'some' or 'every'")

Haspelmath (1993) (*any* patterns with cross-linguistic free-choice indefinites)

Kadmon & Landman (1993) (*any* is a Kamp-Heim indefinite [cf. Heim 1982] lacking quantificational force that triggers widening/strengthening)

Jennings (1994) (*any* is essentially non-quantificational and non-specific, carrying "the warrant or expectation that a certain sort of challenge will receive the reply 'even that one'"; Jennings refers to Fauconnier 1979's scalar analysis)

Lee & Horn (1994), Horn & Lee (1995a), Horn (to appear) (similar to above, but with NPI-*any* and FC-*any* "ordinary" and generic indefinites, respectively, that incorporate a scalar endpoint, i.e. *any* = *a* + *even*)

Dayal (1995) (*any* basically an indefinite à la K&L, but may have inherent quantificational force; requires non-existence and contextual vagueness à la Vendler)

Zwarts (1995) (*any* as non-veridical operator: NPI *any* occurs in those non-veridical contexts that are DE, FC *any* in those that are UE or non-monotonic)

C. Lee (1996) (In a unified account of negative polarity and free choice expressed by Kor. *amu* and Eng. *any*, the key notion is concession by arbitrary or disjunctive choice, based in turn on the notion of indefiniteness and the triggering of a scale, à la Fauconnier 1975b)

Haspelmath (1997) (*any* as marker of low point on scale, à la Fauconnier: a non-reversed scale for FC *any* and a reversed scale for NPI *any*)

Lahiri (1998) (The compositional semantics of a class of polarity sensitive items in Hindi, consisting of a weak indefinite + the scalar particle *bhii* 'even', motivates the behavior of such expressions as both NPIs and FC items; the analysis is 'very similar in its essentials' to that of Lee & Horn 1994)

Tovena (1998), Tovena & Jayez (to appear) (*any* in both NPI and FC uses is an abstract scalar item that is neither indefinite nor quantificational as such, but corresponds to the notion of arbitrary objects)

To this tableau we can assimilate traditional lexicographic statements of the distribution of *any*, such as that of the OED, which contains a single entry, including both NPI and FC occurrences, emphasizes the central semantic role of 'indifference as to the particular one or ones that may be selected', and provides such glosses as the following:

Has any Englishman seen it?	'...an Englishman—I care not which'
If it do any harm	'...harm, no matter of what kind'

III. A-adverbs revisited: almost a useful diagnostic?

Not everyone has succumbed to the indefinist intifada. In recent work, Tovena & Jayez (to appear) and Dayal (1998) have argued against the indefinite family of analyses of FC *any* on a variety of grounds, of which I shall concentrate here on two. (See Giannakidou & Horn in prep. for a more comprehensive evaluation of Dayal's evidence.) While endorsing the end-of-scale character of *any* depicted in Lee & Horn (1994), Tovena & Jayez (to appear; cf. Tovena 1998) argue that the FC *any* of (28a)

(28) a. Mary read any book which was on the reading list.
 b. ??Mary read any book which happened to be on her desk.

cannot be an indefinite because

(i) 'It is unexpected that non-accidental modification [as in (28a) vs. (28b)] definitely improves this type of example', where 'the modification of a noun is accidental whenever it refers to a contingent property of the entities which make up the denotation of the noun.'

(ii) We can insert *almost/practically* in (28a): 'These adverbs are considered universal quantifier modifiers, and their acceptability in this context does not square well with a characterization of *any* as an indefinite.'

On (i), the putative restriction of *any* statements to non-accidental modification (see also Dayal 1998), the facts are less clear than they may appear. I don't find (29a,b)—with future time reference—particularly implausible,

(29) a. I {will/promise to} read any book which happens to be on my desk.
 b. I'll eat any food you {happen to/decide to} cook for me.

and I would suggest that any feeling of restriction attaching to (28) can be reduced to the well-known implicature of causal connectedness for conditionals, given that *any*-statements characteristically represent lawlike generalizations with conditional—and often specifically counterfactual—force that survive sporadic counterexemplification (cf. Vendler 1967, as well

as Horn 1997 and references cited therein), so that the *any*-statements of (28a, b) are understood as the corresponding conditionals in (30):

(30) a. If a book was on the reading list, Mary read it. (LAWLIKE)

    b. If a book is on Mary's desk, she will read it. (NON-LAWLIKE)

More significant, at least historically, is the claim in (ii). Like Tovena & Jayez, Dayal (1998: 449) echoes legions of scholars dating back to Horn (1972) and his fellow-travelers in taking the modifiability of FC *any* but not NPI *any* by *almost* and *absolutely* as evidence for an actual universal quantifier in the representation of the former (see (7), (8) above). But just how reliable is this evidence? With Young-Suk Lee (Lee & Horn 1994, Horn & Lee 1995a), I have proposed an intervention constraint ruling out (certain) sequences of [NPI licenser... A-adverb...*any*$_{NPI}$], on the model of similar constructs advanced for different purposes by LeGrand (1974) and, independently, Linebarger (1980). In its most recent version (with revisions necessitated by some observations of Jack Hoeksema; cf. Horn, to appear), this constraint has the following form:

[IC'] No adverb with quantificational force may intervene between a polarity item and
    its trigger if it semantically combines with the NPI in question.

Essentially (although see the above work for details), the constraint is designed to distinguish (31a,b).

(31) a. *I don't like {absolutely/almost} anyone here.

    b. I like {absolutely/almost} no one here.

It correctly predicts that if NPI *any* is licensed by an approximative adverb with negative force, such an item must be interpreted with the approximative element taking wide scope with respect to negation. Thus (32a) is possible because *hardly* is analyzable as *almost NEG*, not as *NEG almost*. (see the related analysis of Partee 1986, which makes the same point).

(32) a. I like hardly anyone here.   (= 'I like almost no one here')

    b. %I don't like hardly anyone here.

Note also that while some speakers accept the negative concord-type structure in (32b), this is crucially not the contradictory negation of standard (32a), but rather its logical equivalent. Since it is the *hardly (=almost not)* that licenses negative polarity *any* here, the intervention constraint is not violated as it is in (31a).

But even with this modification it is by no means obvious that the usual understanding of *almost* and *absolutely* as diagnostics for FC (and against NPI) *any* can survive.[8] Nor are these two adverbs on all fours. Notice first that (as Partee 1986 has observed) the actual restriction on the occurrence of *almost* and *nearly* is that the modified determiner be interpretable as a precise value, either in a relative set-inclusion sense (as in the case with universals and other 'exact' partitions) or in a more absolute sense (as with cardinals):

(33) a. I could solve almost {all/any/half/none/50/*many/*most/*few}
      of the problems.

    b. Coors Extra Gold is brewed for nearly 52 days. [radio commercial]

In this respect, *virtually* might be a better choice for an approximative diagnostic, although speakers differ with respect to its cooccurrence properties in non-universal contexts like those of (33).

As for *absolutely*, it modifies not just the universals of (34a,b) but scalar endpoints in general, as seen in (34c-f) (and discussed in Lakoff 1972: 632-33 and Horn 1972 §2.3):

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[8]Doubts about the reliability of the *almost/absolutely* diagnostics in fact creep into the work of the card-carrying ambiguist Greg Carlson, who—after trotting out the usual suspects in (i) which permit dual readings modulo the intonation contour

(i) a. If anyone can move that stone, I'll be amazed.

    b. Does anyone like Bob?

    c. I doubt that anyone could be at the door.

       (Carlson 1981: 13; cf. De Morgan 1861, Jespersen 1933, Bolinger 1960, Horn 1972)

—calls attention to the examples in (ii),

(ii) a. For (almost) anyone to leave the room now would be a disaster.

    a'. For anyone to (ever) leave this room (yet) would be a disaster.

    b. Bob is unlikely to kick anyone.

    c. Shooting at anyone ought to be illegal.

    d. For Bob to eat anything now would be impossible.

commenting that while these contexts appear to be existential, licensing the presence of NPI *ever* and *yet*, they are also curiously compatible with *absolutely/almost* and yield 'no detectable ambiguity' between NPI/FC senses (Carlson 1981: 13).

(34) a. Absolutely {everybody/nobody/*somebody} can win.

   b. Absolutely {all/no(ne)/*some/*many/*few} of them can go.

   c. It's absolutely {necessary/certain/impossible/*possible/*likely}.

   d. You absolutely {must/can't/mustn't/*may/*can} go.

   e. He absolutely {always/never/*sometimes/*often/*seldom} eats meat.

   f. I absolutely {adore/love/loathe/*like/*dislike} you.

Ditto for its adjectival base: (35a) is possible only if Sam is an overhuge human, not an actual pachyderm, while the modifier in (35b) disambiguates the description of Gloucester's illegitimate son in favor of the evaluative end-of-scale reading.

(35) a. Sam is an absolute elephant.

   b. Edmund is an absolute bastard.

Similarly, the contrast in (36) only makes sense if you know that the Kinsey scale of sexual orientation extendes from 0 for a hide-bound heterosexual to a 6 for the exclusively gay.

(36) a. Chris is an absolute {Kinsey 0/Kinsey 6}.

   b. #Robin is an absolute {Kinsey 2/3/4/5/3.5/3.14159/...}.

As we have seen, FC *any* lacking universal force occurs in imperative contexts; when it does it may be modified by *absolutely, almost,* or *virtually,* as in the "Pick any number" cases:

(37) a. Take almost any member of Congress. You're likely to find an
       adulterous, amoral perjuror.

   b. Pick up almost any article on polarity. You'll find grammaticality judgments
       with which no sane English speaker will agree.

   c. Go into {absolutely/almost/virtually} any restaurant in San Francisco. A "Thank You For Not
       Smoking" sign will be on display.

Such apparent imperatives may lend themselves to an analysis as protases of implicit conditionals, so that e.g. (37c) is read as (38):

(38) If you go into {absolutely/almost/virtually} any restaurant in San Francisco,
       a "Thank You For Not Smoking" sign will be on display.

If so, we would appear to have a case of NPI *any* (licensed by the limited DE-hood of such protases; cf. Heim 1984), where A-adverb modification is nevertheless quite at home. Indeed, with true imperatives like those of (39), where the conditional paraphrase is impossible, modification by *absolutely* is still possible (despite the lack of universal force) but—as noted

by Hoeksema (1983: 409), citing J. McCawley—approximatives tend to be ruled out on pragmatic grounds.[9]

(39) a. Pick a card, {absolutely/#almost} any card.

   b. Take absolutely any number from 1 to 100. Multiply it by 2,...

Indeed, the initial assumption that A-adverbs are excluded from NPI *any* neighborhoods has been directly challenged on occasion, as early as the claim of LeGrand (1974: 394) that "contrary to Horn's predictions", the sentences of (40) are accepted by "most speakers".

(40) a. %If there's absolutely any noise, I'll clear the courtroom.

   b. %If almost anyone has a cold, I catch it.

Supporting this observation are the sentences of (41), where (as in (40a)) the existential *there* rules out any free choice, much less universal, interpretation.

(41) a. "You let me know if there's absolutely anything I can do, OK?"
                              —from television situation comedy, "Seventh Heaven", spring 1998

   b. If there's absolutely anything you need, please don't hesitate to ask.

Along the same lines, notice that the A-adverb *absolutely* is possible in both (42a) and (42b), although predictably only the former allows a *there*-inserted paraphrase:

(42) a. If you eat absolutely `ANY meat, you're not a vegetarian. (NPI any)

   b. If you eat absolutely ˅ANY meat, you're not a kosher Jew. (FC any)

(43) a. If there is absolutely `ANY meat you eat, you're not a vegetarian.

   b. *If there is absolutely ˅ANY meat you eat, you're not a kosher Jew.

The same possibilities can be found with approximative modifiers like *almost* or *virtually*:

(44) a. If you go to bed with almost `ANYone$_{NPI}$, you should use a condom.

   b. If you go to bed with almost ˅ANYone$_{FC}$, you better use two.

In the examples of (40)-(44), the NPI licenser is the protasis of a conditional. What is crucial, though, is that it is not an adjacent negation. Thus consider (45a), contributed by

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[9]Even this mild restriction may be too strong as it stands, judging from the following suggestion from Tom Ferrell's "Eat Streets" column on how to transport oneself to the international culinary cornucopia that is Brooklyn's Montague Street:

To dine on Montague, take almost any train to Borough Hall station: 2, 3, 4, 5, M, N or R.

(New York Times, Sophisticated Traveler Magazine, p. 10, 10 Nov. 1996)

Senator Hatch, where it's the distance of the neg-raised licenser from NPI *any* that favors the appearance of the A-adverb; compare the less acceptable (45b).

(45) a. I don't think there's a jury **almost anywhere** in this country that would convict the President on this if he would come clean...
(Sen. Orrin Hatch [R-Utah] interviewed on Larry King Live, CNN, 12/11/98, on why Clinton should feel free to acknowledge having lied to the grand jury)

    b. There's no jury (?*almost) anywhere in this country...

Similarly, in the attested example in (46), the licenser is a sentential negation outside the PP environment containing the NPI and its A-adverbial modifier.

(46) I've never been a part of anything like this. I am **not** a rabid fan of **almost anything**.
(Jennifer Watson, Channel 3 News, Hartford, covering celebration for University of Connecticut's NCAA men's college basketball championship, March , 1999)

Besides remoteness (as in (45a) and (46)) and covertness (as in the conditionals of (40)-(44)), another variable conducive to the *[not almost any]* sequence is partitivity. Speakers I have surveyed agree in finding (47a,b) far preferable to (47c,d), although perhaps not entirely impeccable.

(47) a. It was so windy, the quarterbacks couldn't complete almost any of their passes.
    b. She doesn't like almost any of her teachers.
    c. *He doesn't have almost any friends.
    d. *She hasn't taken almost any syntax.

Downward entailing environments introduced by negative predicates also freely co-occur with *almost* or *absolutely any*, as seen in the examples of (48):

(48) a. Ken Starr **lacks absolutely any** sense of {fairness/proportion/humor/...}.
    b. [Supreme Court nominee] Ginsburg is the perfect spite nominee—a man whose foremost qualification is his **lack of almost any**.
(Washington Post , 4 Nov. 1987, A23)
    c. Muresan is a polished offensive player who **lacks almost any** defensive dexterity.
(Sacramento Bee , 23 Feb. 1994, C1)
    d. As if to demonstrate once and for all that the lower the fat content, the lower the gastronomic appeal of a product, the new 5% Symphonia **lacks almost any** trace of charm. So lacking in firmness that I found it almost liquidy, and with an

absolute minimum of flavor, I frankly cannot understand why anyone would waste a good bagel and a fine slice of salmon by combining it with this cheese.
(Jerusalem Post , 17 July 1997, Features, p. 9)

    e. The islands are not that cheap and they have **lost almost any** natural West Indian feel, but...
(Financial Times London , 16 Oct. 1993, Travel XII)

    f. A highlight of David's City is the so-called "stepped structure" uncovered by Yigal Shiloh in the 1980s. The late archeologist believed that the structure was the underpinning of the citadel built by David in the 10th century BCE. It was a sensational finding in an area which previous archeologists had declared to be **bereft of virtually any remains at all** from David's City, let alone a monumental structure.
(Jerusalem Post , 1 Sept. 1995, Features, p. 14)

We are dealing here with NPI *any* in well-behaved DE contexts; if Muresan lacks dexterity he lacks defensive dexterity but not vice versa. Notice also that the substitution of *have, retain,* or *blessed with* for *lack, lose,* or *bereft of* renders these *any*'s impossible. Further, Hoeksema & Klein (1995) point out that the corresponding negative predicates in Dutch license *enig,* a cognate of *any* that lacks any free choice occurrences; cf. Krifka (1995), Horn & Lee (1995b) for more on licensing by negative predicates.

We conclude, then, that it is not NPI *any* that bars either *absolutely* or *almost* and its approximative mates, but adjacent negation per se. This conclusion is buttressed by the evidence from Nexis hits summarized in (49), demonstrating that instances in which overt negation immediately precedes *almost* and *absolutely* are vanishingly rare; in the terminology of van der Wouden (1996), the A-adverbs are weak positive polarity items. (See Klein 1997: 87 for a similar observation and a proposed explanation.)

(49) Nexis cites of structures with negated A-adverbs and *any*:
    not almost any: 0
    not virtually any: 0
    not absolutely any: 1 (in a statement of the President of Honduras)
        vs. **not just any:** 100/month (e.g. in Oct. 1998)
    wasn't almost any: 0
        vs. **wasn't just any:** 765
    wasn't almost: 79 (but see explanation below)
        (cf. **wasn't exactly:** 175-200/month (e.g. 187 in Oct. 1998))

While *almost* does indeed occur in the apparent scope of negation, as attested by the 79 instances of *wasn't almost* (and comparable figures for *didn't almost* and parallel

constructions), almost all of the somewhat relevant examples—ignoring those in which the negation ends one sentence and the approximative begins the next—involve contexts of double and/or metalinguistic negation, thus exhibiting a characteristic property of PPIs (cf. Baker 1970, Horn 1989: 494-99). A few illustrations will suffice:

(49') Plymouth Canton Coach Dan Young knew his Chiefs had to be almost perfect Wednesday if they were to upset the best team in the state. Canton (22-2) played well, but it **wasn't almost** perfect as top-ranked Detroit Pershing defeated No. 76 Canton, 73-57. (Detroit News, 3/14/96)

"The game was almost secondary to the moment that was the end of the Hartford Whalers," coach Paul Maurice said. "Actually, it **wasn't almost** secondary—it was completely secondary. (Hartford Courant, 4/14/97)

[Review of "Almost Acoustic" pop music concert:] Furthermore, depite the presence of a couple of acoustic guitars, Beck's harmonica and the trumpter in Cake, this show **wasn't almost** acoustic—it wasn't acoustic at all. (Los Angeles Times, 12/16/96)

Someone should wake Wilkinson up to the fact that he **didn't almost** win that match, but rather Boris Becker almost lost it by very obviously playing below-par tennis. (New York Times, 9/6/87)

Last year I had $10 on Scott Goodyear to win the Indy 500 and darned if he **didn't almost** do it.. (Toronto Star, 5/30/98)

"I feel different now. I feel new," [tennis player Mary] Pierce said. "It's almost like an overnight thing, but at the same time it's been gradual. I really do think that whatever doesn't kill you makes you stronger." Not that it **didn't almost** come to that. For too long, Pierce has been defined by her abusive father. (Los Angeles Times, 5/25/97)

Thus if *not almost any* is ruled out, this tells us less about the incompatibility of *almost* and NPI *any* or that of negation and FC *any* (cf. Partee 1986 and Dayal 1998) than about the incompatibility of *not* and *almost* .

Especially striking in the data in (49) is the contrast between the freely occurring *not just any* and the virtually non-occurring *[not A-adv any]* sequences, where A-adv = a member of the now familiar set *{almost, practically, virtually; absolutely}*. This contrast is particularly clear in subject position:

(50) Not ⱽANYbody could have done this.
Not just anybody could have done this.
*Not absolutely anybody could have done this.
*Not {almost/virtually/practically} anybody could have done this.

It is to the *not just any* construction and its implications that we shall now turn, after presenting a tabular summary of our revisionist views on the diagnostics:

Construction	∃	any$_{NPI}$	∀	any$_{FC}$	comments/codicils
there-insertion	√	√	*	*	diagnostic for weak/indefinite values; generic a also * here
Quantifier-floating	*	*	√	*	diagnostic for true universals only
exceptives (Q but/except NP)	*	√	√	√	OK if prop. conventionally used to convey universal
heads with DE restrictors (Det N wh...NPI...)	*	*	√	√	generic indefinite heads also license NPIs
whatsoever; at all	*	√	*	√	diagnostic for indiscriminacy (end-of-scale indefinites)
absolutely	*	(*)	√	√	diagnostic for end-of-scale predications; blocked by adjacent overt negation
almost, virtually	*	(*)	√	√	diagnostic for end-of-scale or (with *almost*) exact values; blocked by adjacent negation

Table 1

. Free choice and the indiscriminative: not just any indefinite

On the account defended here, and more fully in Lee & Horn 1994 and other work cited
ove, FC *any* is neither an existential nor a universal quantifier/determiner; it is a non-
ecific scalar indefinite whose semantics involves not only ATTRIBUTIVITY or NON-
'ISODICITY (cf. Giannakidou 1998) but also a quality I have called INDISCRIMINACY (cf.
endler 1967, Haspelmath 1993, Jennings 1994, Horn to appear). This notion of
discriminacy is reinforced by *just* , especially in the context of the anti-indiscriminative *not
st any* construction where it often serves as a disambiguator. Note that (contra the claim of
arlson 1981) the *any* appears here in its free choice incarnation; thus, reprising De Morgan's
inimal pair of fishes (cf. (11', 11") above), only the free-choice version supports a *just*
tervention.

51) a. A whale [is-not- **any**] fish vs. A trout [is-not] [any -fish]
         NPI   FC

    b. A whale [is-not-(*just)-any$_{NPI}$-fish] vs. A trout [is-not] just [any$_{FC}$-fish]

or a more contemporary example of a disambiguating interventionist *just,* consider (52a),
/here the absence of *just* would turn Marta's free choice manifesto into the NPI credo of
elibacy in (52b).

(52) a. I don't want to go to bed with just anyone anymore. I have to be attracted to them sexually.

      (Marta, in 1994 Whit Stillman film "Barcelona")

    b. I don't want to go to bed with anyone anymore.

Along the same lines, compare the significantly distinct contents of the renunciations in (53):

(53) a. I wouldn't marry anyone.   [renounces CONNUBIALITY]

    b. I wouldn't marry everyone.   [renounces POLYGAMY]

    c. I wouldn't marry just anyone.   [renounces INDISCRIMINACY]

In these examples, an unnegated *(just) any* would emphasizes 'not-mattering', as in the French
series of *n'importe* forms *(n'importe qui/quoi/comment/...}).*[10]

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[10]LeGrand (1975: 32) takes all instances of untriggered, obligatorily stressed *any* to derive from a special lexical item, a
separate quantifier *just any* with an optionally deleted *just,* but I see no compelling evidence for this arrant violation of the
Modified Occam's Razor principle.

Some additional attested examples of what Haspelmath (1993: 187; 1997: 189-92) calls
anti-depreciatives, reconstructed in Horn (to appear) as anti-indiscriminatives, are given
below. Note that a paraphrase of the form 'any old X' is frequently available; cf. Horn (to
appear) for additional discussion and examples.[11] While a disambiguating *just* is useful in the
vicinity of a DE licenser to clarify the orientation of the relevant scale, it is not obligatory,
especially when prosody or diacritics (as in (57) or (58)) can accomplish the same effect;
where no disambiguator is present, the result is the garden path NPI reading induced in (59)
and (60).

(54) This isn't just ANY sport utility vehicle.   [from Acura commercial]
      (≈ *not just any old...;* neither universal nor existential)

(55) When our spirits most need a lift, just any old frock won't do.
           (Yale Herald, 26 Jan. 1996, courtesy Ton van der Wouden)

(56) He disapproves that I allow just anyone to come into my building.

           (Susanna Moore (1995), *In the Cut,* p. 100)

(57) A: I'm not supposed to be talking to anybody about this case.
    B: First of all, I'm not ⱽanyone. I'm a licensed dealer in celebrity collectibles.

        (dialogue from episode of ABC television series "Murder One", Dec. 1996)

(58) I use "coke" to mean any cola-based soft drink (coca cola, pepsi cola, RC), but
    I would never use it to refer to *any* soft drink (coke = 7-up). I'm amazed that anyone would say
    coke, when they mean 7-up.

        (posting on American Dialect Society e-mail list, Re: pop and soda, 6 Dec. 1995)

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[11]In Modern Greek, one language not included in Haspelmath's roster of anti-depreciatives, Anastasia Giannakidou points
out (p.c.) that the *(not) just any* reading is brought out either by *aplos* 'simply' modifying a FC (but not NPI) item or by the
combination of the indefinite *enas* 'a, one' with a free choice nominal, as in (i).

    (i) Dhen thelo   na   penderfto   enan opjondhipote.

        not   want ..2SG SUBJUNC marry.1SG a   FC-person

        'I don't want to marry just anybody'

Crucially, the sequence *kathe(nan) opjondhipote* 'just every(body)' is ruled out with universal *kathe* 'every'/*kathenan*
'everybody'.

(59) Q: May striking employees picket or demonstrate anywhere?
      A: No. Striking employeees and their supporters may picket or otherwise demonstrate peacefully on City sidewalks...No picketing, demonstrating, congregating or otherwise gathering inside a University building will be permitted at any time.
      [Yale adminstrator Peter Vallone, "Questions and Answers For Yale University Employees", memo to Yale university employees concerning response to imminent strike, 25 Jan. 1996]

(60) Don't labor under the impression that money can buy anything.
                          (Horoscope for Taurus in San Francisco Chronicle, 23 May 1974)

The indiscriminacy of FC *any* that *not just any* serves to reject is especially salient in an unusual construction that Jennings terms SUPPLEMENTARY *any*. Citing the examples in (61),

(61) a. I think she went to Lake Chapala deliberately to find a man. Any man.
                                                                (from Ross MacDonald)

      b. Suddenly she hoped that someone, anyone—man or woman—would see her...
                                                                (from Joseph Wambaugh)

      c. I am standing here only until a policeman, *any* policeman, turns up.
      d. I am looking for a bicycle, *any* bicycle, that works.

Jennings (1994: 191) describes this construction within the scalar framework developed by Fauconnier (1975a,b, 1979) and exploited in the Lee & Horn (1994) treatment of FC *any*:

> What this use illustrates...is a general feature of 'any', not brought out in Vendler's account, that to use it is to warrant an expectation that a certain sort of challenge will receive the reply 'even that one'. Consider whatever scale you please (some scale may have been situationally suggested) on which to place policemen: slovenliness, fastidiousness, brutality, ineffectualness, dishonesty, scrupulousness. Consider the policeman that you would place at the extreme of the chosen scale. That one will do... A bicycle howsoever rickety? What about this penny farthing that I'm taking to the museum? That will do...

Supplementary *any* illustrates that the apparent universal qualities of FC *any*, if they are present at all, are clearly epiphenomenal:[12]

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[12]Cf. the on-line OED entry for *any*, I.1.c.:

> The universality of 'any'...does not always entail representation as a universal quantifier and is derivative in character, deriving by monotonicity along all chosen scales. If even the oldest (least comfortable, most perilous, etc.) bicycle will do, then a bicycle in less extreme position (newer, more comfortable, safer) will also do.
>   (Jennings 1994: 191-2)

The crucial character of such cases is that a particularizing indefinite—*a* or *some*—primes the generalizing *any* in a veridical (non-modal and non-DE) context, while no priming by a universal (**everyone...someone*) is possible. Additional examples (from a larger inventory in Horn, to appear) are given in (62), with relevant operators highlighted:

(62) Caudell hoped someone, anyone would speak up and greet her by her right name.
                                            (Harry Turtledove (1992), *Guns of the South*, p. 436)

The graffiti was intense, and brilliant; an angry, aggressive plaint of garish color on almost every surface. Somebody see me! Anybody!
                                            (Robert B. Parker (1995), *Thin Air*)

Since early summer...Bob Dole has been trying to do something, anything, to alter the shape of a Presidential campaign whose basic configuration has not changed since the end of the primary elections.
                          ("No Easy Explanations for Dole's Perot Gambit", New York Times, 25 Aug. 1996)

Especially striking as a model of indiscriminacy is an example in which the scalar endpoint (the 'even that one will do' of Jennings 1994) is overtly instantiated rather than just tacitly invoked:

All she could think was that she would rather be someone, anyone, else: the skinny Oriental woman rocked to a nap across from her, or the woman further down dressed in dirty animal skins and reeking of urine.
                          (from *Anagrams*, a novel by Lorrie Moore, 1998, p. 215)

While these cases of supplementary *any* are normally characterized by the fact that a bare *any* in the same frame would be either ill-formed or wrongly interpreted, we do occasionally encounter cases of what we might call auto-supplementary *any*, although the effect is often a self-conscious one of metalinguistic game-playing. The result in each case is a heightened

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In affirmative sentences [*any*] asserts concerning a being or thing of the sort named, without limitation as to which, and thus constructively of *every* one of them, since every one may in turn be taken as a representative: thus 'any chemist will tell you'...

indiscriminacy; in the *any CN* couple of the first example below, for instance, the narrator's wife might (as well) have been *n'importe quelle femme* to him, and he *n'importe quelle homme* to her.

(63) We made love, fiercely, in the dark, out of our estrangement, as strangers. She was faceless to me, she closed her eyes and masked her face, so that she seemed any woman, nameless and multitude. And I knew she closed her eyes so that I was any man, in the dark,...

(Marilyn Sides (1996), "Kites!", from *The Island of the Mapmaker's Wife and Other Tales,* p. 63)

Where "Girls Town" captures the hysterical pitch and hyperkinetic rhythm of actual teen-age conversation, the voices in "Foxfire" are generic teenage suburban, without accent or personal inflection. We are in Anywhere, U.S.A., which is really the same place as nowhere on earth.

("Revenge of the Bad Girls and Other Fantasies", New York Times, 23 Aug. 1996)

"So what's your interest in my missing kids?"
"The family of Janice Tanner would like more information. They don't know how to get it. You aren't volunteering much, apparently. So they asked me to do something. What they asked for is anything, actually."
"Well, you're doing anything," Sergeant Bird said.

(from *Girls*, a novel by Frederick Busch, 1997, p. 97)

V. Ambiguous *any*, ambiguous *even*?

One more potential argument for a unified analysis of NPI and FC *any* involves an undesirable consequence that can be drawn from the competing ambiguist analysis. As we have seen, the two *any*'s often appear in the same grammatical frame but with a characteristic prosodic distinction. This a well-known observation and can be traced at least to Jespersen and Bolinger; cf. (64) and (65) respectively.

(64) a. I can't do anything.   [= I can do nothing.]
   b. I can't do ᵛANything   ["pronounced emphatically and with... falling-rising intonation" = There are some things which I can't do] (Jespersen 1933: §17.9₂)

(65) a. I don't want to go anywhere.
   b. I don't want to go anywhere.   ["with rise-fall-rise pitch accent on the last word, meaning 'I don't want to go just anywhere"] (Bolinger 1960: 379)

On our account, the two *any*'s will be distinguished by reference to which scalar endpoint they invoke. Thus consider the superficially ambiguous sentences in (66) and (67).

(66) Can anyone pass that test?
   a. (existential/NPI reading) ≈ Is there anyone who can pass that test?
   b. (universal/FC reading) ≈ Can everyone pass that test?

(67) If she can solve any problem, she'll get a prize.
   a. ('existential') If there is any problem she can solve...
   b. ('universal') If she can solve every problem...

Invoking Fauconnier (1975a,b, 1979), Haspelmath (1997: 117) explicates the "ambiguity" of (67) as follows:

> *Any* each time expresses the low endpoint on a scale: the low endpoint of the non-reversed scale in [(67b)] (= 'the most difficult problem'), and the low endpoint of the reversed scale, i.e. the opposite endpoint, in [(67a)] (= 'the simplest problem'). Thus we can capture both the insight of the univocal universal *any* theory that the two uses of *any* are closely related, and at the same time account for the ambiguity of sentences like [(67)] which motivated the two-*any* theory.

While this treatment is quite close to ours[13], we should also recognize (with Jespersen and Bolinger) the role intonation plays, along with the discourse context, in determining which of these understandings is more plausible in a given utterance of (66) or (67).

But sentences with *even* potentially allow the same two scalar readings, associated with the same two contours, subject to contextual modification as explored in Horn (1971: 128-29). Thus we normally take (68a) to ask whether the test is so easy that even an ignoramus can pass it and (68b) to ask whether it's so hard that even a genius can't, while (68c) allows both understandings depending on what is assumed about gnomes; the pattern of (69) follows from the same assumptions.

(68) a. Can even an ignoramus pass that test?
   b. Can even a genius pass that test?
   c. Can even a gnome pass that test?

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[13]In the earlier version of his monograph, Haspelmath remarks that "one is well advised to be skeptical that universal quantification in the standard logical sense is involved in free-choice indefinites at all" (Haspelmath 1993: 91). He notes (1993: 52-55) that free-choice indefinites tend to be prosodically prominent and are invariably (as opposed to the corresponding ordinary *some*-series indefinites) non-specific; it is when the non-specifics are contextually ruled out (as in past perfectives or present progressives) that FC *any* and its cross-linguistic analogues are impossible.

(69) a. Even an ignoramus {can/#can't} pass that test.

    b. Even a genius {#can/can't} pass that test.

    c. Even a gnome {can/can't} pass that test.

But, as (70) shows, not (just) ANY contour is compatible with each reading:

(70) a. I don't believe that even an ignoramus can pass that test.

    (i) I don't beLIEVE [(the claim) that even an igno$^\vee$RAmus can pass it]

    (ii) #I don't believe (*the claim) that even an igno`RAmus can pass it

  b. I don't believe that even a genius can pass that test.

    (i) #I don't beLIEVE [(the claim) that even a $^\vee$GENius can pass that test]

    (ii) I don't believe (*the claim) that even a `GENius can pass that test

  c. I don't believe that even a gnome can pass that test.

    (i) I don't beLIEVE [(the claim) that even a $^\vee$GNOME can pass that test]

    (ii) I don't believe (*the claim) that even a `GNOME can pass that test

The same is true, of course, for the "two *any's*", or the two ways of associating *any* with a scalar endpoint:

(71) a. I don't believe that anyone$_{FC}$ can pass that test.

    (i) I don't beLIEVE [(the claim) that $^\vee$ANYone can pass that test]

        I don't believe that anyone—even an ignoramus—can pass that test.

        I believe that not just anyone can pass the test.

    (ii) #I don't believe (*the claim) that `ANYone can pass that test

        I don't believe that anyone— (not) even a genius—can pass that test.

        I believe that no one can pass that test.

  b. I don't believe that anyone$_{NPI}$ can pass that test.

    (i) #I don't beLIEVE [(the claim) that $^\vee$ANYone can pass that test]

        I don't believe that anyone—even an ignoramus—can pass that test.

        I believe that not just anyone can pass the test.

    (ii) I don't believe (*the claim) that `ANYone can pass that test

        I don't believe that anyone—(not) even a genius—can pass that test.

        I believe that no one can pass that test.

Note the close parallel between the (70a) and (71a) on the one hand, both presupposing an easy test (even if one not easy enough for even an ignoramus to pass) and that between (70b) and (71b) (both presupposing a hard test (one so hard that even a genius might not pass it).

Now if we are to treat an *any* sentence allowing both NPI and FC understandings as lexically ambiguous, consistency would seem to demand the same lexical ambiguity for *even*. While such an ambiguity as between ordinary and NPI readings has indeed been proposed for *even*, most prominently by Rooth (1985), this line is open to challenge on both conceptual and empirical grounds (see e.g. Wilkinson 1993) for a dissenting view), and the parallelism observed above tends to cast doubt on any account which treats the *even* and *any* facts as stemming from unrelated lexical ambiguities.

VI. any, ever, and polysemy: The D-NPI/A-NPI distinction

Rebutting various remarks in the literature stressing the typological tendency to distinguish free-choice from negative polarity items (in particular the unsupported assertion in Horn 1972: 131 trumpeting "the isolation of...English from the usual trend encountered in the languages of the world to separate the two cases morphologically"), Haspelmath (1993, 1997) observes that almost half the sampled languages in his exhaustive survey of indefinites do contain *any*-like operators that frequent both free-choice and overtly negative habitats. He regards this convergence as an instance of MULTIFUNCTIONALITY rather than polysemy (much less ambiguity or homonymy) for the indefinites in question. As he explains,

> The majority of the series of indefinite pronouns are used to express more than one of the functions...A more traditional term for such a situation is *polysemy*, but in many cases there is no obvious meaning difference between the different functions—these often seem to be just different CONTEXTS rather than different MEANINGS...Moreover, even when an indefinite series clearly expresses more than one distinguishable function, one could maintain that from the point of view of the individual language, there only is one general meaning *(Gesamt-bedeutung)* that happens to correspond to several more specific meanings in other languages.   Haspelmath (1997: 58-59)

On other accounts, even those abjuring any full ambiguity or homonymy, some form of polysemy is indeed invoked, and even a relative ambiguist like Dayal (1998: 473), who distinguishes an indefinite NPI *any* from a universal FC *any*, portrays herself as an advocate of a "quasi-univocal account of the phenomenon."

On our [less quasi-]univocal account, the link between NPI and free choice *any* is the close relation between the ordinary and generic indefinite end-of-scale determiner *(any CN)* and quantifier *(anyone, anything,...)*. Just as non-scalar GENERIC indefinites *(a tiger eats meat)* are akin but not identical to non-scalar ORDINARY indefinites *(a tiger is in the garden)*, so too are NPI and FC *any* closely related but not identical. This unified approach

has recently been challenged by Israel (1998), who argues that *any* shares the out-of-the-closet polysemy of its fellow-indefinite *ever*.

As Israel points out, *ever* occurs as a true universal element in a variety of non-NPI contexts, chiefly as a temporal universal akin to 'always'. It shows up in relic contexts or collocations *('Twas ever thus, for ever and ever, for ever and a day)*, or before other temporal adverbs *(happily ever after, ever since)*. The flavor imparted by temporal *ever* is often that of an archaizing variant of *always*:

> There is a slight slenderness to the later [Neanderthal] fossils that some paleoanthropologists take as evidence of interbreeding with *Homo sapiens*. Fat chance, say other paleoanthropologists; it was **ever nothing** but war, mutual abhorrence, and murder between the races.
>
> (John Updike (1997), *Toward the End of Time*, pp. 27-28)

Ever appears in appositives *(ever the diplomat, ever the optimist)* and as the first element of lexicalized compounds with the sense of 'forever, always' *(evergreen; ever-popular; ever-changing, everlasting, ever-lovin')*. As a modifier of comparatives, *ever* conveys the sense of 'increasingly' *(ever closer, ever more confusing)*.[14] Non-NPI *ever* also functions as a nontemporal intensifier, usually with *so (Be it ever so humble, there's no place like home)* or in inverted exclamatives *(Was my face ever red!)*.

In its polarity guise, *ever* is a distributional doppelgänger of *any* as a weak/liberal/trigger-happy NPI, occurring in environments where minimizers like *lift a finger* or *drink a drop*, or other restricted NPIs like the predicates *bother* or *budge* are blocked (cf. van der Wouden 1996), and occurring neutrally in questions like (72a,b) when stricter items allow only the "conducive" readings of (72c,d) (see Heim 1984: 106, inter al.) .

(72) a. Has she ever helped you with any of your work?
     b. Which of these people has {fixed any of your cars/ever fixed your car}?
     c. Would she have so much as lifted a finger to help you?
     d. Which of these people has {the least bit of taste/so much as a dime}?

But while *ever*—unlike *any*—can be a bona fide (if somewhat archaic or marked) UNIVERSAL, there is no FREE CHOICE *ever* alongside free choice *any*. The contrast is especially striking when *ever* is contrasted with FC *at any time*, its virtual NPI twin:

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[14]Compare the quite distinct NPI *ever* as post-superlative domain-widener: *the nicest gift ever, the best World War II movie ever, the most damaging scandal ever.*

(73) a. Anything can happen at any time.
     b. *{Anything/Something} can ever happen.

(74) a. You can leave the organization at any time.
     b. *You can ever leave the organization.
     c. Michael can score any time (he wants).
     d. *Michael can ever score. (≠ Can Michael ever score!)

As we would predict, there is no *not just ever* parallel to the necessarily free choice *not just any* construction we have investigated here; the first pair below is from Israel (1998: 14):

(75) a. Glinda won't kiss just ANY linguist. (unambiguously FC)
     b. *Glinda won't just EVER kiss a linguist. (Israel 1998: 14)

(76) a. Glinda won't kiss { ANY$_{NPI}$/*ANY$_{FC}$} linguist.
     b. Glinda won't { EVER/*EVER} kiss a linguist.

(77) a. You can't drop in just ANY time.
     b. *You can't just EVER drop in.

(78) a. Not just anyone can do that.
     b. *Not just ever can you do that.

Indeed, this asymmetry between *any* and *ever* has been recognized for some time: "Although *possible* triggers *any*, it is manifestly not the case that a ◊ is for *ever*" (Horn 1972: 145, with "blame and/or credit" for the pun assigned to Emily Pope). But what conclusions should we draw therefrom?

Israel's central point cannot be challenged: the "patterns of polysemy" relating *ever*, with its existential/NPI and universal functions, to *any*, with its existential/NPI and free-choice functions, are real—but I would argue misleading. In particular, his challenge to the unified analyses of (28), on the grounds that the two *anys* can no more be unified than the two *evers*, is unconvincing. In fact, a scalar indefinite with the morphosyntax of a temporal adverbial like *ever*, as opposed to a determiner like *any* or a pronoun like *anyone*, cannot have an extended free choice meaning because there is no (non-scalar) generic indefinite to sponsor it.

This crucial distinction between pronominal or DETERMINER-based "D-NPIs" and ADVERBIAL "A-NPIs" is especially salient when we look at two crossover cases. Consider first the A-NPI use of *any* that the OED (s.v. **any**, 7) glosses as 'in any degree, at all', which occurs VP-finally and preceding comparatives, some vanilla adjectives, and selected nouns. This A-*any*, on display in (79), is barred from free choice contexts in the same way—and, I would argue, for the same reason—as *ever*.

(79) a. This doesn't help us any.

    b. If it's any better (worse, bigger),...

    c. Is it any good (any use/*any bad/*any blue)?

       It isn't any good (any use/*any bad/*any blue).

       If it's any good (any use/*any bad/*any blue)...

    d. It isn't any different (*any similar).

(80) a. *This {may/could/might} help us any.

    b. *He could be any better.

    c. *"The Phantom Menace" might be any good, for all I know.

    d. *Any good (at all) can come of this.

On the other side of the coin, as Israel (1998: 5-6, 13) observes, *ever* can incorporate as a quasi-determiner on *wh*-words to yield the arguably free-choice indefinite pro-forms shown in (81) and (82):

(81) a. Drop in {any time/*ever/whenever (you like)}.

    b. {Whoever/Anyone who} wants some can have some.

    c. {Who(so)ever/Anyone who} can pull the sword from this stone is the true king.

(82) a. *You can't just EVER drop in.   (= (77b))

    b. You can't drop in just whenEVer.

    c. %You can't drop in just ANYwhen.

             ("rare in literature but common in southern [England] dialects"—OED)

And of course, there's always the holophrastic

(83)   Whatever...,

the all-purpose je m'en foutiste indiscriminative that marks the fin-de-siècle argot of late and post-adolescents.[15]

Now I don't want to overstate the difference between my proposal and that of my target; after all, if Arafat can agree to a rapprochement with Israel, far be it from me to demur. *Any* remains polysemous or multifunctional, particularly (as Israel (p.c.) points out) given the

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[15]The bodiless indiscriminative *whatever* also appears as in argument positions, where it (not surprisingly) functions like *anything*: Here is Latrell Sprewell, the star basketball player, responding to the possibility that the Knicks would ask him to come off the bench rather than start after his recovery from injury: "I'll do whatever. I just want to win." (New York Times 2/19/99).

categorial and behavioral distinctions I draw here between D-*any* and A-*any*. Even for the non-adverbial instances of NPI and FC *any*, I can no more claim that there is precisely one *any* than that there is precisely one indefinite article in English. But I do think that it's worth focusing on the evidence for a contrast between the two *ever*'s and the one-plus *any*, as well as for the key distinction between D-NPIs and A-NPIs—evidence that shows why the essential unity of *any* is clearer than *ever*.

The full range of *any* and *ever* constructions thus combines to ADVANCE rather than DERAIL the quest for an essentially unified account of determiner/quantifier *any*. It is just D-NPI indefinites that lend themselves to the free choice uses of generic indefinites. But is Israel correct in taking -*ever* -headed free relatives to constitute free choice items, as opposed to definites or universals?

VII. wh-ever *free relatives as free choice indefinites*

As it happens, there has been a healthy and as yet unresolved debate in the recent literature on the semantic properties of free relatives (FRs) with both plain *wh*- and *wh-ever* heads; cf. inter alia Larson (1987), Jacobson (1995), Grosu (1996), Dayal (1997), Larson (1999). I shall focus here on the range of diagnostics that distinguish FC *any* from true universals, and that tend to demonstrate that *wh-ever* constructions (FRs with -*ever*) often seem to pattern more like the former.[16]

We begin with existential import: It has been clear at least since Vendler (1967) that universals with *all* and especially with *every* are much more likely to be read as strongly implicating or presupposing a non-null membership of the set they quantify over than are their *any* counterparts, which can be read as law-like conditionals. (In fact, as he observes, the standard conditional analysis of universal statements, which Larson persuasively argues for turning into a biconditional for -*ever* FRs and free comparatives, is more appropriate for *any* than *every* statements, although the situation is more far complex than can be detailed here; cf. Horn 1997 for some of the relevant issues.) It appears that *wh-ever* patterns with *any* nominals in this respect rather than with *every*.

In particular, *wh-ever* clearly lines up with *any* as an indiscriminative rather than a true universal with respect to being satisfied by just ONE end-of-scale examplar in paradigms like

(83)   I'll marry whoever I want.

             = I'll marry anyone I want.

             ≠ I'll marry everyone I want.

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[16]I am grateful to Anastasia Giannakidou, Richard Larson, and John Richardson for discussion of some of the issues and problems surveyed in the section on free relatives. Needless to say...

(84) Whoever I marry will be Jewish

> = Anyone I marry will be Jewish.
> ≠ Everyone I marry will be Jewish.

The bodiless indiscriminative free relatives of (82b) and (83), which only occur in the *wh-ever* versions, also alternate with *any* rather than with *every* nominals:

(85) a. I'll sleep with {whoever/*who}, and you're not gonna stop me!

> = I'll sleep with anyone.
> ≠ I'll sleep with everyone.

b. I'm not gonna marry (just) {whoEVer/ANyone/#EVeryone/*who}.

The non-universal FC imperatives of (12) have their *wh-ever* equivalents as well:

(86) a. Pick whatever card you want. (=any card, ≠ every card)

b. Promise her {anything/whatever (you want)}, but give her Arpège.

Note that with either *any* or *whatever*, (86b) is import-free, amounting to 'it doesn't matter what (if anything) you promise her...', and that again there is no paraphrase with true universals ('Promise her everything...'). If an 'any' statement is a conditional warranty (Vendler 1967), a 'whatever' statement is too, but in each case the warranty entitles the bearer to a free ride on any single attraction; whether it's renewable depends on the rules of the park.

The import-free nature of both *any*-headed relatives and *wh-ever* FRs emerges in other environments, e.g. (from Grosu 1996: 271) *{Any beer/Whatever beer} there is in the refrigerator is mine*. But it is especially striking to find paradigms like that in (87) that show how *-ever* FRs and *any* relatives are import-free in contexts where universals and definites aren't, and where the universal brings in another reading entirely:[17]

(87) She may never marry, but

> a. whoever she does marry will be Jewish.
> b. anyone she does marry will be Jewish.
> c. #the person she does marry will be Jewish.
> d. #everyone she does marry will be Jewish.

Not only are (87c, d) both inconsistent with the existence-suspending disclaimer, but the universal here introduces a polygamy absent from the FC versions.

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[17]The correlation between *any*-headed and *wh-ever* relatives is especially clear in languages like Greek in which the distinction is morphologically neutralized; cf. Giannakidou (1998) for discussion.

Next, we come to the *almost* diagnostic. As has been widely noted, *almost* doesn't always co-exist too peacefully with *wh-ever* FRs, unlike both *any* nominals and true universals. Jacobson (1995: 480) and Dayal (1997: ex. 7), for example, find (88b) ungrammatical.

(88) a. I did {nearly/almost} anything/everything you told me to do.

b. *I did {nearly/almost} whatever you told me to do.

But, as Larson (1999: fn. 10) points out, we are not dealing with absolute distinctions here, but a cline or continuum. His paradigm and judgments are given in (89):

(89) a. Max gave Alice almost {everything/anything} she asked for.

b. ?Max gave Alice almost whatever she asked for.

c. *Max gave Alice almost the thing(s) she asked for.

Indeed, empirical evidence from Nexis citations suggests that even Larson's hesitation with respect to sentences like (89b)—let alone Jacobson's and Dayal's arrant rejection of them—is overstated.

(90) Titanic's demise can mean **almost whatever** one wants it to mean.

> (Tom Shales in the Buffalo News, 4/19/99, Lifestyles 9B)

The English version of the Michel Montignac diet book, Dine Out and Lose Weight, has hit town and it's selling like hotcakes. He swears that with the right food combinations, you can lose weight and still eat **almost whatever** you want, even in fancy French restaurants.   (Montreal Gazette, 3/26/99, Living D14)

Although most of the reports have suggested that only a small minority of the I.O.C.'s 114 delegates may have received direct financial benefits from local organizers, the overwhelming message is that **almost whatever** a delegate asked for could not be denied...

> (New York Times, 1/24/99, Sports p. 1, re International Olympic Committee scandal)

'The longer vision is to help people buy **almost whatever** it is that they want to buy on the Net.'

> (Spokesman for amazon.com quoted in Seattle Times, 12/7/98, Business C2)

Jospin might admire le Blairisme, but Old Labour will be triumphant in Paris **almost whoever** forms a government on Monday.   (The Observer, 6/1/97, p. 27)[18]

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[18]Notice that the modified *wh-ever* in this case defines an adjunct clause rather than an argument. Two points should be noted about such expressions: no paraphrase with *any*-headed relatives is possible here, but the indiscriminative *no matter wh-* sense is clearly retained:

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Mukhamedov's utter involvement in every role, and his subjection of his impressive personality to the style and needs of each appearance, ensure that **almost whoever** dances with him looks her best.　　(The [London] Times, 1/21/99)

Other A-adverbs also modify *wh-ever* (but not plain *ever*-less) FRs:

(91)　Cutting weight doesn't just make a wrestler weaker physically. Lawrence Central coach Sam Ruff noted it could affect him mentally. Instead of worrying about eating, O'Dell now eats **virtually whatever** he wants every day.

(Indianapolis Star, 2/13/99, Sports D7)

"I'll do **absolutely whatever** it takes," Walton said. "A place like Helix High School changes your life, so it excites me to be here."

(San Diego Union Tribune, 1/24/99, B2, on Helix graduate and Hall of Fame basketball player Bill Walton, returning for a scrub-down reunion day)

For some speakers, modification of *wh-ever* FRs is somewhat more natural with other approximatives than *almost*, as in (92a); once again, *wh-ever* relatives pattern with indefinites, while plain *wh*-relatives pattern with definites, whence the ungrammaticality of (92b,c).

(92)　a. His parents give him {just about/virtually} whatever he asks for.
　　　b. *His parents give him {just about/virtually} what he asks for.
　　　c. *His parents give him {just about/virtually} the stuff he asks for.

Besides the argument for the definiteness of *wh-ever* FRs based on the purported (but, as we have seen, not actual) non-cooccurrence of *almost wh-ever* sequences, Jacobson and others have pointed to the diagnostic of polarity licensing. We have seen that *any*-headed NPs trigger NPIs, although on our argument not because they are universals. If *wh-ever* FRs fail to trigger NPIs, this would seem to weigh against their status as either universals or indefinites. Jacobson (1995: 480) does indeed take NPIs to be ruled out in the scope of (even) *wh-ever* FRs, citing the contrast between (93a,b) as an instance of this generalization.

(93)　a. I can read everything/anything that Bill ever read.
　　　b. *I can read whatever (books) Bill ever read.

(i) Whatever you think of him, he's my man.

(ii) *Anything you think of him, he's my man.

(iii) {No matter what/It doesn't matter what} you think of him, he's my man.

But both this datum and the conclusion based on it can be challenged—and indeed, have been. Dayal (1997: ex. (11)) notes that the *wh-ever* versions of (94a,b) are much better than their plain FR counterparts,

(94)　a. He got into trouble for {whatever/*what} he ever did to anyone.
　　　b. I will go {wherever/*where} the hell you go.

while Larson (1999: 11-12) suggests that any marginality of (93b) stems from *"ever*-doubling" and cites other cases of straightforward NPI licensing by *wh-ever*—but not plain *wh*—free relatives (citing earlier work by Iatridou and Varlacosta):

(95)　a. [Whatever anyone buys for her] Phyllis objects to.
　　　b. [Whoever takes anything from my refrigerator] is in trouble.
　　　c. I'll do [{whatever/*what} anyone suggests].

I share Dayal's judgment on (94a)[19] and Larson's on (95) and would simply add that not just weak NPIs *(anyone, ever)* but minimizers are licensed by *wh-ever* heads:

(96)　a. Whoever touches (so much as) a drop of my scotch is in trouble.
　　　b. I'll give a prize to whoever sleeps a wink with all this racket.

---

[19]The polarity item *the hell* that Dayal uses as a diagnostic for licensing in (94b) is not a straightforward NPI, but what I've called a negative-epistemic polarity item (Horn 1972: §3.2), restricted (more or less) to contexts in which the speaker is professing ignorance or in which there has been a change in her state of ignorance/knowledge:

　　I wish {I knew/#I didn't know} what the hell (the fuck, etc.) I was doing.

　　　　(cf. true NPIs: I wish {I didn't know/#I knew} anyone here.)

　　I {asked her/#told her} what the hell I was doing.

　　{Can you tell me/#Shall I tell you} what the hell is going on?

　　{I just realized/#I realize} what the hell is going on.

　　{I've forgotten/I just remembered/#I remember} what the hell we're supposed to do next.

　　What the hell he thinks he's doing I have {no/#a good} idea.

Thus the distribution of *wh-hell* (and its less printable ilk) is not directly relevant to the quantificational force of FRs, but is instead linked to the lack of knowledge that accompanies all instances of *wh-ever* FRs (cf. Jacobson 1995) and, as seen here, some instances of plain FRs as well.

In any event, the premise of the debate—that any licensing of NPIs in such contexts confirms the status of *wh-ever* FRs as universals or free-choice elements, and in any case as non-definites—is itself open to question, since non-importing generic definites (especially plurals, but sometimes even singulars) may license NPIs in clauses with negative affect. Consider, for example, the contrast in (97) and the attested example in (98):

(97) a. I'll read {whatever/any/*the} books you've ever asked me to read.

  b. I'll read {the/those} dissertations that include {any discussion of/ so much as a subsubsection on} free relatives (but I won't read anything on non-restrictives).

  c. The student who lifts a finger to help him {will go straight to hell/ #will be rewarded in heaven}.

  d The student who so much as touches a drop of the single malt in my drawer {is in mortal peril/#will appreciate the smoky peat}.

(98) Shame on Murray Chass for his whitewash job on George Steinbrenner. I became sick to my stomach reading the excuses and apologies for the awful things the Yankees' principal owner has ever done.

  (letter to the editor, New York Times, 1/28/98)

One additional piece of evidence for linking *wh-ever* FRs with *any*-type FC indiscriminatives rather than with either definites or true universals is provided by the distribution of *namely* cited by Dayal (1997: §2). Here again, *wh-ever* FRs pattern with FC *any* nominals, while plain FRs pattern with universals and definites. (99a,b) are from Dayal's paper; (100a,b) are herewith added to the stew:

(99) a. *Whatever Mary is cooking, namely ratatouille, uses onions.

  b. What Mary is cooking, namely ratatouille, uses onions.

(100) a. {Everything/The things} Mary is cooking—namely ratatouille, latkes, and goulash—use(s) onions.

  b. *Anything Mary cooks—namely ratatouille, latkes, and goulash—uses onions.

Plain FRs, like universals, definites, and pseudo-clefts, allow conjoint parentheticals, while *wh-ever* FRs, like indirect questions, allow only disjoint ones. (100b) becomes much better if namely is replaced by *be it* (or its analogues) and the *and* is replaced by *or*, and *wh-ever* FRs are similar:

(101) a. Anything Mary cooks—be it ratatouille, latkes, or goulash—uses onions.

  b. Whatever Mary {cooks/is cooking}—(whether it's) ratatouille, latkes, or goulash—uses onions.

And as John Richardson (p.c.) points out, we can freely mix and match our indiscriminatives:

(102) Anything Mary cooks—ratatouille, latkes, whatever—uses onions.

The evidence we have surveyed in this section indicates that *wh-ever* functions not as a definite or universal but as an indiscriminative or quodlibetic free-choice marker closely akin to *any*. It should be noted as well that while many instances of plain *wh* free relatives do indeed pattern with definites (cf. Jacobson 1995) or as true universals, other occurrences appear to function as free (or grammatically determined) alternants of *wh-ever*. This is illustrated in a particularly eloquent example of what I like to think of as free-part harmony, appearing on the Rolling Stones' classic *December's Children:*

I'm FREE, to CHOOSE WHOM I please, ANY OLD time.
I'm FREE, to please WHO I CHOOSE, ANY OLD time.

("I'm free", M. Jagger & K. Richard (1965) , emphasis added)

While the constructive portion of the arguments presented here tends toward the establishment of both free choice *any* and *wh-ever* FRs as scalar indefinites, I have not sought to represent these properties explicitly; for a formalization of the semantic properties of *any* in the spirit of the present paper, see Giannakidou (1998) and Giannakidou & Horn (in prep.). I hope that by illustrating the difficulties inevitably encountered by competing approaches currently on the market, and by casting additional doubt on the conceptual and empirical advantages of ambiguist and universalist treatments of *any*, I have in any case provided some of the essential destructive energy needed to clear the field for subsequent research.

Acknowledgments

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