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I love me some datives: Expressive meaning, free datives, and F-implicature

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5.1 Introduction

In addition to introducing the very successful product line of conversational implicatures, Paul Grice and his successors have assembled an arguably inchoate class of phenomena under the trade name of CONVENTIONAL IMPLICATURE, whose reception in the scholarly marketplace has been somewhat bridled. A conventional implicature associated with expression \( E \) is a non-cancelable contribution to the content of an expression whose falsity does not affect the truth conditions of \( E \). This construct has evoked much recent skepticism – Bach (1999) has consigned it to the dustbin of mythology, while Potts (2005 et seq.) has undertaken a pyrrhic rehabilitation via redefinition – but Grice’s admittedly sketchy device for treating aspects of content that are irrelevant to the truth conditions of an asserted proposition has a rich lineage.

In delineating meanings that do not “affect the thought” or “touch what is true or false”, Frege (1892, 1897/1979, 1918) directly prefigured Grice’s conventional implicature. While much recent scholarship has followed Dummett (1973) in dismissing Frege’s positive proposals in this area as representing a confused, subjective notion of “tone”, this fails to do justice to Frege’s intention and practice. For a range of connectives, expressive particles, pronouns, and syntactic constructions, some proposed for the role by Frege and/or Grice and others not considered by them, such an approach remains eminently plausible.

5.2 The Fregean landscape of sub-sense relations

In addition to the presupposition (Voraussetzung) of reference for proper names in sentences like Kepler [died/didn’t die] in misery (Frege 1892: 40), Frege also allows for the weaker relation of “side-thought” (Nebengedanke) of existence for
universally quantified statements, an essentially pragmatic relation which involves material neither meant nor presupposed as admitted (Frege 1906: 306-7). The former constitutes a necessary condition for an assertion to be made; the latter does not. (See Horn 2007 for elaboration).

But this does not exhaust the inventory of Fregean relations for implication beyond – or below – the domain of sense and reference. In fact, the issue arises for Frege in the *Begriffsschrift*, before the distinction between *Sinn* and *Bedeutung* is even drawn:

The difference between ‘and’ and ‘but’ is of a kind that has no expression in this Begriffsschrift. A speaker uses ‘but’ when he wants to hint [*einen Wink geben*] that what follows is different from what might at first be supposed. (Frege 1879: 63)

Similar hints or suggestions recur elsewhere. Considering a spectrum of linguistic phenomena ranging from particles like *although*, *but*, *yet*, *still*, and *already* to active/passive alternations and word order, Frege devotes several passages throughout his works to describing such expressions and constructions that “aid the hearer’s understanding” without, however, affecting the propositional content – or, in Fregean parlance, the thought. Here is Frege in “Über Sinn und Bedeutung” on the meaning contributions of adversative particles (here and below, boldface is added):

Subsidiary clauses beginning with ‘although’ [*obgleich*] also express complete thoughts. This *conjunction* [. . .] *does not change the sense of the clause but only illuminates it* in a peculiar fashion (footnote: Similarly in the case of ‘but’ [*aber*], ‘yet’ [*doch*].) We could indeed replace the concessive clause without harm to the truth of the whole by another of the same truth value; but the light in which the clause is placed by the conjunction might then easily appear unsuitable, as if a song with a sad subject were to be sung in a lively fashion. (Frege 1879: 167)

Crucially, then, the difference between *p and q* and *p although q* does not affect the truth conditions of the proposition involved, a claim that appears correct. Imagine I bet you $100 that Robin will marry Chris although Chris is extremely poor and it develops that Robin does marry Chris, but precisely because of, not in spite of, Chris’s impecunious state. Then the *although*-condition is not satisfied, but it is clear (to me!) that I have won the bet, for which all that matters is the two parties wed.

Frege provides an inventory of phenomena lending themselves to similar analyses in “Der Gedanke”, beginning with the choice between the neutral *horse* [*Pferd*] and its evaluatively laden counterparts like *steed* or *nag* [*Roß, Gaul, Mähre*]:
It makes no difference to the thought whether I use the word ‘horse’ or ‘steed’ […] The assertive force does not extend over that in which these words differ […] Much in language serves to aid the hearer’s understanding, for instance emphasizing part of the sentence by stress or word-order. Here let us bear in mind words like ‘still’ and ‘already’. Somebody using the sentence ‘Alfred has still not come’ [Alfred ist noch nicht gekommen] actually says ‘Alfred has not come’ and, at the same time hints [andeutet] – but only hints – that Alfred’s arrival is expected. Nobody can say: Since Alfred’s arrival is not expected, the sense of the sentence is therefore false. The way that ‘but’ differs from ‘and’ in that we use it to intimate [andeuten] that what follows it contrasts with what was to be expected from what preceded it. **Such conversational suggestions make no difference to the thought.** A sentence can be transformed by changing the verb from active to passive and at the same time making the accusative into the subject. In the same way we may change the dative into the nominative and at the same time replace ‘give’ by ‘receive’. Naturally such transformations are not indifferent in every respect but they do not touch the thought, they do not touch what is true or false […] It is just as important to ignore distinctions that do not touch the heart of the matter, as to make distinctions which concern essentials. But what is essential depends on one’s purpose. **To a mind concerned with the beauties of language, what is trivial to the logician may seem to be just what is important.** (Frege 1918: 331)

The thought in Frege’s theory of meaning corresponds to the notion of what is said in (neo-)Gricean;¹ in current terminology the key claim is that the phenomena under discussion here do not affect the determination of what is said. In stating Alfred still has not come, I say that he hasn’t come, while “hinting” that his arrival is expected; p but q differs from p and q in “intimating” a sense of contrast. These two verbs in Geach’s rendering – hint and intimate – both translate Frege’s andeuten, a verb we can gloss (with Gricean hindsight) as ‘(conventionally) implicate’ and nominalize as Andeutung. While the historical significance of Frege’s remarks in this area is often overlooked (for example, Frege is nowhere mentioned in Chris Potts’s (2005) major monograph on conventional implicature), the Andeutung relation, for a component of linguistic meaning that does not affect propositional content or “touch what is true or false”, is a direct precursor of Grice’s conventional implicature.

Among Frege’s intriguing, if largely overlooked, commentaries in this area is a passage in the unpublished 1897 Logic (Frege 1897/1979: 242) touching on the

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¹To be sure, this is not an entirely straightforward matter. The delineation of what is said remains at the heart of scholarly disputes in neo-Gricean and post-Gricean pragmatics; see discussion below and Bach 2001, Saul 2002, Carston 2002, and Horn 2009 for elaboration and references.
division of labor between semantics and discourse pragmatics. After noting that
the addition of particles like *ach* ‘ah’ and *leider* ‘unfortunately’ or the replace-
ment of *Hund* ‘dog’ with *Köter* ‘cur’ “makes no difference to the thought”, Frege
continues:

The distinction between the active and passive voice belongs here too. The
sentences ‘M gave document A to N’, ‘Document A was given to N by M’, ‘N received
document A from M’ express exactly the same thought; we learn not a whit more or
less from any of these sentences that we do from the others. Hence it is impossible
that one of them should be true whilst another is false. It is the very same
thing that is here capable of being true or false. For all this we are not in a position
to say that it is a matter of complete indifference which of these sentences we use
[…] If someone asks ‘Why has A been arrested?’ it would be unnatural to reply ‘B has
been murdered by him’, because it would require a needless switch of the attention
from A to B. Although in actual speech it can certainly be very important where
the attention is directed and where the stress falls, it is of no concern to logic. (Frege
1897/1979: 242)

At issue here are those alternations that involve the packaging of content moti-
vated by considerations of information structure, or what the Prague school lin-
guists would later dub functional sentence perspective: the choice between mem-
bbers of (quantifier-free) active/passive pairs or alternants involving indirect con-
verses (Cruse 1986: §10.7) like *give* and *receive*, motivated in each case by the
goal of mapping topics into subject position. Frege’s pairs are ALLOSENTENCES
(Lambrecht 1994), in which differences in syntactic or prosodic form correlate
with differences in information packaging while the information itself (the proposi-
tional content) remains constant. Frege also presciently foreshadows the mod-
ular approach to meaning in natural language: render unto logic what is relevant
to sense, reference, and truth conditions, render unto pragmatics what is relevant
to usage so long as it concerns distinctions without a difference to the thought or
propositional content.

The examples motivating Frege’s appeal to subsense relations, which we pro-
visionally denote as *Andeutungen* (‘suggestions, hints’), thus extend to a range of
cases:

The legacy of Fregean subsense relations has been anything but straightforward.
One reason is that Frege was more concerned in collecting such phenomena
for the purpose of setting them aside rather than in any attempt to characterize
them positively. This has not prevented analysts from tossing Frege’s examples
of the kind in Table 5.1 into a mixed bag labeled, from Dummett on, as TONE.
For Dummett (1973: 2-3, 83-89), tone – conflating the Fregean notions of Fär-
bung ‘coloring’ and Beleuchtung ‘illumination’ – is problematic because of its
(allegedly) inherent subjectivity, characterized in terms of ideas (Vorstellungen) or mental images:

Frege makes a poor explanation worse by suggesting that mental images are incommunicable in principle: no two people can ever know that they have the same mental image. It would follow that tone was a feature of meaning which was, in principle, subjective. This conclusion is a simple contradiction. Meaning, under any theory, cannot be in principle subjective [. . .] Tone is not, however, in itself any more subjective than sense. (Dummett 1973: 85)

Dummett’s conclusion that Frege’s characterization of subsense relations is incoherent due to this subjectivity has become received wisdom; cf. e.g. Neale (1999, 2001). As Neale (1999) puts it, “Dummett shows decisively that Frege’s positive position on colouring is untenable, so I will spend no more time on it.” But “Frege’s positive position” is nothing Frege would have recognized, much less endorsed. When discussing the examples that have been most closely scrutinized, including the but vs. and distinction, the contribution of noch in noch nicht, or the non-referential meaning associated with cur, Frege writes not of any Vorstellungen communicated here but rather of what the speaker andeutet (‘suggests, hints’). In the passages from the Begriffsschrift or those from the Logik (Frege 1897/1979: 152) two decades later, the speaker gibt einen Wink (‘hints’) that some contrast exists between the clauses that aber conjoins or that the Köter is not a highly regarded canine. Crucially for Frege (as for Grice), this is a distinction without a truth-conditional difference; the thought would be the same whichever lexical item is chosen. But while the two terms in each case are not interchangeable, a hint or suggestion is not ipso facto a subjective “idea”. Since Frege alternates between the two terms andeutet and gibt einen Wink to identify a non-truth-conditional meaning that a speaker suggests, hints, or intimates (prefiguring conventional implicature), while never considering the kind of data for which Grice develops the
notion of CONVERSATIONAL implicature, I shall dub this subsense ingredient of conventional content F-IMPICATURE.

While conceding that “a hint is evidently not the production of a mental image”, Dummett still appears to mischaracterize Fregean doctrine (to the extent that it is a doctrine) of subsense relations. Dummett (1973: 88) sees Fregean “tone” as more plausibly applying to cases of “expressive meaning”, whereas the choice of but as against and “does not serve to convey any attitude on the part of the speaker, in the sense in which a speaker may evince, e.g., a respectful, apologetic or regretful attitude.” This would be an easier claim to evaluate if we knew just what sorts of “expressive” examples Dummett has in mind, but it is certainly true that current work on conventional implicature has focused largely, although not exclusively, on expressive constructions (see e.g. Davis 2009; Kim & Sells 2007; McCready 2004; Potts 2005, 2007c; Potts & Kawahara 2004, and the papers in this volume, Gutzmann & Gärtner 2013).

5.3 Frege, Grice, and the contribution of but

Grice’s first differentiation between conventional implicature and the relations on either side of it (conversational implicature, semantic presupposition) is presented (without labels) in the course of his defense of the causal theory of perception (Grice 1961: 126-132). Grice’s analysis of the relation of (1c) to (1a) includes the claims in (2).

(1)  
- a. She was poor but she was honest.  
- b. She was poor and she was honest.  
- c. There is some contrast between poverty and honesty, or between her poverty and her honesty.

(2)  
- the truth status of (1c) is irrelevant to the truth conditions of (1a), as distinct from the case of (semantic) presupposition: “Even if the implied proposition were false, i.e. if there were no reason in the world to contrast poverty with honesty either in general or in her case, the original statement could still be false [rather than devoid of truth value]; […] if for example she were rich and dishonest.” Of course (1a) can also be true on Grice’s account if (1b) is true and (1c) false.  
- what is said in (1a) does not semantically imply (1c), whence the anomaly of #If she was poor but honest, then there is some contrast between (her) poverty and honesty.  
- the implication of (1c) is detachable, i.e. removable by replacement of but with and as in (1b).  
- the implication of (1c) non-cancellable (#She is poor but she is honest, but I do not mean to suggest there is any contrast between poverty and
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- the inference from (1a) to (1c) is “a matter of the meaning of the word ‘but’” (unlike the inferences drawn in the relevant contexts from Jones has beautiful handwriting and his English is grammatical or My wife is either in the kitchen or in the bedroom)

Six years later, when Grice affixes the conventional implicature label, but again has pride of place, along with therefore (Grice 1989: 25); apparently without recognizing it, Grice thus traces the footsteps of Frege, for whom the contrast suggested or hinted at by adversatives is the primary instance of Andeutung or F-implicature. Expressions falling under this analysis represent a recalcitrant residue for Grice (who was concerned with delineating what is said and what is conversationally, and hence calculably, implicated) as they did for Frege (who was concerned with the thought, i.e. with sense and potential reference); for both, detecting an F-implicature facilitates the real work of semantics by clearing away the brush. But Grice also situates this relation within a map of what we refer to (though he does not) as the semantics/pragmatics divide. If not always accepted, his effect on the landscape is widely recognized, as here by Davidson:

It does not seem plausible that there is a strict rule fixing the occasions on which we should attach significance to the order in which conjoined sentences appear in a conjunction: the difference between ‘They got married and had a child’ and ‘They had a child and got married.’ Interpreters certainly can make these distinctions. But […] much that they can do should not count as part of their linguistic competence. The contrast in which is meant or implied by the use of ‘but’ instead of ‘and’ seems to me another matter, since no amount of common sense unaccompanied by linguistic lore would enable an interpreter to figure it out. Paul Grice has done more than anyone else to bring these problems to our attention and help to sort them out. (Davidson 1986: 161-162)

But how, exactly, does the sorting work? If descriptive content, reflecting what is said, falls within semantics and if what is conversationally implicated (e.g. the ‘for all I know, not both p and q’ upper-bounding implicatum associated with the utterance of the disjunction “p or q” or the negative effect of the Gricean letter of recommendation) falls within pragmatics, where does conventional implicature fall? One standard view – impossible to confirm directly, since Grice never refers to pragmatics as such3 – is that by falling outside what is said, the conventionally

\[2\] Note that even metalinguistic negation is ruled out here: \#She isn’t poor BUT honest, she’s poor AND honest. Rejection of the implicature requires a more explicitly metalinguistic device, as noted in the text below.

\[3\] Of course, Grice could have referred to pragmatics. We need to be even warier of similar representations about Frege, as when Kaplan (1999: fn. 12) claims Frege would have said that epithets
What utterer meant

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>what U said</th>
<th>what U implicated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>conventionally</td>
<td>non-conventionally (e.g. conversationally)</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Figure 5.1: The meaning tree: two versions

implicated is pragmatic (see e.g. Gutzmann 2008: 59). One argument on this side is terminological; in Kaplan’s words,

According to Grice’s quite plausible analysis of such logical particles as “but”, “nevertheless”, “although”, and “in spite of the fact”, they all have the same descriptive content as “and” and differ only in expressive content […] The arguments I will present are meant to show that even accepting Grice’s analysis, the logic is affected by the choice of particle, as it should be on my view of logical validity as the preservation of truth-plus rather than (merely) descriptive truth. If this is correct, then generations of logic teachers, including myself, have been misleading the youth. Grice sides with the logic teachers, and though he regards the expressive content as conventional and hence (I would say) semantic (as opposed to being a consequence of his conversational maxims), he categorizes it with the maxim-generated implicatures. (Kaplan 1999: 20-21)

To be sure, conventional implicatures are implicatures. But then again, they are conventional; we are indeed dealing here, unlike in the maxim-based cases, with aspects of content. In essence, the question comes down to which of the two diagrams in Figure 1 we take to more faithfully represent Grice’s thinking.

While most exegesis (including Horn 1989: 146 as well as Kaplan above) focuses on the unity of the implicature category and thus opts for the left-hand tree, it is arguably the right-hand tree, adapted from Neale 1992: 523, that more accurately reflects what is said by Grice.

Two decades after the William James lectures, Grice revisits the status of these categories in his Retrospective Epilogue (“Strand Five”, Grice 1989: 359-365), where he differentiates central and non-central modes of meaning by invoking the two criteria of formality (“whether or not the relevant signification is part of the conventional meaning of the signifying expression”) and dictiveness (“whether

“do not contribute to cognitive content and thus the study of their use belongs not to semantics but to pragmatics”. Given that the semantics/pragmatics distinction postdated Frege by several decades, we cannot be certain just how Frege would have classified his curi and nag, much less his Boches.
or not the relevant signification is part of what the signifying expression says”). If, for example, a speaker says “p; on the other hand, q” in the absence of any intended contrast of any kind between p and q,

one would be inclined to say that a condition conventionally signified by the presence of the phrase “on the other hand” was in fact not realized and so that the speaker had done violence to the conventional meaning of, indeed had misused, the phrase “on the other hand.” But the nonrealization of this condition would also be regarded as insufficient to falsify the speaker’s statement. (Grice 1989: 361)

It is formality without dictiveness that yields conventional implicature, although the latter term itself appears nowhere in the Epilogue.

If conventional (or F-)implicature for adversatives like but and on the other hand is a matter of non-truth-conditionally projecting but encoded content (cf. S. Barker 2003), just what is this content? Dummett (1973), like Bach decades later, points out that the implicature contributed by but cannot involve simple “contrast” between the clauses it connects:

Frege’s account of ‘but’ is incorrect: the word is indeed used to hint at the presence of some contrast; but not necessarily one between what the second half of the sentence asserts, and what you would expect, knowing the first half to be true […] If a club committee is discussing what speakers to invite, and someone says, ‘Robinson always draws large audiences’, a reply might be ‘He always draws large audiences, but he is in America for year”; the objector is not suggesting that a popular speaker is unlikely to go to America, but that, while Robinson’s popularity as a speaker is a reason for inviting him, his being in America is a strong reason against doing so. The word ‘but’ is used to hint that there is some contrast, relevant to the context, between the two halves of the sentence: no more can be said, in general, about what kind of contrast is hinted at. (Dummett 1973: 86)

While Dummett (and Bach) find Frege (and Grice) too restrictive in spelling out what p but q adds to p and q, others have proposed alternative treatments, invoking not contrast – even context-dependent contrast – but surprise or denial of expectation, i.e. the unexpectedness of q given p. Relevance theorists have argued that but and related discourse connectives involve procedural rather than conceptual meaning (Blakemore 2002; Hall 2007), but others have questioned this distinction or its application (Hansen 2003; Pons Bordería 2008; Rieber 1997). But neither contrast nor unexpectedness in themselves account for the role played by but clauses in argumentation (Anscombre & Ducrot 1983; cf. also Merin 1999: 203-209 for a formalization within decision-theoretic semantics): for a speaker uttering p but
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$q$, $p$ constitutes an argument for $r$, while $q$ constitutes a stronger argument for $\neg r$. Dummett’s first committee member presents a reason for inviting Robinson; the objector, while conceding this point, offers a stronger reason for not inviting him. The lack of any intrinsic contrast between the two clauses connected by but is underlined by the possibility of $p$, but $q$ too or the frame illustrated in the sampler in (3); here and below, the diacritic $\gamma$ marks examples obtained by Googling.

(3) a. $\gamma$War is hell, but so is withdrawal.
b. $\gamma$Breast cancer is unfair, but so is life.
c. $\gamma$Divorce is hell, but so is a bad marriage.
d. $\gamma$Boyfriend is visiting soon, but so is my period!!?

An argumentation-sensitive account of the non-truth-conditional contribution of but also makes sense of an otherwise puzzling asymmetry in the interpretation of $p$ but $q$ clauses; the perspectives urged toward the subject in (4a) and (4b) are very different indeed.

(4) a. He is rich but he is dissolute.
b. He is dissolute but he is rich.

(Cf. Blakemore 2002: 103 and Vallée 2008: 422 on the asymmetry of but.)

So just what is the contribution of but and why is it so hard to pin down? This difficulty is widely recognized. Blakemore (2002: 53-54), for example cites the “elusive quality of but”, noting elsewhere that other discourse particles like well are also “frustratingly elusive” (Blakemore 2002: 128); cf. Hall (2007: 155-156) for similar observations. More generally, as we shall observe, this “descriptive ineffability” (to adopt the term from Potts 2007c) is a trait symptomatic of conventional implicatures in general. (But see Gutzmann 2013 [this volume] for some reservations.)

5.4 Conventional implicature and its discontents

For Grice (1989), a conventional implicature $C$ associated with an expression $E$ manifests the following two definitional properties:

- by virtue of being conventional, $C$ constitutes a non-cancelable aspect of the meaning of $E$

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4There are occurrences of but that conform more naturally to a contrast analysis than a denial-of-expectation or argumentative approach, as in (i), from a New York Times article “In North Carolina, Lawsuit Is Threatened Over Councilman’s Lack of Belief in God” (Dec. 13, 2009):

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- by virtue of being an implicature, C’s truth or falsity has no effect on the truth conditions of E.

As we have seen, Frege’s comments on (what Dummett calls) “tone” have received mixed reviews at best, in part because Frege collected such phenomena largely for the purpose of setting them aside rather than in any attempt to characterize them positively. In this respect, too, he foreshadows Grice, whose goal in (briefly) delineating the category of conventional implicature was more to say what token exemplars are not – viz., part of what is said or of what can be rationally calculated – than to say what they are.

The first attempt to formalize Grice’s notion is Karttunen & Peters’s (1979) proposal to fold the better established – but, they argue, inconsistently defined – relation of presupposition into conventional implicature, for which they offer a multidimensional non-truth-conditional treatment of even and related particles within an extended version of Montague Grammar. On the their analysis, (5a) entails (and indeed is logically equivalent to) (5b) while conventionally implicating both (5c) and (5d) (or the conjunction of the two).

(5)  
\begin{enumerate}
\item a. Even [Bill\_f] likes Mary.
\item b. Bill likes Mary.
\item c. Existential implicature: There are other x under consideration besides Bill such that x likes Mary.
\item d. Scalar implicature: For all x under consideration besides Bill, the likelihood that x likes Mary is greater than the likelihood that Bill likes Mary.
\end{enumerate}

For Bach (1999), on the other hand, the putative instances of conventional implicature nominated by Grice or Karttunen & Peters – or by Frege under other labels – involve either secondary aspects of what is said (as with even, but, although, still, and similar particles) or higher-level speech acts (as with adverbial modifiers like frankly or to tell the truth). Bach’s principal argument against the Fregeo-Gricean line on but centers on the behavior of “ACIDs” (alleged conventional implicature devices) in embedded contexts. Without rehearsing the issues here, I note that Bach’s arguments based on his “IQ [indirect quotation] test” –

An element of a sentence contributes to what is said in an utterance of that sentence if and only if there can be an accurate and complete indirect quotation of the utterance (in the same language) which includes that element, or a corresponding element, in the ‘that’-clause that specifies what is said. (Bach 1999: 340)

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5As with but, the content of the implicature(s) associated with even have been matters of contention for some time; cf. Kay 1990, Horn 1992, Francescotti 1995, Rieber 1997, and Schwenter 2002 for some relevant considerations.
– have been challenged on a number of fronts by, among others, Carston (2002: §2.5), Blakemore (2002: 56-8), S. Barker (2003), Hall (2007), and Greenhall (2007). In addition to his arguably myth-conceived dismissal of conventional implicatures, Bach (1999) also objects to the particular analysis of but sketched by Frege and Grice, and in this he (like his precursor Dummett is quite correct, as we have noted. Similarly, Grice’s invocation of conventional implicature for the analysis of therefore –

In some cases the conventional meaning of the words used will determine what is implicated, besides what is said. If I say (smugly), *He is an Englishman; he is, therefore, brave*, I have certainly committed myself, by virtue of the meaning of my words, to its being the case that his being brave is a consequence of (follows from) his being an Englishman. But while I have said that he is an Englishman, and said that he is brave, I do not want to say that I have *said* (in the favored sense) that it follows from his being Englishman that he is brave, though I have certainly indicated, and so implicated, that this is so. I do not want to say that my utterance of this sentence would be, *strictly speaking*, false should the consequence in question fail to hold. (Grice 1989: 25-26)

– has been challenged on empirical grounds by Bach (1999), Neale (1999, 2001), and Predelli (2003). Defending this analysis is certainly a more difficult task in the case of therefore than it is for its fellow candidates but and after all (along with several of Frege’s nominees). For Grice, while *q because p* says that the truth of *q* follows from that of *p*, *p therefore q* only implicates this connection, but this judgment is not widely shared. This is likely a point on which speakers differ; it is certainly possible that the status of aspects of word meaning could shift from beyond to within the umbrella of what is said (or what Potts calls “at-issue” meaning), as indeed recognized by Frege:

Of course borderline cases can arise because language changes. Something that was not originally employed as a means of expressing a thought may eventually come to do this because it has constantly been used in cases of the same kind. A thought which to begin with was only suggested by an expression may come to be explicitly asserted by it. (Frege 1897/1979: 241)

It is plausible that this kind of shift, exemplified in the well-known euphemism treadmill, could be responsible for the instability of implicated vs. “at-issue” meanings of particles and other expressions.

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6One germane objection raised by S. Barker (2003: fn. 21) is that Bach, in applying the IQ test to ACIDs embedded under *said that*, “assumes that the ‘said-content’ locution as used in ordinary language tracks the theoretical notion of said-content, but there are no cogent reasons for holding this.”
Bach’s revised analysis of but and therefore proceeds from his rejection of the “OSOP” (One-Sentence-One-Proposition) assumption and his consequent advocacy of multi-dimensional semantic analyses. For a (paleo- or neo-) Fregean or Gricean addressing the status of connectives like but, the relevant question here is not whether two or more propositions may be expressed (directly or indirectly) by the utterance of a given sentence, but what the consequences for the truth conditions of that sentence are when one of these propositions is false. For Bach, both the conjunction and the (context-dependent) contrast between the conjuncts qualify as components of what is said in p but q; our reluctance to brand (1a) false if just the (1b) component fails to hold derives not from (1b)’s status as (merely) implicated but from the fact that it is not the primary assertion.

In his book-length treatment of the relation, Potts (2005) follows Bach in arguing for the asserted or, in his terminology, “at-issue” status of the but/even class but at the same time he rebrands Grice’s conventional implicature category for his own class of “CIs”, encompassing (what he takes to be) the non-at-issue contributions of expressives (that jerk), supplements (e.g. non-restrictive relatives and appositives), epithets, and honorifics. But while the notion of secondary assertion, invoked in one form or another by both Bach (1999) and Potts (2005), is a useful construct, it appears to be a better fit for some of the “CI” cases in Potts’s catalogue than it is for the original range of phenomena falling under F-implicature. Thus, consider the case of appositive or non-restrictive relative (NRR) clauses as in Frege’s (1892: 38) celebrated example in (6).

(6) a. Napoleon, who recognized the danger to his right flank, himself led his guards against the enemy position.
   b. Napoleon recognized the danger to his right flank.
   c. Napoleon himself led his guards against the enemy position.

Such cases, pace Potts 2005, do involve two asserted propositions, although the assertion in the relative clause (6b) is backgrounded or secondary. Frege maintains that the falsity of either (6b) or (6c) results in the falsity of (6a), although his intuition is not universally shared. In fact, whether we are inclined to judge a sentence false on the basis of the falsity of its contained NRR clause depends on our assessment of the significance of that information in that clause for the overall claim. Thus, New Haven, which is the capital of Connecticut, is the home of Yale University might count as (misleading but) true as an answer to a question about the location of various Ivy League colleges but false as an answer to a question about which state capitals host Ivy League institutions, given that Connecticut’s

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7 Other critics of the Gricean notion include Stanley (2002), whose constraint on the relation between what is said to what is communicated, his “Expression-Communication Principle”, is inconsistent with conventional implicature, and Iten (2005), who challenges the Fregean-Gricean approach from the Relevance-theoretic perspective. (See also the Carston 2002 and Blakemore 2002 references on procedural meaning cited above.)
capital is Hartford.

A strong argument for Frege’s dual-assertion analysis for such cases is the insertability of an overt performative within the NRR, which indicates that such clauses are part of at-issue (even if backgrounded) rather than merely implicated (or presupposed) content.

(7) a. The bank bailout bill, which I hereby pledge to support, is immoral and unconscionable.
   b. The qualifications of this woman, whom I hereby nominate, are unquestionable.

Similar results hold for the not only p but (also) q construction (Horn 2000), where p and q are both at issue in Potts’s sense but q is foregrounded with respect to p, whether or not q in fact entails p. Once again, evidence from the distribution of overt performatives indicates that both p and q are put forward as assertions, promises, etc., as seen in the attested examples in 8, due respectively to Oprah Winfrey and http://www.a-weddingday.com.

(8) a. ²Not only do I hereby retract my claim, but I also hereby apologize to the cattlemen in the great state of Texas.
   b. ²Not only do I promise to be a good and faithful husband to you, but also to be a patient, loving father to [children’s names].

But does the pattern seen in such clausal constructions extend to but, still, even, and similar particles? It’s hard to find any examples that would support the argument.

A more direct objection to the dual-said-content analysis of such cases is that the falsity of the “backgrounded” content (relating to contrast, unexpectedness, etc.) may render the host sentence inappropriate but not false (cf. S. Barker 2003). In these cases – contra Bach (1999) and Potts (2005) – the traditional Fregean line, distinguishing what is F-implicated from what is said from remains eminently solid. ⁸

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⁸The argument here does not automatically extend to nominal appositives, which do appear to be robustly non-at-issue. I cannot discuss Potts’s treatment of parenthetical supplements as CIs here except to note that supplements do not map onto simple embedded structures. While Potts (2005: 92) takes (i) and (ii)

(i) Max, it seems, is a Martian.
(ii) It seems that Max is a Martian.

to be equivalent, this cannot be the case, since “but he isn’t really” can only be felicitously appended in the latter case. Similarly, compare (iii) and (iv) (assuming coreference):

(iii) It seems that Max is older than he (really) is.
(iv) #Max, it seems, is older than he (really) is.

See Amaral et al. (2007b) for other problems with Potts 2005, and Harris & Potts (2009a) for a response, focusing on the controversial speaker-oriented criterion for CIs.
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Nor are these the only expressions that lend themselves to this approach, as exemplified by the case of epithets and other expressives, where the Potts (2007c) approach is consistent with the Fregean tradition.

Williamson (2003, 2009), in his spirited defense of Frege’s account of pejoratives (e.g., *cur, Boche*) in terms of (proto-)conventional implicature, insightfully addresses a potential objection to an F-implicature-based analysis of pejoratives: How can we reconcile the intuition that someone might assent to (9a) and reject (9b) with the claim that the difference between *dog* and *cur* is merely a matter of Fregean “tone” and not sense?

(9)

a. Every dog is a dog.

b. Every dog is a cur.

Williamson (2003) responds:

Such problems undermine Frege’s simple account of propositional attitude ascriptions, not his claim that pairs like ‘*cur*’ and ‘*dog*’ have the same truth-conditional meaning. For similar problems arise even for pairs of synonyms with the same tone. Kripke (1979) gives the example of the synonymous natural kind terms ‘*furze*’ and ‘*gorse*’. A speaker might […] acquire normal competence with both without being sure that they refer to exactly the same kind of plant. Thus ‘He believes that all *furze* is *furze*’ and ‘He believes that all *furze* is *gorse*’ appear to differ in truth-value. It does not follow that ‘*furze*’ and ‘*gorse*’ are not synonyms after all. Such problems show nothing special about pejoratives. Whatever the right account of propositional attitude ascriptions, it is compatible with the Fregean view that ‘*cur*’ and ‘*dog*’ differ in tone but not sense (truth-conditional meaning). (Williamson 2003: 262)

Williamson’s line on epithets is challenged by Hom (2008), but this critique is based on a misunderstanding, as shown by Hom’s claim that on the conventional implicature account of ethnic slurs “the derogatory content is merely implicated and not part of what the sentence literally says (i.e. derogatory content is not part of the semantic content of the sentence)” (Hom 2008: 423). But semantic content

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9As the editors, Daniel Gutzmann and Hans-Martin Gärtner, point out, *cur* may shift to incorporate the negative ascription (= ‘mongrel’ or ‘obnoxious dog’) into its truth-conditional content. This shift, an instance of the reanalysis envisaged by Frege in the passage cited above, may be coerced in contexts like “I like (most) dogs, but I despise curs.” Similar remarks apply to human-referring epithets.

10While Hom (2008: 423) also finds “pragmatic minimalists” like Williamson guilty of holding epithets to be entirely synonymous with their nonpejorative correlates, no theorist who distinguishes what is meant from what is said (allowing for aspects of encoded meaning in the former category) actually regards *dog* and *cur*, or (to take Hom’s example) *Chinese* and *Chink*, as synonymous pairs. The same objection applies to Ludlow’s (2012) defense of the claim that the “differences in application”
is not identical to truth-conditional content. Conventional implicatures constitute part of *encoded* content but not part of *truth-conditional* content (differing in this respect, as argued above, from appositives and non-restrictive relatives):

The conventional implicature possessed by a sentence S is not part of its force, but is a part of S’s semantic content [. . .] Nevertheless, S’s implicature makes no contribution to S’s truth-conditions. (S. Barker 2003: 3)

Beyond discourse particles (*but, even, Ger. ja, doch, Jap. yoku(mo)*), there are more candidates for F-implicature status than were dreamt of in Frege’s or Grice’s philosophy, ranging from second person pronouns in most Romance, Germanic, and Slavic languages, the full domain of expressive language (from slurs and epithets to honorifics and intensifiers), evidentiality markers bearing on the source of information or the strength of speaker’s commitment (cf. Aikhenvald 2004; Davis et al. 2007; Faller 2012; Matthewson et al. 2007), and the uniqueness or maximality condition on definites (Horn & Abbott 2012).

One of the strongest cases for F-implicatures involves second person “T/V” pronoun choice, illustrated by the distinction between *tu* and *vous* in French or *du* and *Sie* in German. More clearly than *but* (and certainly *therefore*), the T/V distinction does not involve what is said, “makes no difference to the thought”, and leaves truth conditions unaffected, but it does involve conventional, non-calcuable aspects of meaning. Notice that even if we accepted the verdict of Bach’s IQ tests for adversative connectives like *but, still*, and *even*, the contribution of the familiar vs. formal pronouns fails these tests and thus cannot constitute part of what is said: if I am on formal terms with you, I cannot remind you that #Votre mère a dit que tu dois lui donner un coup de téléphone (*Your (formal) mother said that you (fam.)"

between *a* and *the* do not preclude their sharing the same “semantical content”:

[M]any synonyms [sic] customarily are put to different uses. Take, for example, Grice (1961, 1975) on the distinction between ‘but’ and ‘and’. On Grice’s account ‘but’ and ‘and’ literally mean the same thing, but different “conventional implicatures” are associated with them; ‘but’ implicates a sense of contrast between the conjuncts. (Ludlow 2012: 386)

As argued in Horn & Abbott 2012, if there is no semantic (encoded) difference between indefinites and definites, there is nothing from which to derive their putative pragmatic differences.

Levinson (1983: 128-129) suggests, but does not pursue in detail, a conventional implicature-based analysis of T/V pronoun choice. A speaker’s move from the T to the V form, or vice versa, will often generate *conversational* implicatures signaling an increase in intimacy, alienation, contempt, etc.; it is the static if complex values of the pronouns of power and solidarity (Brown & Gilman 1960, Mühlhäusler & Harré 1990, T. E. Zimmermann 1997, Taavitsainen & Jucker 2003) that lend themselves to an F-implicature treatment. See Keenan 1971 for an earlier treatment of T/V pronouns in terms of pragmatic presuppositions, Kaplan 1999 and Greenhall 2007 for use-conditional approaches, Potts 2007c: §4 for a CI analysis, and Sauerland 2007 for a critique of unified accounts of pronouns and epithets based on their differential behavior with respect to perspective shifting in indirect discourse.
should give her a phone call’) even if what your mother said to you earlier was indeed *Tu dois me donner un coup de téléphone*. In Potts’s terms, the T/V choice is very much “speaker-oriented” in the fashion of canonical CIs.\textsuperscript{12}

The choice between *Tu as tort* and *Vous avez tort* (‘You’re wrong’) is based on the speaker’s assessment of the social context, not truth conditions. Similar remarks could be entertained for natural gender, such as the choice between *he* and *she* in English or analogous gender distinctions in other languages, which have been treated in presuppositional terms (Büring 2005; Cooper 1983). Thus in affirming “*Tu es soûl*”, my belief that a certain social relationship obtains between us and that you are male is not part of the thought or of what is said; both propositions are indeed *communicated*, but what is said is simply that you’re drunk. If this is right, then what is said in all of the variants in (10) is identical.

(10) a. *Tu es soûl.* ‘You (sg., masc., familiar) are drunk’
b. *Tu es souêle.* ‘You (sg., fem., familiar) are drunk’
c. *Vous êtes soûl.* ‘You (sg., masc., formal) are drunk’
d. *Vous êtes souêle.* ‘You (sg., fem., formal) are drunk’

Kaplan (1999) has advocated extended notions of “validity-plus” and “truth-plus” within the “semantics of use” to deal with the expressive aspects of meaning contributed by hypocoristics, ethnic slurs, epithets, and interjections, as well as second person pronouns and other honorifics,\textsuperscript{13} but his observations are in fact consistent with the spirit of the Fregean/Gricean approach; cf. Gutzmann 2008 for a use-conditional analysis of German modal particles (*ja, doch, wohl, halt*, et al.) that bridges the gap between F-implicatures and Kaplan’s semantics of use.

In this connection it may be worth responding to one attempt to refute the view of the T/V distinction through the lens of conventional implicature. Tsohatzidis (1992: 572) observes that while (11a) could be true (if I do always use the V form in speaking to Paul), its counterpart in (11b) is necessarily false, indeed self-falsifying. The same facts hold in reverse for (12a), (12b); it is an illocutionary contradiction for me to use the second-person singular to Paul while denying I would ever do so.

\textsuperscript{12}Such pronouns, in indexing both a second-person referent and an appropriateness condition, seem to cast doubt on Potts’s (2005: 7) generalization (2.5) that “No lexical item contributes both an at-issue and a CI meaning”, but – as Chris Potts reminds me – pronouns are feature complexes that don’t constitute “lexical items” in the relevant sense. Another problem for generalization (2.5), as noted in Horn 2007: fn. 9 and Williamson 2009: fn. 16, is posed by expressives take the form not of adjectival modifiers or appositives (“that damn guy”, “that asshole Joe”) as in Potts 2005 but of nominal epithets per se (“I wouldn’t hire that scoundrel”, “Why did you vote for that asshole?”). In these cases, a lexical item does “contribute both an at-issue and a CI meaning” – no problem, of course, for the echt Fregean/Gricean view. More recently, McCready (2009b) proposes a “mixed content” line on numeral classifiers in Japanese, on which the truth-conditional contribution of the numeral combines with the CI meaning of the nominal classifier.

\textsuperscript{13}Analyses of honorifics and other expressives in terms of Pottssian CIs are given in Potts & Kawahara 2004, McCready 2004, 2010, Potts 2007c, and Kim & Sells 2007.
Je vous parle toujours au pluriel, mon cher Paul. (T)
Je te parle toujours au pluriel, mon cher Paul. (F)

Je ne vous parle jamais au singulier, mon cher Paul. (T)
Je ne te parle jamais au singulier, mon cher Paul. (F)

Similar considerations apply to the contrast in (13) (= ‘I now begin to use the T form to you’).

En ce moment, je commence à te tutoyer. (T)
En ce moment, je commence à vous tutoyer. (F)

Thus, Tsohatzidis concludes, the T/V distinction must be truth-conditionally relevant, ruling out a conventional-implicature-based analysis.

But this argument really hinges not on the truth-conditional contribution of second person pronouns but on the formal role of self-reference here and in analogous cases, e.g. those in (14) and (15), where it would be unwarranted to infer that I and yours truly are referentially distinct or that we must distinguish the contribution to compositional semantics of Bart and Lisa vs. Lisa and Bart.

I never refer to myself in the third person. (T)
Yours truly never refers to himself in the third person. (F)

I never refer to Bart and Lisa in alphabetical order. (F)
I never refer to Lisa and Bart in alphabetical order. (T)

Thus, pace Tsohatzidis, self-referential or metalinguistic minimal pairs of the kind seen in (11)-(13) don’t disprove the thesis that the T/V distinction is truth-conditionally irrelevant. (Arguably, other considerations are involved here; see T. E. Zimmermann 1997 for elaboration.)

Summarizing where we stand at this point, I have supported the Fregean approach positing non-truth-conditional “F-implicatures” for a wide range of cases, including particles like but and even where Potts (following Bach) diagnoses the relevant backgrounded contributions of meaning as secondary aspects of what is said. I have maintained that even if we grant the two dimensions of meaning posited by Bach and Potts (and indeed by Karttunen & Peters), we have no compelling evidence against the Fregeo-Gricean position and for the claim that the second dimension (contrast, unexpectedness, etc.) affects the truth conditions or “thought” of the containing sentence. On the other hand, a Pottsian CI analysis of “supplements” like the non-restrictive relative clauses of Frege’s Napoleon example (6) or the related not only clauses in (8) is less compelling; in this case, we do indeed have evidence for two at-issue clauses, where the failure of either may affect the truth conditions of the sentence as a whole. In a third set of cases involv-

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14 As the editors point out, the metalinguistic nature of examples like (11)-(13) is further supported by the non-content-driven “contradiction” of Je te parle toujours en anglais, mon cher Paul.
ing expressive meaning, including epithets and T/V pronouns, the F-implicature approach and the CI approach elaborated in Potts 2007c and similar work coincide.

Before turning to a construction (and its relatives) that provides additional grist for the Fregean/Gricean mill, let us attempt to depict the landscape of (non-)at-issue meaning. The F-implicatures we have discussed – for but, even, T/V pronouns, epithets, etc. – are distinct from the assertorically inert entailments discussed in particular Horn 2002, 2009 as exemplified in exclusives (e.g. only), exceptives (e.g. nobody...but) and approximatives (almost, barely). An inert entailment is not asserted but it is entailed, thus constituting a truth condition for the entailing sentence: Only Pat passed is false if nobody passed. An F-implicature, by definition, cannot be a truth condition for the implicating statement.\textsuperscript{15}

Thus we have the (non-)at-issue relations as given in Table 5.2.

Table 5.2: (non-)at-issue meaning relations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>implicature</th>
<th>assertorically inert entailments</th>
<th>assertion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>conversational</td>
<td>conventional</td>
<td>secondary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is part of encoded meaning?</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affects truth-conditions</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is asserted? (=at issue?)</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Projects? (e.g. takes wide scope)</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>example</td>
<td>or, some</td>
<td>but, T/V</td>
<td>only, almost</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>F-implicature</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{15}Thus, for example, the exclusive proposition (i) has the inert entailment in (ii) and the ordinary (asserted) entailment in (iii).

(i) a. Only Lee passed the test.
    b. Lee can pass that test.
    c. No one other than Lee can pass that test.

Similarly, the approximative in (iia) entails both (iib) and (iic), but only the latter entailment is asserted.

(ii) a. Robin almost passed the test.
    b. Robin didn’t pass the test.
    c. Robin “came close to” passing.

5.5 Frege got him a new locus classicus: The personal dative and F-implicature

A shibboleth of Southern and Appalachian non-standard U.S. English is the optional appearance of a nonsubcategorized “personal dative” pronominal in transitive clauses which obligatorily coindexes the subject and whose semantic contribution is ill-understood. This personal dative (PD) bears suggestive if not always straightforward relations to constructions involving the distribution of morphosyntactically distinct dative marking in such languages as French, German, Warlpiri, Hebrew, and Old English involving what have been variously termed ethical, free, non-lexical, or affected datives. Some of these non-indirect object datives are coreferential with the subject (e.g. Je me prends un petit café) while others (to be surveyed in §5.6 below) are non-coreferential (e.g. Ils lui ont tué son oiseau); they typically invite benefactive and malefactive (adversative) understandings respectively.

Our focus in this section is the English personal dative, on display in a range of traditional country and mountain ballads and their modern descendants [boldface used here to indicate coreference, not contrast or focus]:

(16) a. And now I’ve married me a pretty little wife
    And I love her dearer than I love my life.
    (“Rake and Rambling Boy”, trad.)

b. I’m gonna buy me a shotgun, just as long as I am tall.
    (Jimmie Rodgers, “T for Texas”)

c. When I was a young girl, I had me a cowboy.
    (John Prine, “Angel From Montgomery”)

d. Now the Union Central’s pulling out and the orchids are in bloom,
    I’ve only got me one shirt left and it smells of stale perfume.
    (Bob Dylan, “Up to Me”)

The ordinary pronominals here contrast minimally with the reflexive in e.g. I’m gonna sit right down and write myself a letter. (The PD counterpart I’m gonna write me a letter would also be possible in the relevant dialect when me is not an indirect object/goal argument.)

While first person singular “bound” pronominals predominate, second and third person cases are also possible in the backwoods:

(17) a. Ø₁ Get you₁ a copper kettle, Ø₁ get you₁ a copper coil,
    Cover with new-made corn mash and never more you’ll toil.
    (“Copper Kettle”, traditional ballad)

b. My daddy he once told me
    Don’t you love you any man
    (Dusty Springfield, “We’ll Sing in the Sunshine”)
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(18) Raised in the woods so’s he knew every tree
    \[\text{[pro]}\] Kilt him, a b’ar when he was only three.\(^{16}\)
    (“Ballad of Davy Crockett”)

Note that the PDs above co-occur the with other well-known instances of Appalachian English features (cf. Wolfram & Schilling-Estes 1998) – the determiner in *them jugs*, the verb forms *lay* and *kilt*, the noun *b’ar* [= *bear*], contracted *so-[a]s*, *a*-prefixation and “g-dropping” in *a-fillin*.\(^{17}\)

Moving from lyrics to prose, we find PDs – while still restricted to (informal) register – ranging freely over person, number, and geography; these examples are set in Chicago, New York, Minnesota, and Philadelphia respectively.

(19) a. “I’m going to have to hire me a detective just to follow you around.”
    (1988 Sara Paretsky novel, Blood Shot, p. 191)

b. “It’s too bad we don’t have any of those hellebores”, I say. “We could drop them in the Meer and poison us some fish.”
    (2006 Ayelet Waldman novel, Love and Other Impossible Pursuits, p. 224)

c. “If you attend church just to go through the motions, God’d rather you get you a bottle of bourbon and a whore and go to a hotel and have you a good time.”
    (Uncle Al in Garrison Keillor’s Lake Wobegon Summer 1956 (2001), p. 274)

d. I keep logs of illegal huntin’ here on the wildlife preserve. Poachers, hunters – they come by at night, tryin’ to pinch ‘em some deer meat.
    (Ranger to detectives on “Cold Case”, CBS, 28/11/04)

As seen in (20)-(23), PDs are not restricted to argument positions; they occur where true datives (including true reflexive goals) cannot, they fail to saturate the subcategorization frame of ditransitives, and they co-occur with an external subcategorized indirect object:

(20) a. I need me a Coke.

\(^{16}\) Alternatively, the PD may be cataphoric to the subject of the next line, “Davy, Davy Crockett/King of the wild frontier”, rather than linked to a pro subject. Unfamiliarity with the regional markers in the relevant line in the insular 1950s led some hearers to misparse the relevant line as “Killed in a bar when he was only three” despite the pragmatic implausibility of such a reading within the context.

\(^{17}\) In the absence of such features, the PD may strike listeners as anomalous or even patronizing, as seen in the negative reaction by a blogger to the line “She said she married her an architect” in Dan Fogelberg’s 1980 pop classic “Same Old Lang Syne”: “Did she really say ‘I married me an architect?’ Or is Fogelberg, who seems capable of standard usage, the kind of guy who would say, ‘Dag nabbit, she up ’n married her an architect’” (http://whatstherumpus.blogspot.com/2005/12/more-stupid-holiday-songs.html). This same Dagnabbit Effect may have cost John Kerry the 2004 election when he entered a small town grocery in rural Ohio and infamously asked “Can I get me a hunting license here?” (See Horn 2008: §4 for elaboration.)
b. I seen me a mermaid once.
   (from movie “Hunt for Red October”)

(21) a. He bought (himself/him) a new pick-up.
   b. He needs {*himself/him} just a little more sense.
   c. What I like is goats. I jus’ like to look at me some goats.
      (Sroda & Mishoe 1995)

(22) a. She fed {*her/herself} some chitlins.
   b. She gave {*her/herself} a big raise. (vs. She got her a big raise.)

(23) a. He’s gonna buy {him/*himself} a pick-up for his son.
   b. He’s gonna buy (*him) his son a pick-up.
   c. I need me a little more time for myself.

Semantically, the salient property of PDs is their lack of effect on the truth conditions of the sentences in which they occur. Syntactically, the salient features of PDs are their restriction to appearance as clitics or weak pronouns attaching to the verb (*I want yours truly some grits), their optionality, and their apparent violation of Principle B, their appearance outside subcategorized positions – and their failure to satisfy subcategorization requirements, as in (22). I argue in Horn 2008 that because PDs are not arguments, they are ipso facto not co-arguments with the subject and therefore do not trigger the co-argument version of Principle B advocated by Pollard & Sag (1992) and Reinhart & Reuland (1993).\(^1\)

The grammatical and sociolinguistic characteristics of the Personal Dative construction (PDC) are explored in more detail in Christian 1991, Webelhuth & Dannenberg 2006, Conroy 2007, Horn 2008, and Hutchinson & Armstrong to appear; we shall concentrate here on the semantic and pragmatic implications of its distribution. Just what is the semantic contribution of the non-argument pronominal to the clause in which it occurs, given that it does not alter truth conditions? What are the characteristics of predicates that license PDs? First, while many naturalistic occurrences of PDs involve such verbs as get, buy, make, have, want, and need, one relatively recent addition to the set of licensers is worth noting. Since Toni Braxton’s pop song “I Love Me Some Him” (lyrics by SoulShock & Karlin, Andrea Martin, and Gloria Stewart) reached the top of the charts in 1997 –

I love me some him
I’ll never love this way again
I love me some you
Another man will never do

\(^1\)While pronominal PDs are thus allowed, this does not in itself rule out the appearance of reflexives as an alternate option, as the editors point out. As is well known, the usual complementary distribution of pronominals and anaphors does not preclude their overlap in some environments, such as picture noun contexts (She read a story about her(self)) and non-argument PPs (He pulled a robe around him(self)), and this may apply here as well; see fn. 23 below.
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– the title has generated a snowclone\textsuperscript{19} of the form \textit{I (Just) Love Me Some X}. Note that X here is not semantically quantified (the singer does not adore just an unspecified subpart of her beloved) but is a name, pronoun, generic, etc. that only occurs with an indefinite to satisfy the constraints on the direct object (theme) argument in the PDC. Thus Owens’s declaration below essentially reduces to the observation “I love myself.”

(24) \textit{The “I love me some” snow clone}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textbf{I LOVE ME SOME ME}
\begin{itemize}
  \item – slogan popularized by American football player Terrell Owens (a.k.a. “T.O.”)
\end{itemize}
\item \textbf{I just love me} some Jude Law.
\begin{itemize}
  \item – posting on salon.com
\end{itemize}
\item \textbf{My husband} used to \textit{love him} some Jack Daniels.
\begin{itemize}
  \item – Halle Berry’s character to Billy Bob Thornton’s, ”Monster’s Ball”
\end{itemize}
\item \textbf{I love me} some fat bitches! More cushion for the pushin’. [generic, not existential \textit{some}!]
\begin{itemize}
  \item – The rapper Redman, in 2001 movie “How High” (gracia Kelly Nedwick)
\end{itemize}
\end{itemize}

As in the examples cited earlier, these PDs typically involve positive affect, often conferring a benefit to the subject. Thus compare the minimal pairs in (25) and (26), in which the personal dative is marked or unacceptable for most speakers in the absence of intention.

(25) \begin{itemize}
\item a. \textbf{He} shot \textbf{him} two squirrels.
\item b. \#\textbf{He} (got drunk and) shot \textbf{him} two coonhounds (by mistake).
\end{itemize}

(26) \begin{itemize}
\item a. \textbf{She} caught \textbf{her} a catfish.
\item b. \#\textbf{She} caught \textbf{her} a \{cold/case of the clap\}.
\end{itemize}

Predictably, the versions in (26b) are fine in the unlikely event that the cold or case of the clap was contracted intentionally. Affect-linked asymmetries in the licensing of PDs are reflected in the data in (27), reflecting google entries surveyed on March 1, 2009.

(27) \begin{itemize}
\item a. I love me some X: 1,020,000 vs. I hate me some X: 23,400 (\textit{Yankees, exams, emo})
\item b. She loves her some X: 833 (\textit{grapefruit, sparkly dance boys, Ozzy, chocolate, jesus, Halloween, Z cars, kraft dinner}) vs. She hates her some: 7* (\textit{J. Lo, Mao})
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{19}See the wikipedia entry at \url{http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Snowclone} for much more on snowclones. PDs themselves (along with their international cousins; cf. §5.6 below) have become trendy enough to make it into Language Log; see Mark Liberman’s “On beyond personal datives?” November 2009 post on “I nearly stepped on me a dog” (\url{http://languagelog.ldc.upenn.edu/nll/?p=1863}), my guest post (\url{http://languagelog.ldc.upenn.edu/nll/?p=1868}), and the (over 80) comments they sparked.
c. I want me some X: 650,000 (fonts, Krispy Kremes, candy, monitors, ...)

d. I saw me some X: 28,400 (relating to entertainment, fun, goal attained, etc.)

e. I found me some X: 142,000 (happiness, friends) vs.
   I lost me some: 7* (clothes)

[*of which one is a link to Horn 2008]

When *see* licenses PDs, it typically alludes to the result of a conscious effort of looking; along the same lines, consider the 2007 Toby Keith song lyric “I’m gonna get my drink on/I’m gonna hear me a sad song” (gratia Will Salmon), in which the sad song is not encountered accidentally but deliberately sought out.\(^{20}\) Even the examples with apparent negative affect are often more positive than it may initially appear; many of the *I lost me some X* examples occur in the frame *I lost me some weight*, where the loss is the result of intentional action.

In other cases, a PD with negative affect is facilitated by local syntagmatic priming, often in a contrastive context. Thus a blog evaluating the movie Serendipity, which featured John Cusack as protagonist and fate and destiny as plot elements, includes the verdict “I love me some John Cusack. I hate me some Fate and Destiny.”

Another factor favoring the appearance of PDs is the spontaneous, occasion-specific nature of the utterance, typically signifying the satisfaction of a current intention, need, or desire; this is the NONDISPLACEABILITY property of CIs noted by Potts 2007c, although others (e.g. Amaral et al. 2007b, Gutzmann 2013 [this volume]) have challenged the reliability of this diagnostic. In 28 – the response of Miss South Carolina (the geographically challenged contestant in the 2007 Miss Universe pageant\(^{21}\)) to the query “What’s the first thing you’ll do when you get home?” – the PD expressing the speaker’s current dining plans disappears in the reportive follow-up.

(28) [I’m gonna] eat me some hamburgers. I haven’t eaten hamburgers in three years.

Moving the PD from the first sentence to the second (“I haven’t eaten me hamburgers in three years”) renders the utterance less likely, even for Miss South Carolina.

While many PDs (with *get, buy*, etc.) directly involve possession, others – in particular with *need or want* – look forward to a future possession marking the completion or satisfaction of a current modal or propositional attitude, as in (29),

\(^{20}\)Fellbaum (2005: 236) notes that the “agent as beneficiary” construction tends to exclude perception verbs, as in her "?!I saw me an accident on the road and ??I hear me some noises in the street, but this exclusion is based on the assumption that the subject lacks the relevant Toby Keith-style intention.

\(^{21}\)Cf. [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1j3iNxZ8Duw](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1j3iNxZ8Duw).
from Michael Montgomery’s extensive database.

(29) **He needs him** just a little more sense.

Both *need* and *want* are typically analyzed as embedding possession – to need (or want) is to need (or want) to have\(^{22}\) – and *have* is a canonical PD predicate. Other attested examples are more recalcitrant, extending the construction to contexts in which the “personal” dative is impersonal (although still benefactive in a sense) or affective but not obviously benefactive, even in an extended sense:

(30) a. That house needs it a new roof. (Sroda & Mishoe 1995)
b. He rode him around with a head in his trunk for a week. (M. Montgomery, p.c.)

Narrowing down the contexts in which PDs appear (or appear naturally; it’s hard to determine any absolute exclusions, especially as the construction spreads beyond its original home turf) helps determine the meaning they contribute. But what is the status of that meaning? If PDs are not subcategorized by the verb, and *a fortiori* not (indirect) objects (the “Southern Double Object” label of Webelhuth & Dannenberg 2006 notwithstanding), what are they? If personal datives do not constitute arguments of the predicate, what is their semantic contribution, if any, to the sentences in which they appear?

Unsurprisingly, I take PDs to contribute an F-implicature of subject affect, imposing a use-conditional constraint on its felicitous assertion, viz. that the speaker assumes that the action expressed has or would have a positive effect on the subject, typically satisfying the subject’s perceived intention or goals. Note in particular that PDs share with (other) F-implicatures the property of descriptive ineffability cited above: the content of such implicatures is notoriously elusive.\(^{23}\) In this respect, it patterns with

(31) *the implicature of effort or difficulty associated with manage*

*the source of the positive or negative assessment in the implicatures associated respectively with deprive and spare* (Wilson 1975)

*the nature of the contrast/unexpectedness implicated by but* (see discussion in §5.2)

\(^{22}\)Evidence includes the distribution of time adverbials modifying the interval of possession: *I {need/want} your printer until tomorrow afternoon (for a week, . . . )*; cf. e.g. Dowty 1979: 269-271.

\(^{23}\)As Geurts (2007) points out in his critique of Potts 2007c, the presence of ineffability can at most be a necessary, not sufficient, condition on expressives and other candidates for non-at issue meaning, since at-issue meaning in many cases – including, although not limited to, those involving vagueness – may well be (relatively) ineffable in their own right. One response, which I cannot pursue in depth here, is that while there may be fuzzy boundaries in the extension of terms like *green* or *languid*, to take two of Geurts’s examples, the core of their meaning contribution is not infected with ineffability as it is for the examples of non-truth-conditional effects under discussion here (extending to *but* and *even*, where, unlike Potts, I invoke conventional implicature). Thanks to the editors for drawing my attention to the relevance of Geurts’s discussion.
the characterization of the scalar F-implicature associated with even (relative or absolute? unlikelihood or noteworthiness?)

the nature of the expressive attitude embodied in racial and ethnic slurs and other epithets (Potts 2007c; Williamson 2003, 2009)

the precise notion of uniqueness, maximality, or individuability constituting F-implicature of definite descriptions (cf. Horn & Abbott 2012 and references cited therein)

the appropriateness implicatures for tu vs. vous or other T vs. V 2nd person sg. pronouns within a given context in a particular sociolinguistic community of practice (T can be affectionate, presumptuous, comradely, or condescending; V can be polite, aloof, diplomatic, or hostile; cf. Brown & Gilman 1960; Greenhall 2007; Mühlhäusler & Harré 1990; Taavitsainen & Jucker 2003; T. E. Zimmermann 1997)

Thus the fact that it is difficult to pin down precisely what it is that PDs contribute to the semantics of the sentences in which they occur, as eloquently demonstrated by the literature on the construction, is an indirect argument for situating that meaning – however it is to be represented – as an F-implicature.

But what motivates (or permits) this property of ineffability for F-implicatures? It is plausible that the edges of truth-conditional meaning should be discrete, while inconsistency in the mental representation of non-truth-conditionally relevant content is less pernicious. If you know generally that my use of vous rather than tu signals something in the range of formal respect, distancing, and/or lack of intimacy, my precise motives can remain underdetermined, but if you don’t know whether I’m using a 2nd person or 3rd person pronoun, the indeterminacy would be more serious. Similarly, you will want to know whether I bought the car for myself or for my son, and hence to whom an indirect object pronoun refers, but whether or not you can figure out precisely why I affirm “I bought me a car for my son” rather than simply “I bought a car for my son”, no difference in argument structure or truth conditions will arise.

Another feature of the PD that speaks to its F-implicature status is its resistance to negation. We saw in (27) above that PDs generally prefer emotively positive contexts that reflect the fulfillment of the subject’s intentions or goals. More generally, we noted the contrast between love (± the relevant snowclone) and hate. In fact, there are over 300,000 raw google hits for “I don’t love me some X”, but these tend overwhelmingly to involve either syntagmatic priming or the canceling effect of double negation:

(32) “love me some” under negation
Okay, I don’t love me some Adam Sandler, the way I love me some Cadbury Eggs and the way I love me some latex kitchen gloves. But his new movie, Punch-Drunk Love, . . .

Just because I’m not watching Elf repeatedly does not mean I don’t love me some Christmas.

Which is not to say I don’t love me some Wham!

At what point do fanatics say to themselves, ‘Okay, I know killing is supposed to be all wrong and shit, but dammit if I don’t love me some God!’?

Indeed, most negated love me some cites are of the form “(It’s) not/It isn’t that I don’t love me some X”, “Don’t think that I don’t love me some Y”, “I can’t say I don’t love me some Z”, etc.

When we move to other predicates, the results are similar. Some empirical contrasts, courtesy once again of Google (Nov. 1, 2009), with some outliers indicated:

(33) Polarity constrasts with PDs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predicate</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“I have me some”</td>
<td>22,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“I have me a”</td>
<td>37,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“I don’t have me a/any”</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“I lack me a/any”</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“I want me some”</td>
<td>677,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“I don’t want me any”</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“I like me some/a”</td>
<td>130,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“I don’t like me any/a”</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“I dislike me some/any/a”</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As is well known, many of the standard examples of F-implicature are essentially impermeable to ordinary negation. If you tell me She’s poor but happy and I am willing to grant that she possesses both properties but reject any expectation that poverty and happiness generally contrast, it’s not clear how I can convey this, especially with a simple negative (?She’s not poor but happy). Not even Hercules can lift that stone doesn’t negate Even Hercules can lift that stone, but instead paraphrases Even Hercules can’t lift that stone. Some F-implicata can be attacked only with metalinguistic or echoic negation, while others (e.g. the assumptions con-

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24 Gutzmann (2008), for example, shows that ja (implicating that the proposition is already known to the hearer), along with other modal particles like halt (implicating the obviousness of p), doch, and wohl, as opposed to truth-conditionally relevant particles like nur, allein, vielleicht, scopes out of negation. We return to the link between German Modalpartikeln and non-argument datives in the following section.
veyed by the use of epithets or T/V pronouns) consistently scope out of negation. Once again, the behavior of the PD construction as positive polarity items effectively resisting the scope of negation is consistent with their treatment in terms of F-implicature, a conventional but non-truth-conditional contribution to content.

With PDs, a complicating factor may be the typically benefactive nature of the construction; the subject is understood to intend and/or be positively affected by, the action in question. There is thus a conflict between the negativity, in the emotive or evaluative sense, of negation (cf. Horn 1989; Potts 2010) and the positivity of PDs. Thus, it is not surprising when a television commentator declares of a college football team that “Auburn hired them one heck of an offensive coordinator” (heard 6 Jan. 2009); a parallel declaration following a characteristically disappointing season that “The Mets fired them another manager” would be far less likely, even controlling for regional differences.25

5.6 Around the world with non-argument datives

In the Construction Grammar based treatment of the “Southern double object” advocated by Webelhuth & Dannenberg (2006), the personal dative construction is taken to be a sui generis idiom, precluding any effort to seek a systematic relationship between the non-standard English construction and non-subcategorized datives in other languages that index either the subject or non-subject referents.26 The term free dative (cf. also non-valence, extended, or sentence dative) is sometimes employed as a cover term for what we will see is a family of related constructions.


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25The editors point out another factor for the asymmetry here, viz. the “negativity of negation” (Horn 1989, Potts 2010). In Horn 2008: 179, I attribute the virtual lack of anaphoric X’s ass (cf. Beavers & Koontz-Garboden 2006) in PDs – despite the very occasional ‘God loves his ass some kidneys’ (‘God loves kidneys’) or ‘I need my ass some gingko biloba’ – to the clash between the adver
sative nature of metonymic X’s ass and the benefactive nature of PDs. In naturally occurring instances of this kind, e.g. ‘(You should) get your ass some help/therapy’, the metonymic (non-proctological) occurrence of your ass ‘marks not simply a pejorative attitude, but rather the speaker’s impatience toward the addressee/subject’, who will indeed achieve a positive affect by following the prescription.

26As Adele Goldberg reminds me, there is nothing intrinsic to Construction Grammar itself that rules out a systematic attempt to relate the PDC to non-argument datives in other languages.
across many languages and language families are offered by Lamiroiy & Delbecque (1998), Hole (2006), Bosse et al. 2012, and the papers in Hole et al. (2006). While space prevents a full travelogue, some relevant high points of the journey will be explored briefly here.

We begin our tour with French, in which a coreferential construction bearing apparent connections with the PD occurs in informal or colloquial usage, typically (but not exclusively) with 1st person subjects and common monosyllabic verb forms:

(34)  
a.  *Je me bois un bon café chaud.  
   lit., ‘I drink me a good hot coffee’  
b.  *J’ouvre le frigo, je me bois un verre de vin rouge, je me détend dans mon canapé.  
   ‘I open the fridge, I drink (me) a glass of red wine, I relax on my couch’  
c.  *Je me lis tantôt la Bible et le Coran, du Porno et du mystère.  
   ‘I read (me) sometimes the Bible and the Koran, porno and mysteries’  
d.  *Je me fais un voyage.  
   [6210 hits, mostly 1st person]  
   ‘I make (me) a trip’  
e.  *Manger pour elle deveint secondaire ou alors elle se prend un repas devant le pc.  
   ‘Eating becomes secondary to her, or she has (her[ self]) a meal in front of her p.c.’

Note that when a 3rd person example is attested, as in (34e), the reflexive clitic is mandatory; *Elle lui prend un repas . . . is impossible.  

While standard German lacks directly parallel subject co-referential datives (as opposed to the non-coreferential non-argument datives discussed below), Silke Lambert has called my attention to a similar construction in the Westphalian/Niederrhein dialect area:

(35)  
a.  Ich trinke mir jetzt einen Kaffee.  
   lit. ‘I drink me a coffee now’  
b.  {Er/Sie} trinkt sich jetzt einen Kaffee.  
   lit. ‘He/She drinks himself/herself a coffee now’

As in (34e), only a reflexive is possible in 3rd person cases, not the simple pronominal.  

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27The appearance of non-argument reflexive clitics in such cases can be taken as evidence for different OT-style rankings of the relevant soft constraints, where the preference for reflexive marking of locally coreferential nominals clashes with the preference for restricting non-logophoric reflexives to co-arguments. It is worth noting that for some speakers English PDs may themselves take the form of reflexives rather than pronominals, as in the 2008 Mariah Carey song lyric “The whole entire world can tell/That you love yourself some me” [gratia Ben Zimmer].  
28For additional related discussion, see the WordReference Forum thread on sich etwas es-
The constructions in (34) and (35) are similar to, but more constrained than, the English PD; cf. also range of Polish datives described by Dąbrowska (1997). The “Lamedh” or le-marked dative of Biblical Hebrew is a more distant cousin, occurring in collocations glossed as ‘Get thee away’, ‘Turn thee aside’, or ‘Our bones are dried up, our hope is lost, we are cut off’ (Ez. 37:11, lit. ‘We are cut us off the parts’): cf. Gesenius 1910: §119, Muraoka 1978. In fact, as Elitzur Bar-Asher informs me (p.c.), while translators are typically advised to leave the Lamedh untranslated, Gesenius (1910: 381) describes it as a dativus commodi or incommodi, i.e. benefactive/malefactive dative, “used – especially in the colloquial language and in later style – in the form of a pronoun with [le-] as an apparently pleonastic dativus ethicus, with many verbs, in order to give emphasis to the significance of the occurrence in question for a particular subject. In this co-anchornstruction the person of the pronoun must always agree with that of the verbal form.”

This construction is an intransitive cousin of the PD; note the reference to its “apparently pleonastic” character. A similar extended use of subject-coreferential datives is found in late Latin “dans l’usage populaire, pour indiquer d’une façon plus intensive la part que le sujet prend à l’action; beaucoup de verbes se sont ainsi construits, notamment des verbes de mouvement” (Bourciez 1930: §118c):

A millennium later, we find something similar closer to home – not only in archaic intransitives (“Now I lay me down to sleep”, “Get thee hence”) but in a more direct forerunner to the PDC.29 (Sweet 1900) describes the “pleonastic dative” of Old English in analogous terms (boldface added as usual for coreference and underlining to highlight passages of particular relevance):

In OE a personal pronoun in the dative is often added reflexively to a pronoun in the nominative but without materially affecting the meaning, as in hē ondrēd him þone mann ‘he was afraid of the man’, literally ‘feared for himself’, hie gewiton him ‘they departed’. (Sweet 1900: §1106)

Over a century later, Keenan (2003) independently provides an updated take on this construction:

[F]rom Late OE through ME we also find many non-theta (pleonastic) occurrences of pronouns. They do not satisfy either a semantic role requirement or a syntactic requirement of the verb. In OE they are

29Curme (1931: 107) describes both the “reflexive dative” PD-style transitive construction (“Let every soldier hew him down a bough” [Macbeth]), now “more common in popular speech than in the literary language” (“I want me a woman who can milk” [Lucy Furman’s “The Quare Women”, 1923]), and its intransitive counterpart in the form of a “weak, almost pleonastic, dative of interest [...] after sit, lie, and verbs of motion and fearing” (I sit me down, I dread me, He walked him forth) in texts from Shakespeare and Marlowe to Byron and Tennyson.
usually dative [. . .] They are always bound to the local subject, agreeing with it in person, number and gender and serve semantically to heighten the involvement of its referent: e.g. the subject acted intentionally or was involved in the action in some way other than the role it has in virtue of being the subject argument. (Keenan 2003: §1.2)

Keenan’s examples include the sentences in (36)

(36) a. forðæm hi him ondrædœ dœ frecenesœ dœ hi ne gesioœ
   because they them fear the danger that they not see
   CP.433 c880

b. ac he ne wandode na him metes to tylienne. . . & nam
   but he not hesitated at all him provisions to provide . . . and took
   him on orfe & on mannum & . . . gewende him pa east werd
   him in cattle and in men and . . . went him then eastward
   to his feder & gewendon heom pa begen east weard . . .
   to his father and went them then both eastward . . .
   Chron(E)1052

Like those in ancient Hebrew and Latin, the Old/Middle English “pleonastic” datives mark heightened subject involvement but occur in transitive as well as intransitive clauses.

Traveling to yet another continent, we find pronominal non-argument coreferential datives Down Under in Warlpiri, as described by Simpson (1991: 382):

(37) a. ka-nyanu kuyu nyanungu-ku pi-nyi.
   PRES-REFL meat it-DAT hit-NONPAST
   Liwirringki-rlj-ji.
   Lizard sp.-ERG-EUPH
   ‘. . . it kills itself animals, that Lizard’

b. Palkarni-rlipa-nyanu yalumpuju ngalipa-ku-jala
   scarce-1PL.SBJ-REFL that.near we.PL.INCL.-DAT-CLEAR
   marda-rni.
   hold-NONPAST
   ‘We’ll keep these scarce things just for ourselves’

Commenting on this construction, Legate (2001) notes its similarity to English ‘I’m gonna bake me a cake’, i.e. the PDC.

In addition to the non-argument subject-coreferential datives surveyed above, in many languages the involvement of non-subject participants not subcategorized by the predicate may also be indexed by dative (pro)nominals. Typically (although not invariably), these non-argument datives are restricted to pronouns (sometimes
to “speech-act”, i.e. 1st and 2nd person, pronouns) and often serve to mark adversative or maleficiary rather than beneficiary affect, as in the French imprecation *Foutez-moi le camp*. One language with a particularly robust array of free datives is German. Discussing the examples in (38),

(38)  

a. Helf *mir* mal deinem Vater in der Kühe.  
_ help me-DAT a-minute your-SG father in the kitchen_  
‘Go help your father in the kitchen for a minute for me’

b. Der David hat mir der Claudia schon zuviel Geschenke gegeben.  
_the-David has me-DAT the-Claudia-DAT already too-many gifts-ACC given_  
‘I think [lit., ‘To me’] David has already given Claudia too many presents’

Maling (2001: 432) comments:

This extra dative […] is interpreted as a beneficiary or person adversely affected by the event […] I assume that this dative is not subcategorized for by the verb. As an adjunct rather than an argument, it is not a grammatical object, and thence not a counterexample to the descriptive generalization that German allows at most one dative object per clause. (Maling 2001: 432)

Although not co-indexing the subject in the manner of PDs, these datives are thus similarly non-subcategorized, non-arguments, and non-objects, and Maling’s reference to adverse affect is the negative counterpart of our characterization of the usual semantic value of PDs. Indeed, Gutzmann (2007) analyzes the contribution of the “dativus ethicus” in contexts like (38a) as a conventional implicature expressing “that the speaker has some personal interest in the hearer’s execution of the action requested.”

However, Gutzmann (p.c.) notes that (38b) is not in fact a _dativus ethicus_ but a _dativus iudicantis_, allowing 3rd person (and non-pronominal) objects that can be fronted and questioned, unlike ethical datives. A case can be made that such examples, as distinct from true ethical datives, do contribute to truth-conditional rather than just use-conditional meaning and are thus less suited to an F-implicature-based analysis.30 As stressed by Draye (1996), Gutzmann (2007), Lambert (2007, 2010), and others, “free datives” represent a continuum, members of a dative family. The relevant properties of the family members include their syntactic optional-ity, non-argument status, non-extractability, preference for pronominal and in par-

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30Parallel situations are attested elsewhere. Thus Sawada (2010) argues that the Japanese particle *chotto* contributes at-issue content when it functions as an amount minimizer but contributes only C1 content when it functions as an expressive minimizer. Cf. Davis et al. 2007 for similar observations about the epistemic and expressive value of various evidentials.
ticular 1st person form, and affectedness (Betroffenheit), unpacked by Lambert as the cognitive/emotional involvement of the referent (based on the speaker’s assessment). By these criteria, it is only the true ethical datives that are clear candidates for the analytical option of F-implicature.

Similar “affected dative” constructions have been posited for older English (Curme 1931: 106-109), for Romance (see e.g. Leclère 1976, Barnes 1985, Authier & Reed 1992, and Herschensohn 1992 on the “non-lexical” datives of French and Cuervo 2003 on Spanish), and for Modern Hebrew (Berman 1982, Halevy 2007, Linzen 2008).

In French, German, Serbian/Croatian, Modern Hebrew, and other languages, the non-coreferential cases are often seen as extending to possessive datives. Thus we obtain paradigms like (39) (culled from above sources; glosses mine); note that lexical dative NPs are ruled out in these environments, as seen in (39d).

(39) a. Paul se tape un pastis.
   ‘Paul knocks (him) back an anisette’
   [“Reflexive dative”, marking the subject’s interest; cf. (34)]

b. Au mont St. Michel, la mer te monte à une de ces vitesses!
   ‘At Mont St. Michel, the sea rises (on you) at an incredible speed’
   [“Ethical dative”]

c. Il te lui a donné une de ces gifles.
   ‘He gives her a slap (on you)’

d. Jean lui a attrapé deux rhumes. (*Jean a attrapé deux rhumes à sa mere.)
   ‘Jean caught {her/*his mother} two colds.’

e. Les mains lui tremblent.
   ‘His hands are shaking’
   [“Possessive dative”]

Lamiroy & Delbecque (1998) gather this family together under a single umbrella:

[T]he possessive and the ethical dative are different manifestations of one and the same basic phenomenon, viz. that of introducing entities into the sentence structure which, from a syntactic point of view, are not lexically predicted by the verb and which semantically correspond to entities that are not actively involved in the process but nonetheless affected by it, in one way or another. (Lamiroy & Delbecque 1998: 63)

Possessive datives have unsurprisingly been candidates for F-implicature-oriented analyses, complete with ineffability effects. In her study of external possessive constructions in Northern Pomo, Spanish, and Czech, O’Connor (2007) argues that EPCs, which index “[the] speaker’s stance or judgment with respect to the outcome of the event for the possessor”, allow the speaker to “exploit a relatively
underspecified conventional implicature to convey scorn, respect, distance, or empathy, or to otherwise enrich hearer’s understanding of their stance toward the fate of the extra-thematic possessor.” But there are differences among the members of the dative family as well as similarities, especially in their syntax. Berman (1982: 49-50), while acknowledging that “extended” datives in Hebrew (including possessors, benefactives, and others) “have in common the sense of association or involvement of someone with an event for which he is not responsible, and of which he is not the direct patient, an event by which he is nonetheless affected, either favorably or adversely”, distinguishes the more restricted ethical datives from other members of its “extended” family, including the possessives.

Extended datives, such as those in (38), are indeed all animate and “affected” by the action of the clause without being related to the valency of the verb. Instead, they involve “sentence datives” à la Curme (1931), Draye (1996), or Burridge (2003). But following Barker & Dowty (1993), possessives are arguments – viz., nominal arguments of the possessee – while ethical datives are echt non-arguments, which may be one factor for the differences cited in the literature, e.g. the fact that passives are fine with lexical datives in French, somewhat unnatural with possessive datives, and totally out with ethical datives (Lamiroy & Delbecque 1998: 64; glosses theirs).

(40) a. Ce livre lui a été donné par son grand-père.
   ‘This book was given to him by his grandfather’

   b. ??La figure lui a été cassée par la police.
   ‘His face was broken [i.e. he was stabbed] by the police’

   c. *Une de ces gifles te lui a été donnée. ‘He got one of those smacks (to your detriment)’

Similarly, in Hebrew it is only the ethical datives and the PD-type subject coreferential datives that completely block extraction and allow only clitic form (cf. Borer & Grodzinsky 1986; Halevy 2007).

A similar conclusion is reached independently by Gutzmann (2007) for ethical datives, the title of whose paper, “Eine Implikatur konventioneller Art: Der Dativus Ethicus”, plays off that of Wegener’s (1989) paper on modal particles, “Eine Modalpartikel besonderer Art: Der Dativus Ethicus.” Indeed, we find sentences that allow a variety of readings extending from the members of the dative family

31 Whence the “Dead Possessor Effect” described in Burridge 2003, Hole 2006, and elsewhere. The minimal pair in (i) is from Burridge 2003 (her (43)/(44)), although the editors point out that the anomaly is reduced with an impersonal subject (Man zog dem Toten . . .).

(i) Wir zogen dem Verletzten/#Toten die Jacke aus.
   ‘We took off the injured/#dead person’s coat’

(See Hole 2006, Linzen 2008, and Bosse et al. 2012 for reflexes of the dead possessor effect in Mandarin, Hebrew, and Albanian respectively.) A genitive in an example like (i) would freely allow either a living or dead possessor, since it is the link between datives and affectedness that is crucial.
(including those manifesting the EPC) to modal particles, involving in each case the contribution of an F-implicature. Thus (41), from Lambert (2007), following Schmid (1988), allows dativus commodi, dativus incommodi, and/or external possessive readings: did Max cut the roses for his girlfriend, did he spite her by cutting them (cf. “Max cut the roses off on her”), or did he just cut off her roses?

(41) Max schneidet seiner Freundin die Rosen ab.

\[ \text{Max cuts his-FEM.DAT girlfriend the roses off} \]

(Lambert 2007: (17), from Schmid 1988: 153)

Similarly, Lambert (2007: (21)) notes, the implicature contributed by the ethical dative in (42a) (a line from Empfang, a poem by Richard Dehmel) could equally well be contributed by ja, the Modalpartikel in (42b), either alongside or instead of the dative particle.32

(42) a. Aber komm mir nicht im langen Kleid!

\[ \text{but come me-DAT not in.the long dress} \]

b. Aber komm (mir) ja nicht im langen Kleid!

Studies of German modal particles (ja, doch, denn, halt, bloß, . . .) by Meibauer (1994), Wegener (2002), and especially Gutzmann (2008) have shown that while MPs often have homophonous non-MP doppelgängers, true MPs can be distinguished by their inability to bear stress and their tendency to be phonetically elided, by their semantically bleached meanings (as against their adverbal homophones), by their syntactically constrained distribution (appearing only in the middle field, and sometimes restricted by mood or illocutionary force), and by their inability to be questioned, focused, or negated, traits we have already seen to cluster with F-implicated material.33 Most strikingly, MPs can be suppressed salva veritate and with no palpable loss of informative content; they function epistemically to signal the speaker’s attitude about the proposition, rather than contributing to truth conditions. Thus, Gutzmann (2008: 52) notes that the four truth-conditionally identical statements in (43) differ in what is implicated, yielding different appropriateness or use conditions for all four:

(43) a. Peter is \( \emptyset \) ein Linguist. ‘Peter is a linguist’

b. Peter is ja ein Linguist. ‘... as you (should) know’

c. Peter is doch ein Linguist. ‘... in contradiction to an earlier claim’

d. Peter is halt ein Linguist. ‘... which is an incontrovertible fact’

32Other speakers find (42b) acceptable only with stressed ja, which rules out an MP reading given the diagnostics noted in the text. (Cf. Gutzmann 2008: 74 for related discussion.)

33In these and other respects, the “evidential” markers in St’át’í الاحتلال described by Matthewson et al. (2007) – reportative ku7, inferential k’a, and perceived-evidence -an’ – pattern strikingly like the German Modalpartikeln. For more on the semantic status of the meaning contribution of evidentials cross-linguistically, see also Faller 2002, 2012; Aikhenvald 2004; and Davis et al. 2007.
As Gutzmann (2008: 62) observes, use-conditional meaning (à la Kaplan 1999) may be a more accurate label than expressive meaning for these phenomena.

Our whirlwind tour of some of the world’s celebrated non-argument dative cites has barely scratched the surface of the complex range of phenomena involved, but it does suggest that the personal dative of non-standard varieties of American English, rather than constituting an isolated idiom, is in fact one representative of a wide class of non-argument affectees. Such affectees are typically marked as datives in languages with a more sophisticated panoply of case options than modern English retains, whence the semi-misnomer of “personal dative” for what is not formally a dative at all. In English, which lacks a weak clitic reflexive like Dutch zich or French se (cf. Reuland 2001), the non-argument status of the locally co-indexed element suffices to allow, or for most speakers in the relevant dialect to require, its representation as an ordinary pronominal, in apparent (but, I have suggested, not real) violation of Principle B.

Mention should be made of related constructions in which non-subject affectees appear as obliques (as in the English adversative My dog died on me) or as subjects (as in the adversative passives found in many languages); cf. Hole 2006 for a comprehensive study of “extra arguments”. To the extent that this terminology is well-taken, we are not dealing with (mere) F-implicature as with PDs and non-coreferential ethical datives; extra arguments, after all, are arguments.

While I have argued that PDs, as non-co-arguments, are exempt from Condition B, they can represent bound variables, as seen in the quantifier binding in (i) and the requirement for sloppy readings in (iiia) as opposed to the strict reading preferred in (iib), (iic) for contrastive focus (non-PD) pronominals (§2 Horn 2008: cf.).

(i) \{Everyone here/Only Billy Joe\} needs him a new pickup truck.

(ii)
   a. I need me a shotgun and so does Billy Bob.
      [sloppy identity only: we both do]
   b. I want ME to win and so does Hubert.
      [pref.: ‘Hubert wants me to win too’]
   c. I voted for ME and so did Hubert.
      [pref.: ‘Hubert voted for me too’]

For Conroy (2007), PDs – notwithstanding their pronominal appearance – are in fact anaphors, bound variables assigned case but no theta role, akin to SE anaphors on the theory of Reuland (2001). Note too that non-subject-coreferential (ethical) dative pronominals in Hebrew can be bound variables, as with the “affected experiencer” lo (iii), from Bosse et al. (2012: 98); (iii): translation modified)

(iii) Kol hor\(e_1\) hit-achen she-ha-yeled pi’tom baxa lo\(1\) be-emca ha-seret.
      every parent go-irritated that-the-child suddenly cried to.him/her in.middle the movie
      ‘Every parent\(1\) got irritated when their\(1\) child suddenly cried in the middle of the movie on them\(1\)’

Bosse et al. (2012: 1224) argue that in general “binding from the assertive content into the non-assertive content is allowed in natural language.”
5.7 F-implicature: some residual issues

I have tried to demonstrate the utility of what I call F-implicature, subsuming a variety of relations Frege introduces under different labels (or non-labels) along with Grice’s relation of conventional implicature (a.k.a. “formality without dictiveness”). Symptoms of F-implicature status include detachability, non-cancellability, and irrelevance to the truth conditions of (or the thought expressed by) the sentence that contains them. Additional characteristics include projection out of embedded contexts, the immunity to certain kinds of objection, and ineffability or context variation in the content of the implicature.

For both Frege and Grice, but not necessarily for linguists “concerned”, in Frege’s words, “with the beauties of language”, identifying the constructions in question – a motley collection of particles, speaker-oriented sentence adverbs, prosodic features, word order effects – serves largely to isolate them in terms of what they are not: they do not affect the thought, the truth-conditionally relevant meaning of a given expression, and at the same time they can’t be computed by general principles of rational interchange. We have expanded the collection (or cited other work that expands it) to encompass a number of other candidates for F-implicature status, including additive and scalar particles, evidential markers, 2nd person pronouns, epithets and other expressives, the uniqueness condition on definites, and non-argument personal datives.

Along the way, we have touched on Pottsian CIs, a class disjoint from Gricean conventional implicatures (and overlapping with their Fregean precursors). While I find Potts’s (and Bach’s) reanalysis of the classical implicature examples as part of what is said unpersuasive, his multiple-propositions approach does allow for an insightful description of clausal appositives and not only… but also constructions, where both expressed propositions are in principle truth-conditionally (rather than merely use-conditionally) relevant. But these are distinct from true F-implicatures, which do not involve “said-content”.

Finally, and again very much in the spirit of Grice’s (and Frege’s) views, Jayez (2004) and Jayez & Rossari (2004) argue that discourse markers are not part of what is said or asserted but constitute conventional implicatures, as they may be explicitly communicated and grammatically embedded, but are not asserted and...

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36 It should be clear that in referring to F-implicatures (or conventional implicatures) as truth-conditionally irrelevant (to what is said), I am not claiming – nor is Frege or Grice – that their own content is itself non-truth-conditional; cf. Bach 1999: 331-332 on this fallacy.

37 Thanks to Eliza Block for helping me organize these properties more coherently, while also raising doubts about whether the putative F-implicating devices really form a natural class. My current speculation is that the very salient distributional differences Block isolates within this category are attributable to the syntactic differences among the implicature triggers but I will have to defer these questions to another occasion.

38 See Salmon 2011 for an empirical argument that an analysis based on F-implicature (or classical conventional implicature) provides a better account of epistemic must than one invoking Pottsian CI or presupposition.
cannot be directly refuted. They argue further that presuppositions, as traditionally conceived, are a subset of conventional implicatures – those constituting part of given information. On the other hand, one argument for distinguishing between presuppositions and F-implicatures is based on the property of binding and filtering that has been recognized since Karttunen (1973) as characterizing presuppositions but that seems not to apply to F-implicatures:

(44) a. If he’s married, his wife is unhappy.
    b. #If there’s a contrast between poverty and happiness, they’re poor but honest.
    c. #If Max is obnoxious, that bastard just got promoted.
    d. #Si nous nous connaissons, tu es soûl.
       ‘If we know each other, you [fam.] are drunk’
    e. #If he wanted to listen to something sad, he just heard him a sad song.

On the topic of non-refutability, it is worth noting that besides the responses of “You’re wrong” or “That’s false”, which Jayez & Rossari (2004) show cannot attach to conventionally implicated material, another all-purpose refuter is “Bullshit!”, as explored by Ward (2003), who credits Craig Roberts for seminal work in this area. Substitution of bullshit for whaddaya mean produces anomaly:

(45) A: “Her name is Caroline. She’s an Italian girl but she’s pretty.”
    B1: “What do you mean, but she’s pretty, Ma?” Frank said.
       “Why not ‘and she’s pretty’?”
    B2: #“Bullshit, Ma.” Frank said. “Why not ‘and she’s pretty’?”

Bullshit! is equally incapable of overriding the F-implicature of even, as Merde! is for that of an inappropriate tu or vous. On the other hand, as Gregory Ward points out (p.c.), the causal component of therefore is a viable candidate for bullshit-rejection, which supports its banishment from the ranks of F-implicature:

(46) A: Lance loves musical comedies and has seen “Mamma Mia” twice.
    He is, therefore, gay.
    B: Bullshit. That doesn’t follow.

The PDC patterns with other cases of F-implicature on the bullshit diagnostic:

(47) A: Toby heard him a sad song.
    B: #Bullshit. He heard one, but no way it was on purpose.

39Geoff Shaw (p.c.) notes that there is considerable variation on the relevant judgments, and that for many speakers an implicature-rejecting “Bullshit” response may be felicitous in some contexts. Thus in Dummett’s example from §5.2 above, someone might reject the observation “Robinson gives good lectures but he is in Australia” by exclaiming “Bullshit! Our unlimited budget would cover the cost of the flight.” But even if this is acceptable (it’s marginal for me), it becomes totally impossible if the rebuttal consists of a bare “Bullshit!” This could only be used to refute one or both of the actual conjuncts, not the contrast between the reasons for and against inviting Robinson.
As Grice (1989: 46) acknowledges, “The nature of conventional implicature needs to be examined before any free use of it, for explanatory purposes, can be indulged in.” I hope to have shown here that for a range of expressive meanings in natural language, including a subset of non-argument datives, the careful indulgence in a coherent program for conventional but non-truth-conditionally relevant content, in the tradition of Frege (1879, 1892, 1897/1979, 1918) and Grice (1961, [1967] 1989), is free from bullshit.

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5. I love me some datives: Expressive meaning, free datives, and F-implicature


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