15
WJ-40: Issues in the Investigation of Implicature

Laurence R. Horn

Without actually employing the term ‘pragmatics’, Paul Grice laid out the map for modern pragmatic theory in his William James lectures of 1967 by setting out:

...a distinction...within the total signification of a remark...between what the speaker has said (in a certain favored and maybe in some degree artificial, sense of ‘said’), and what he has implicated (e.g., implied, indicated, suggested, etc.), taking into account the fact that what he has implicated may be either conventionally implicated (implicated by virtue of the meaning of some word or phrase which he has used) or non-conventionally implicated (in which case the specification of implicature falls outside the specification of the conventional meaning of the words used). (Grice 1989[1967]: 118)

While each genus of implicature has undergone rigorous scrutiny from many directions over the ensuing four decades, our attention here will be focused on the non-conventional species, particularly the dominant breed of conversational implicature. Conventional implicature has been buried (Bach 1999) or radically reconfigured (Potts 2005) but is on the rise; see Horn (2007b, 2008) for one attempt at rehabilitation and Gutzmann (2007) for a valuable new extension.

1. The Uses of Quantity

It has been recognized for millennia that assertions based on the particular, existential, or weak scalar operator some can express true propositions even when the stronger value all is known to hold, although the result (Some dogs are mammals, It is possible that 2+2=4) may appear awkward or anomalous. For Aristotle, whatever holds of all dogs holds ipso facto of some (Topics 109a3), and this view largely prevailed until the mid-nineteenth century, when Sir William Hamilton of Edinburgh posited a semantic distinction between two senses of some, the indefinite (at least some) and the semi-definite (some but not all), with the latter as basic: ‘Some, if not otherwise qualified, means some only – this by presumption’ (Hamilton 1860: 254). On this reading of the particular, the statements Some men are bald and Some men are not bald are not only (as for Aristotle) compatible (or ‘merely verbally opposed’), given that their conjunction is logically consistent, but are in fact indistinct: ‘in reality and in thought, every quantity is necessarily either all, or none, or some. Of these the third...is formally exclusive of the other two’ (ibid.: 261).

Hamilton’s lifelong nemesis, Augustus De Morgan, was quick to attack this approach. While acknowledging the existence in ‘common language’ of Hamilton’s ‘presumption’ whereby some conveys some not (not all), De Morgan defended the standard practice of relegating this inference to an extra-logical domain. For both De Morgan and his fellow anti-Hamiltonian John Stuart Mill, the delimiting of some is subject both to the effects of context and speech level and to the speaker’s epistemic state (as signalled by the added emphases below):

There are three ways in which one extent may be related to another...: complete inclusion, partial inclusion with partial exclusion, and complete exclusion. This trichotomy would have ruled the forms of logic, if human knowledge had been more definite. De Morgan 1858: 121)

No shadow of justification is shown...for adopting into logic a mere sous-entendu of common conversation in its most unprecise form. If I say to any one, ‘I saw some of your children today’, he might be justified in inferring that I did not see them all, not because the words mean it, but because, if I had seen them all, it is most likely that I should have said so: even though this cannot be presumed unless it is presupposed that I must have known whether the children I saw were all or not. (Mill 1867: 501)

The implied upper bound (=not all) associated with the ordinary language assertion of some is attributed here to a tacit principle that would need another century before its explicit formulation. An early stab at this principle is due to Strawson (1952: 178–9), who credits this ‘general rule of linguistic conduct’ to ‘Mr H. P. Grice’: ‘One should not make the (logically) lesser, when one could truthfully (and with greater or equal clarity) make the greater claim’. Grice’s own ‘first shot’ (1961: 132) at this ‘general principle governing the use of language’ was that ‘One should not make a weaker statement rather than a stronger one unless there is a good reason for so doing’, later refashioned as his (first) maxim of Quantity (Grice 1989: 26): ‘Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the talk-exchange).’ (For a survey of related, and in some cases independent, formulations of the principle within mid-twentieth-century
philosophy of language, see Horn 1990.) Note in particular the role of the boldfaced codicils above, which recognize the interplay of quantity with other factors, including clarity, quality (truthfulness) and relevance, represented by competing maxims in the Gricean framework.

In neo-Gricean frameworks (Horn 1972, 1989, 2004; Gazdar 1979; Levinson 2000), the maxim of Quantity

- is canonically induced by unilateral entailment relations between lexical oppositions
- motivates the establishment of quantity scales such as those in (1):

(1) <all, most, many, some> <no(ne), few/not many, not all>
<always, usually, often, sometimes> <never, rarely, not always>
<certainty, likely, possible> <freezing, cold, cool, lukewarm>
< and, or > <excellent, good, OK>
<the, a > <thumb, finger>

Based on such scales, the speaker's assertion of a relatively weak value Q(quantity)-implicates that she was not in the epistemic position to have asserted any stronger value (to its left) within the same scale (see Horn 2006b for a response). This accounts for the role of context in the cancellation and reinforcement of the upper bound of scalar predications, allows for generalizations across operator types (quantifiers, binary connectives, deontic and epistemic modals, non-embedding predicates), while obviating the need to invoke any lexical ambiguity for the relevant operators (e.g. inclusive vs. exclusive disjunction).

On this approach, scalar values are lower-bounded by their literal meaning ('what is said') and upper-bounded by quantity-based implicature. Thus the 'one-sided' meanings delivered by the linguistic semantics may be pragmatically enriched to yield the 'two-sided' understandings typically communicated:

(2) a. Pat has 3 children. ...
...at least 3...
... exactly 3...
b. You ate some of the cake. ...
... some if not all...
... some but not all...
c. It's possible she'll win. ...
... at least 0...
... 0 but not certain...
d. He's a knife or a fool. ...
... and perhaps both...
... but not both'
e. It's warm.
... at least warm...
... but not hot'

The alternative view on which each scalar predication in (2) is lexically ambiguous between one-sided and two-sided readings is ruled out by the Modified Occam's Razor principle (Grice 1989: 47): 'Senses are not to be multiplied beyond necessity'. (See Carston 2002 for a sceptical view of this heuristic and Bontly 2005 for an empirically supported defences of M.O.R. based on its role in language acquisition.)

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**Figure 15.1 Square of Opposition (Apuleius and Boethius, after Aristotle)**

The neo-Gricean approach to the subcontraries allows us to reconstruct Aristotle's notion of 'merely verbal' opposition between I and O vertices of the Square of Opposition as a relation of mutual quantity implicature, as shown in figure 15.1.

Scalar implicature provides a natural account of the lexicalization asymmetry of the Square of Opposition, an asymmetry displayed as table 15.1.

**Table 15.1 Lexicalization and the three-cornered square**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Determiners/quantifiers</th>
<th>Quant.adverbs</th>
<th>Binary quantifiers</th>
<th>Correlative conjunctions</th>
<th>Binary connectives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A: all α, everyone</td>
<td>always</td>
<td>both (of them)</td>
<td>both...and</td>
<td>and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I: some α, someone</td>
<td>sometimes</td>
<td>one (of them)</td>
<td>either...or</td>
<td>or</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E: no α, no one</td>
<td>never</td>
<td>neither (of them)</td>
<td>neither...nor</td>
<td>nor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(=always~some)</td>
<td>(=both~never)</td>
<td>(=both~or)</td>
<td>(=both...and)</td>
<td>(=and~)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O: *nall α, *neverone</td>
<td>*always</td>
<td>*noth (of them)</td>
<td>*noth...nand</td>
<td>*nand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(=some~all)</td>
<td>(=always~never)</td>
<td>(=either~noth)</td>
<td>(=either~or)</td>
<td>(=and~or)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Although *some* does not contribute the same semantic content as *some not (not all)*, the use of either of the two values typically results in communicating the same information in a given context, *some but not all*. The relation of mutual quantity implicature holding between positive and negative subcontraries results in the superfluity of one of the two for lexical realization, while the functional markedness of negation (see Horn 1989 for extensive documentation) predicts that the unlexicalized subcontrary will always be O rather than I. I have argued (Horn 1972: chapter 4; 1989: §4.5; to appear) that this pragmatic account of the ‘three-cornered square’ is more general and more explanatory than the rival theories that either dismiss the asymmetry as uninteresting or restrict it to the determiners and quantificational operators of anaphors of other operator types (e.g. connectives, adverbs, and modalities) along with intermediate values that can be mapped onto the Square of Opposition.

The neo-Greco-phonon position on scalar predicates has been vigorously challenged by relevance theorists (e.g. Carston 2002, 2004, 2005 and work reviewed therein), who take scalar predications to involve not lexical but propositional ambiguity, with the pragmatically enriched two-sided meanings constituting ‘explicatures’. While the standard neo-Greco-phonon line (Horn 1972, 1989; Levinson 2000) treats all the cases in (2) homogeneously, there is considerable evidence that this analysis is not actually tenable for number words, as in (2a). Rather, such predications are semantically underspecified, rather than assigned the weak, ‘at least n’ values by linguistic means; the propositional content is filled in only through reference to the context of utterance. Arguments for this position, originally given in work by Carston (1988) and Köenig (1991), are ratified and extended in later work including Horn (1992), Geurts (1998) and Bultinck (2005). But crucially, what’s sauce for the cardinals is not necessarily sauce for the other scalar values.

Thus, while Ariel (2004, 2006) disputes an implicature-based account of the upper bound of *most*-statements (i.e. the move from *most F are G* to ‘not all F are G’) in part on the basis of a putative parallel between *most* and the cardinals regarding the status of the upper bound, I have argued (Horn 2006a: §4) that *most* is crucially distinct in behaviour from the cardinals and that its meaning, like that of *some*, should be assigned the standard neo-Greco-phonon account (unilateral semantics cump upper-bounding scalar implicature). The strongest evidence for such a distinction is the fact that a simple negative answer to a general scalar question, as opposed to one involving a cardinal value, always returns a ‘less than’ meaning, since this context selects descriptive and not metalinguistic negation. If you ask me whether most of the students passed, my negative response commits me to the proposition that 50% or fewer passed, not to the disjunction that either 50%-or-fewer passed or else all of them did. Yet it is just such a disjunction that I must be asserting if my reply negates the proposition that ‘50% to 99% of the students passed’ as on Ariel’s semantic-upper-bound account.

On the other hand, if you asked me whether ten students passed and I knew that fifteen did, I must first determine whether you were asking me if at least ten passed or exactly ten passed before knowing whether to answer positively or negatively; a simple ‘No’ response to ‘Did ten of the students pass?’ would commit me to either ‘Fewer than ten passed’ or ‘Either fewer or more than ten passed’, depending on the context. Similarly, I would report that ‘I am surprised that most of the students failed’ only if I had expected at least half of them to pass, while my report that ‘I am surprised that five students failed’ is consistent with either a more pessimistic or more optimistic expectation.

In addition to the linguistic evidence collected in Horn (2006a) and other work, a new considerable body of empirical work has confirmed that the acquisition and processing of cardinals differs along a variety of parameters from that of other scalar values; note especially the studies in Papafragou and Musolino (2003) and Hurwitz et al. (2006), as well as Papafragou and Schwarz (2006) for empirical challenges to Ariel’s findings on *most*. Thus, while pride of place must be given to the important work of Carston, the behaviour of cardinals must somehow be distinguished from that of their inexact scalar cousins. It is not obvious to me how the unitary explicature-based programme for scalar operators is equipped to draw the necessary distinctions here, any more than is the approach in Levinson (2000: 87–90), which retains the original (Horn 1972) neo-Greco-phonon line for both cardinal and general scalar predications.

If (non-cardinal) scalar assertions are upper-bounded by scalar implicature, just what is it that a speaker quantity-implicates against? There is a major split on this issue between weak and strong treatments. Gazdar (1979) and Levinson (1983, 2000) are strong epistemic theorists, taking a speaker who asserts *p(j)* to implicate that she knows ~p(j), where j–i. For weak theorists, following Mill (1867) above, this implicature is a two-stage process: in telling you some of the students in the class are freshmen, I directly implicate that I don’t know/believe all of them are; it’s only if I assume that you assume my full knowledge of the situation (e.g. that I’ve checked through all the pre-registration forms) that I will implicate, and you will be licensed to infer, that I know not all of them are freshmen. (This last step embodies what Geurts 2009 has called the ‘Competence Assumption’.)

Weak epistemic theorists include Soames (1982), Hirschberg (1985), Horn (1989), Sauerland (2004), and Geurts (2009, to appear). But which weak treatment is warranted? Hirschberg takes the utterer of *p(j)* to implicate a disjunction: either the speaker knows the stronger proposition doesn’t hold or doesn’t know whether or not it holds (1985: 79–80). When S affirms that p(j) holds, ‘S believes that higher p(j) are false or S does not know whether higher p(j) are true or false’ (ibid.: 81). But this disjunction – S either knows p is false or doesn’t know whether or not p is true – in fact reduces to the implication that S does not know (for a fact) that p(j) is true, the position
adopted in Horn (1989: chapter 4). Essentially, Hirschberg takes S’s implicature to be the disjunction \((K \lor p) \lor \neg (K \land \neg K \lor p)\). This amounts to the claim that either nobody won or somebody-but-not-everybody won, equivalent in turn to the claim that not everybody won, since a disjunction of the E vertex of a logical square with the conjunction of the I and O vertices is equivalent to O, i.e. the contradictory of A (figure 15.2):

(I \lor E, as a disjunction of contradictories, is true by definition.) This result is intuitively correct: In saying it’s warm, I implicate that I don’t know for a fact that it’s hot. If you believe I know the actual temperature, you will strengthen this to infer that I’m communicating that (I know) it isn’t hot, but since there’s no guarantee of my epistemic security, this can’t be a first-order implicature.

Hirschberg (1985: chapter 5) represents the content of the relevant scalar implicatures in the form ‘\(\neg \text{BEL} (...)\); with a strengthening of ‘\(\neg \text{KNOW} \lor \text{BEL} \)’. But this strengthening is not warranted, for the following reason: I can say ‘It’s warm, and I believe it’s hot, but not (without anomaly) ‘It’s warm and I know it’s hot’. If I knew it was hot, I should have said so. But if I just believe it’s hot, I can’t really assert that it is without violating the second Quality maxim. I can only assert what I believe I know, not what I (merely) believe. What the utterance of \(p(i)\) implicates, ceteris paribus, is just that the speaker doesn’t know that \(p(i)\), for any \(p(i)\) stronger than \(p(i)\).

In sum, the use of a weaker value \(W\) (e.g. some, possible) suggests that for all the speaker knows no stronger value – and especially not the strongest value \(S\) – on the same scale (all, certain) could have been substituted salva veritate. a’s utterance of ... \(W\)... implicates not \(K_{\neg S}(S)\), i.e. that a knows the stronger counterpart... \(S\)... is false, but only (ceteris paribus) that \(\neg K_{\neg S}(S)\).

2. Implicatures and ‘strengthening’

In addition to the question of what is implicated, recent work has also addressed the issue of when and how what is implicated is implicated. In earlier work on the projection problem for implicatures, Gazdar (1979)

argued that scalar implicatures (henceforth SIs) in particular are blocked in embedded contexts, based on the observation that a standard upper-bounding implicature like that from the assertion of (i) (3a) to (3b) seems to disappear when the scalar predicate falls within the scope of a logical operator, as it does in (4a), which does not implicate (4b):

(3) a. Paul ate some of the eggs.
   b. [For all the speaker knows] Paul did not eat all of the eggs.

(4) a. It is not the case that Paul ate some of the eggs.
   b. [For all the speaker knows] It is not the case that Paul did not eat all of the eggs.
   [= He ate all of them.]

As observed by Hirschberg (1985), however, this cannot be a fact about embedded environments in general, since substituting e.g. ‘It is true that’ for ‘It is not the case that’ in (4a/b) will restore the implicature. On Hirschberg’s account, SIs are blocked by overt negation alone. But while Gazdar’s approach blocks too many implicatures, Hirschberg’s blocks too few. Without fully making the case, I suggested (Horn 1989: 233–4) that SIs are blocked in downward entailing (DE) contexts. But, as Levinson points out, it is not really a matter of blocking the implicatures generated by the positive scale so much as predicting the implicatures induced by the inverse scale, given the scale-reversing properties of negation and other downward entailing operators described in Fauconnier (1975): \([T]\)The apparent blockage is due to the fact that negatives reverse scales and so we get different implicatures, which themselves survive negation’ (Levinson 2000: 254–5). Thus, in asserting that Paul didn’t eat many of the eggs, I implicate (ceteris paribus) that he didn’t eat all of them (since the positive scale \(<all, most, many, some>\) will not be relevant here), but that he didn’t eat none of them, i.e. that he ate some (since the scale \(<none, not many, not all>\) is now operative).

More recently, Chierchia (2004) has argued, based on the interaction of negation and disjunction in complex sentences, that SIs are computed locally by semantic composition rules rather than read off utterances globally and that they are hence part of the grammar, instead of constituting ‘merely’ pragmatic effects derived from general principles of rational interchange. For Chierchia, the ‘suspension’ of SIs in DE contexts and the licensing of NPIs in the same environments (see Ladusaw 1980) represent a parallel effect of strengthening.

I will not address here (but see section 3, below) the general issues posed by the compositionality problems raised by Chierchia, or by Fox (2006) in a related localist theory utilizing covert exhaustification; see Sauerland (2004), Spector (2006), Russell (2006), and Geurts (2009, to appear) for various Grice-compatible approaches to the locality data, Reinhart (2006) for a
mixed approach, and King and Stanley (2005) for a different route. (Geurts's
dwork is especially useful for its review of the comparison of the various menu
options.) But the basis for Chierchia's notions of 'blocking' and 'strengthening'
are worth examining more closely, and it is to this examination that I
now proceed.

Chierchia’s claim that DE contexts block, rather than reverse, implicature
derives from his perception that while positive scales induce 'direct' SIs, nega-
tive and DE contexts generate only 'indirect' SIs, which 'appear to be gener-
ally somewhat weaker and flimsier than their positive counterparts' (2004:
58). Thus for Chierchia, there is an asymmetry not acknowledged in the
standard neo-Gricean account, which incorrectly predicts – on the basis of
the scales in (1) – a parallel between the positive case in which the assertion
of (5a) will (ceteris paribus) implicate (6a), resulting in the speaker’s com-
municating (5b), and the negative case in which the assertion of (6a) will (ceteris
paribus) implicate (5a), resulting in the speaker’s communicating (6b).

(5) a. Some F are G. (6) a. Not all F are G.
b. Some Fs are Gs, but not all are. b. Not all F are G, but some are.

Similarly, Chierchia (2004: 69) maintains, 'Our intuitions concerning the
implicature of sentences like [I don't have many matches left] are somewhat
shaky. In particular, such a sentence may or may not implicate that I have
some matches left.' Of course, the 'may or may not' codicil is endemic to
implicature calculation, given the nature of can-cellerability and indetermi-
nacy on the Gricean account. But is there any evidence that the implicature
in the positive case is more direct or stronger than in the negative, or that
the scalar effects in (8) are more robust than those in (9)?

As it happens, the Oxford English Dictionary’s first citation for the term
'scalar implicature' in the literature is for a passage in which it is observed
that 'not all implicates not none, i.e. some' (Horn 1972: 96). Nor is this premise
restricted to neo-Griceans. In one of the earliest applications of Gricean
reasoning in the linguistic literature, Chomsky (1972: 112) takes the inference
from not many to some in contexts like (7) to be not weaker but actually
stronger than a garden-variety conversational implicature.

(7) a. Not many arrows hit the target.
b. Some arrows hit the target.

For Chomsky, 'Sentence [(7a)] (equivalently, Few arrows hit the target)
prepares that some arrows hit the target.' Similarly, (8a) is taken to
presuppose (8b):

(8) a. [Not much/Little] enthusiasm was shown for that project.
b. At least some enthusiasm was shown.

I have argued (Horn 1972: chapter 2) that the relation in (7a) and (8a) must
be (scalar) implicature, not presupposition. But there is no reason to believe
that the inference with these pairs is on shakier or flimsier ground than that
with (5) or other positive scalars. Absent the posited asymmetry between
positive and negative scales, we can’t really claim that SIs are suspended in
DE contexts, but only that (as Levinson points out) the SIs induced there are
based on negative scales as opposed to positive ones.

Given DE operators’ twin role as licensors of NPIs and putative blockers
of SIs, Chierchia seeks to unify the two phenomena under the umbrella
of compositional semantics. In particular, he argues, just as NPIs serve to
strengthen a negative implicature (as in the widening-cum-strengthening
account of any due to Kadmon and Landman 1993), so too ‘implicatures
must lead to strengthening’ (Chierchia 2004: 70). But do NPIs invariably
strengthen negative force?

It is undeniable that any in both negative polarity and generic/non-
episodic (free choice) contexts effectively strengthens a simple indefinite
(Kadmon and Landman 1993) or contributes an end-of-scale even-type
meaning (see Lee and Horn 1994; Lahiri 1998; Horn 2000b) as in (9), and
that ever – the temporal analogue of any – and minimizers such as those in
(10) likewise serve to reinforce negation:

(9) a. I don’t have [potatoes/any potatoes].
b. [An owl/Any owl] eats mice.

(10) a. Robin didn’t [eat a bite/drink a drop].
b. Dana isn’t saying a word about it.

However, other NPIs, in particular those not involving indefinites, do not
obviously result in strengthening. In his valuable studies of the lexical
semantics of polarity, Israel (1996, to appear) distinguishes emphatic NPIs
(any, ever, at all, and the minimizers) from attenuating NPIs (e.g. much, over-
much, long, be all that, any too, great shakes, be born yesterday, trouble to, mince
words); the attenuators do not strengthen negative force. Among the atten-
uating NPIs are negative modals (need, Dutch hoeven), yet, anymore (for the
majority dialect), and until. While He won’t recover is a stronger negative
than He won’t recover tout court, She hasn’t recovered yet mitigates rather than
strengthens the negative force of She hasn’t recovered, just as He doesn’t read
much weakens the force of He doesn’t read.

If NPI licensing does not necessarily yield strengthening, what of the pur-
posed strengthening effect of scalar implicatures? To return to the exam-
ple in (5) and (6): Some but not all Fs are Gs is, to be sure, more informative
and more specific than Some F are G sans implicature, but it does not result
in a stronger positive assertion, nor does Not all F are G but some are result
in a stronger (negative) claim than Not all F are G. By implicating the upper
bound, the speaker in effect weakens the positive or negative force of what is said.

In the dualistic model of implicature I have been urging over the last two decades (Horn 1984, 1989, 2000a, 2007a), those implicatures based on the Q Principle (‘Say enough’, a generalization of Grice’s first maxim of Quantity) are distinguished from those based on the R Principle (‘Don’t say too much’, a correlate of Zipf’s principle of least effort encompassing the second Quantity maxim, Relation, and Brevity). While Q-based implicatures do not strengthen the force of an assertion, R-based implicatures do. These include the ascription of the ability to perform some action implicating the successful performance of that action (Dana was able to solve the problem), the ‘perfection’ of a sufficient if-condition to a necessary and sufficient if-condition (If you mow the lawn, I’ll give you $5), and the conventionalized narrowing of a word’s extension from a set to a salient or prototype member or subset, including the use of vague expressions as euphemisms for what one would prefer to leave unsaid. (Compare the I [for Informativeness] heuristic of Levinson 2000 and the ‘inference to the best interpretation’ it invokes.)

Evidence for a Manichaean pragmatics (Horn 2007a) is provided by the mirror image principles of synonymy-avoidance (an R-based tendency motivated by the speaker’s economy) and homonymy-avoidance (a Q-based tendency motivated by the hearer’s economy) as factors in language acquisition and linguistic change, as well as the complementary processes of linguistically motivated Q-based narrowing (rectangle ⇨ ‘non-square’, finger ⇨ ‘non-thumb’, friend ⇨ ‘non-lover’) and socially motivated R-based narrowing (drink ⇨ ‘alcoholic drink’, temperature ⇨ ‘fever’, unfriend ⇨ ‘lover’).

Related to lexical narrowing, and again motivated by social considerations – in particular, those relating to euphemism and respect for negative face as described in Brown and Levinson (1987) – is the R-based strengthening of negative expression. In Bosanquet’s words (1911: 281), ‘The essence of formal negation is to invest the contrary with the character of the contradiictory’. Speakers across a wide range of languages tend to weaken the force of their intended negative judgments, counting on hearers to fill in the intended stronger negative evaluation. In English, the resultant contrary negatives in contradictory clothing include the varieties of affixaal negation, simple litotes, and ‘neg-raising’ instantiated in (11a–c) respectively; see Horn (1989: chapter 5) for extensive discussion.

(11) R-based negative strengthening

(a) contrary readings for affixal negation (conventionalized/lexicalized strengthening)

He is unhappy.
She was unfriendly.
I disliked the movie.

(stronger than ¬[He is happy])
(stronger than ¬[She was friendly])
(stronger than ¬[I liked the movie])

(b) litotes/understatement in simple denials (online/non-conventionalized strengthening)

He’s not happy with it.
I don’t like ouzo.
I’m not optimistic that φ.

(stronger than ¬[He’s happy with it])
(stronger than ¬[I like ouzo])
(stronger than ¬[I’m optimistic that φ])

(c) neg-raising effects (strengthened understanding as a convention of usage)

I don’t believe it’ll snow.
I don’t want you to go.
It’s not likely they’ll win.

(= I believe it won’t)
(= I want you not to go)
(= It’s likely they won’t)

In each case a general, formally contradictory negation is strengthened to a specific, contrary understanding: where the constructions differ is in the degree of conventionalization of this strengthening inference. Since Aristotle, it has been recognized that affixal negatives conventionally strengthen to contraries, whence the readings in (11a). In litotes, I say that I don’t like ouzo (11b), or that I’m not exactly thrilled with your advice, precisely to avoid acknowledging my antipathy directly; at the same time, I count on your willingness to fill in my intended R-strengthened (contrary) interpretation rather than simply taking me at my (contradictory) word. In an embedding environment, this same practice is responsible for the neg-raising effect seen in (11c), where a negative operator with semantic scope over certain predicates of opinion, desire, or likelihood is understood as if it had lower-clause scope. The contrary meaning (‘x disbelieves that p’, ‘x believes that not-p’) is sufficient but not logically necessary to establish the truth of the contradictory (‘x does not believe that p’), yet it is treated as if it were necessary – not surprisingly, since it represents the inductively salient case that makes the contradictory true and since there may be social constraints against direct expression of the stronger contrary (see Horn 1989, 2000a).

Carston (2002: chapter 3, 2005) rejects the distinction between R-based and Q-based implicature as illusory, on the grounds that ‘there is a strengthening of communicated content from “at least some” to “just some”’ (Carston 2005: 314–15) that is entirely parallel to, say, the strengthening of not believing that p to believing that not-p. One question arising here is the extent to which relevance theory itself is truly unitarian, given the trade-off between effort and contextual effect: ‘Human cognitive activity is driven by the goal of maximizing relevance: that is...to derive as great a range of contextual effects as possible for the least expenditure of effort’ (Carston 1995: 231). But in any event, does the upper-bounding effect of Q-based, in particular scalar, implicature amount to strengthening, as maintained by both Carston and Chierchia? Does a scalar implicature, by upper-bounding an assertion, in fact strengthen it? In particular, what exactly do we mean by ‘strength’?
In fact, while R-based implicature increases both the informative content and rhetorical strength (positive or negative) of the assertion, what is communicated as a result of Q-based upper-bounding, while it is more specific and hence informationally stronger than the unbounded utterance, is not rhetorically stronger than what is said (i.e. the basic utterance without the implicature). Thus, while some is consistent with all, some but not all (let’s call it somef) is inconsistent with all. Thus somef F are G, while unilaterally entailing some F are G, yields a more specific but not a stronger positive assertion.

Further, as Michael Israel (p.c.) points out, a statement with some is clearly stronger than one with somef in the terms of Ducrot’s argumentation theory (see, e.g., Anscombe and Ducrot 1983). Thus, a sentence like (12a) represents a stronger argument for the (underlined) conclusion than does the more specific but rhetorically weaker (12b):

(12) a. I’ve graded some of the exams, so it’s time for a break.
   b. I’ve graded some, but not all, of the exams, so it’s time for a break.

As Israel also notes, already is possible in the former but not in the latter, given the incompatibility of directly expressing the Q-based implicature with the suggestion that things are ahead of schedule:

(13) a. I’ve already graded some of the exams (so let’s go out for a beer).
   b. I’ve already graded some, but not all, of the exams (so let’s go out for a beer).

Another argument for distinguishing the two kinds of strength is provided by the distribution of rank orders (Lehrer 1974; Hirschberg 1985; Horn 1989, 2000b), which are related to, but distinct from, true scales; (14) incorporates a proposed notational differentiation and (15) provides additional examples of rank orders.

(14) True scales
    <scalding, hot, warm> <felony, misdemeanor, tort>
    <certain, likely, possible> <win, place, show>
    <loath, hate, dislike> <dead, sick>

(15) <general, colonel, lieutenant>
    sergeant, privates
    <full professor, associate professor>
    ass’t professor
    <senior, junior, sophomore>
    freshman
    <$a \psi |d| a \text{ almost } \psi |d|$

(16) A: Do you have a flush?
    B: [No/#Yes] (in fact) I have a full house.

(17) A: Do you have at least a flush?
    B: [Yes/#No] (in fact) I have a full house.

Rank-ordered items essentially build in the upper bound: Chris has a full house and Chris has a flush are equally informative, in that neither entails the other. Similarly for Dr. Doolittle is a full professor vs. Dr. Doolittle is an associate professor. Yet the first member of each pair is rhetorically stronger in asserting that the higher rank holds. Once again, we see that rhetorical strength is distinct from informative strength.

In addition to challenging – or at least problematizing – the claim that scalar implicature results in strengthening, these observations provide additional support for a dualistic or Manichean approach to pragmatic inference; a minimal pair illustrating the difference between R-based and Q-based implicature is provided in (18):

(18) a. Not only was she able to solve the problem, (in fact) she solved it.
    (a was able to φ R-implicates a ψ φ)
    b. #Not only is it possible that she solved the problem, (in fact)
    it’s (possible but not certain that she solved it.
    (it’s possible that p Q-implicates it’s not certain that p)

3. Pragmatic intrusion and ‘what is said’

Recent years have witnessed the formulation of a partial consensus regarding semantic underspecification and pragmatic enrichment, a consensus that agrees in rejecting the conception bequeathed by Grice that the pragmatics can be simply ‘read off’ the semantics, while disagreeing on the conclusions to be drawn for the Gricean notion of ‘what is said’. When we turn from the relatively straightforward cases of reference fixing and ambiguity resolution cotenanced by Grice himself to the more problematic phenomena of completion and saturation or free enrichment (see Bach 2001; Recanati 2001, 2004; Carston 2002, and references therein, as well as the
relevant chapters in Horn and Ward 2004), it is clear we must accept what Bach (2005) terms the ‘contextualist platitude’:

Linguistic meaning generally underdetermines speaker meaning. That is, generally what a speaker means in uttering a sentence, even if the sentence is devoid of ambiguity, vagueness or indexicality, goes beyond what the sentence means.

Thus, the speaker uttering the non-bracketed material in each example in (19) may well communicate the full sentences indicated, enriched by the bracketed addenda. As seen from the cancellability diagnostics on display in (20), however, this process is pragmatic in character, even though its result is the computation of truth-conditionally relevant propositions that are not directly expressed:

(19)  a. I haven’t had breakfast [today].  
      b. John and Mary are married [to each other].  
      c. They had a baby and they got married [in that order].  
      d. Robin ate the shrimp and [as a result] got food poisoning.  
      e. Chris is ready [for the exam].

(20)  a. John and Mary are married, but not to each other.  
      b. They had a baby and got married, but not necessarily in that order.

The demarcation of the explicit is no trivial matter; the subtitle of Carston (2002) is, after all, The Pragmatics of Explicit Communication. A faithfully Gricean theory can accept neither Levinson’s picture of implicatures as benignly informing literal content (what is said) nor the notion of explicature as applied by relevance theorists. As Bach has stressed, the typically communicated propositions in (19) cannot literally be ‘explicatures’ because they are not explicit; at the same time, they are not implicatures but ‘implicatures’, implicit in, rather than read off, what is said.

Objecting to the premise that a pragmatically supplemented proposition is not communicated explicitly, Carston (2005: 311) observes that in many cases there will then be nothing (or, more exactly, no proposition) on our account that is communicated explicitly. But if we can agree that no full-fledged proposition is literally expressed and explicitly communicated, what do we gain by then taking the most nearly explicitly communicated proposition to constitute an explicature, with the acknowledged suggestion of explicitness? Carston defends the term as justified on the grounds that ‘this partially pragmatically-determined proposition is about as explicit as we ever are, or can be’ in (19)-type examples. But even if we grant that filling in the bracketed material in such cases yields the closest thing we can get to an explicitly communicated proposition, the theory of meaning is not an enterprise like horseshoes or hand grenades, where closeness counts.

Whether or not we invoke ‘truth-conditional pragmatics’ (to adopt Recanati’s term), it must be borne in mind that implicatures – whether conventional or conversational – are propositions that have their own truth-conditions. In uttering a given sentence in a given context, the speaker may communicate more than one truth-evaluable proposition, and what is said (in the Gricean sense) may correspond to a proposition radical that is not itself truth-evaluable, as with Chris is ready (Bach 2001, 2006). At the same time, there are the intuitions of the localists – Levinson (2000: §3.3) and Chierchia (2004), among others – and the problem itself, formulated through examples in which the implicatures licensed by a sub-expression seem to affect the truth-conditions of the larger expression in which they are embedded, as in the celebrated example from Cohen (1971) of conjunctions within conditional protases, where (21a, b) are intuitively assigned distinct truth-conditions.

(21)  a. If the old king dies and a republic is declared, I’ll be happy.  
      b. If a republic is declared and the old king dies, I’ll be happy.

Analogous cases noted by Wilson and Carston involve comparatives and negations:

(22)  It is better to meet the love of your life and get married than to get married and meet the love of your life.

(23)  a. He didn’t drive home and drink 3 beers; he drank 3 beers and drove home.  
      b. Driving home and drinking 3 beers is better than drinking 3 beers and driving home.

Even if we follow King and Stanley (2005) in explaining away (23a) as an instance of metalinguistic negation (Horn 1989), this won’t extend to the evidently parallel cases.

Some concessions to the localists appear inevitable, despite the efforts of diehards like King and Stanley (2005), whose response to the evident presence of what they term strong pragmatic effects is to massage the logical form of the original sentences to reveal independent semantic motivation for what would otherwise require localist pragmatic accounts. As stressed by Geurts (2009), the key issues are the plausibility of that independent motivation and the nature of the explanation it provides. One factor on which there is some agreement is the role of focal stress (Horn 2004, 2006a; King and Stanley 2005). In the scalar-antecedent conditionals in (24), both
Levinson and explicature theorists would build the stronger (bilateral) meaning (e.g. *some but not all, warm but not very warm*) into what is said:5

(24) a. If some of my friends come to the party, I'll be happy – but if all of them do, I'll be in trouble.
   b. If it's warm, we'll lie out in the sun. But if it's very warm, we'll go inside and sit in front of the air-conditioner.
   c. If you're convicted of a felony, you'll spend at least a year in jail. And if you're convicted of murder, you'll be executed.
   d. If you're injured, the paramedics will take you to the nearest trauma centre. But if you're fatally injured, you'll be taken to the morgue.

But in each of these contexts, it's only when the stronger scalar is reached that the earlier, weaker one is retroactively adjusted to accommodate an upper bound into its semantics, e.g. with *some* being reinterpreted as expressing (rather than merely communicating) 'some but not all' or *injured* 'non-fatally injured'.

The same issues arise for other applications of the pragmatic intrusion argument. Thus, Levinson (2000: 210) extends the argument from conditionals like (21) to *because* clauses, based on such examples as (25):

(25) a. Because he earns $40,000, he can't afford a house in Palo Alto.
   b. Because he's such a fine friend, I've struck him off my list.
   c. Because the police recovered some of the missing gold, they will later recover it all.

But Levinson's cases are heterogeneous. Example (25a) involves a cardinal, which as we have seen is indeed plausibly taken to involve an adjustment of what is said. In (25b), *such a fine friend* involves conventionalization of the intended sarcasm; compare *Because he's so considerate, I fired him*. Finally, the *all* in the main clause of (25c) forces the reprocessing of the *some* in the first clause as 'some but not all', a reading triggered by the focal stress on *some*. Without the *all* or another context-forcing continuation and without focus, this narrowing is difficult or impossible to obtain.

In general, the distribution of such *because* clauses is quite constrained, in particular for the non-cardinal scalar cases in which the implicated upper bound is taken to be the reason for the truth of the second clause and in which no reprocessing is forced by the affirmation of a stronger value, whence the oddness of the examples in (26):

(26) a. Because the police recovered some *[i.e. only some]* of the gold, the thieves are expected to return later #(for the rest).
   b. #Because it's warm out *[i.e. because it's warm-but-not-hot]*, you should still wear a long-sleeved shirt.

Typically, both focus and contrast of scalar values are required, serving to convert a scale to a rank order of incompatibles, just as *at least* and *yet* coerce rank orders into scales, as we saw in section 2.

So what can we conclude on the issue of implicatures and pragmatic intrusion? While scalar implicature is derived for the most part by the usual Gricean means, that original programme must evidently be modified to allow for a restricted range of cases of locality effects in which upper bounding can enter into the reinterpretation of what scalar operators express, although this reinterpretation is itself pragmatic in nature. (Geurts 2009 provides a useful survey of the domain, including a useful distinction between marked [Levinson]-type cases and unmarked [Herchel]-type cases of putative locality effects and convincing arguments on why only the former represent true problems for classical and neo-classical Gricean theories of implicature; see also Geurts to appear.)

In any case, pace Levinson (2000), generalized conversational implicatures cannot be default inferences, both because they are not inferences - by definition an implicature is an aspect of speaker's meaning, not hearer's interpretation (see Schwenter 1999: 26; Bach 2001, 2006; and Saul 2002b) - and because they are not defaults. This last point is especially worth stressing in the light of much recent work in experimental pragmatics undertaken by Ira Noveck, Dan Sperber, Richard Breheny, and their colleagues (see e.g. Noveck and Posada 2003; Bott and Noveck 2004; Breheny, Katsoy and Williams 2006) arguing that – contra 'neo-Gricean theory', in their styling – children and adults do not first automatically construct implicature-based enriched meanings for scalar predications and then, when the 'default' interpretation is seen to be inconsistent with the local context, undo such meanings and revert to the minimal implicature-free meaning. To the extent that the empirical work on the processing of implicature recovery can be substantiated and extended, this is a very interesting result, but any automatic enrichment or default interpretation accounts threatened by such work are not those of the actual Gricean tradition. I see no reason to revisit the distinction between generalized and particularized implicature as Grice originally formulated it (1989: 37, emphases added):

I have so far considered only cases of what I might call 'particularized conversational implicature'... in which an implicature is carried by saying that p on a particular occasion in virtue of special features of the context, cases in which there is no room for the idea that an implicature of this sort is normally carried by saying that p. But there are cases of generalized conversational implicature. Sometimes one can say that the use of a certain form of words in an utterance would normally (in the
absence of special circumstances) carry such-and-such an implicature or type of implicature.

An implicature may arise in a default context without thereby constituting a default or automatic inference. Nor should this be surprising: I shave every morning unless it's a weekend day at home, but this does not render my shaving on work days 'automatic' -- I still have to get out the razor and actually scrape away.

4. On what is said (again): a defence of austerity

A bone of perennial contention in neo- and post-Gricean pragmatics is the proper treatment of 'what is said'. Relevance theorists (e.g. Carston 2002) have questioned the utility of this notion (to the extent that it cannot be identified with the RT notion of explicature); Recanati (2001) distinguishes a Gricean notion of what-is-said_min from what-is-said_max, with only the latter playing a significant role within his framework of truth-conditional pragmatics; and even the self-described 'semantic minimalists' Cappelen and Lepore (2005) endorse an inflationary view of what is said, incorporating pragmatically inferred expansions.

To be sure, Grice's notion of what is said cannot be accepted as is. For one thing, as Bach (2001) and Saul (2002a) have stressed, we can -- and should -- give up Grice's overly restrictive condition that saying something entails meaning it, i.e. that we can't say what we don't mean. This constraint becomes implausible when we consider slips of the tongue, non-literality, and performances or rehearsals. (Recall in this connection the distinction between locutionary and illocutionary acts from Austin 1962: saying ≠ stating.) Communicative intention does not determine what is said.

This point aside, what is the fate of the Gricean notion of what is said? As argued by Bach (2001), Saul (2002b, 2006) and Borg (2004), the death-knell for a relatively orthodox or (in Saul's terms) austere conception of what is said may be premature. Bach (2001) has advanced the 'syntactic correlation constraint', based on Grice's position (1989: 87) that what is said must correspond to 'the elements of [the sentence], their order, and their syntactic character'; aspects of enriched content that are not directly linked to the utterance cannot be part of what is said. As we have noted, many have been sceptical of this view, from Cappelen and Lepore (2005) to Recanati (2001, 2004) and the relevance theorists. In the words of Carston (2005: 310; see also Carston 2002: §2.5 and Carston 2004), 'It is hard to see what this conception of "what is said" buys one. What does 'what is said' buy one?' As the following travelogue suggest, it depends on who -- and where -- one happens to be.

The first stop in our grand tour through the space-time continuum is twenty-first-century New York, with an episode from The White Rose (Korelitz 2005: 296), a reimagining of Der Rosenkavalier as a comedy of manners in modern Manhattan. In the local context, protagonist Oliver is disconsolate after a quarrel with his older lover Marian during a weekend in the Hamptons. After she drives them back to New York (supposedly for a faculty meeting she must attend) and drops him off in midtown, he impulsively heads uptown to Columbia to set things right with her, arriving at the history department only to discover that there is no faculty meeting, whereupon he happens to encounter Sophie, a grad student of Marian's who had engaged the services of his florist shop for her upcoming wedding. So poor, distracted Oliver must make small talk with Sophie...

He hasn't done the first thing about the flowers for her wedding. And now, just thinking about the flowers for the wedding fills him with abject misery. "I'm sorry", he hears himself say, "I feel terrible about what happened..."

"You came all the way up here?" Sophie asks, "To apologize?"

"Yes," Oliver says, with some relief, and truthfully enough. He has in fact come all the way up here to apologize, albeit not to her.

What is said is true, as indicated in the boldfaced commentary, whence the feeling of relief (Oliver did in fact go up to Columbia to apologize, after all, albeit to Marian); what is communicated is false (viz. that Oliver went to Columbia to apologize to Sophie).

The manipulation of these two dimensions of meaning -- what is (aus- terely) said vs. what is communicated -- can be accomplished with more premeditation than it was for Oliver. We travel back now to seventeenth- century Paris to visit the Jesuits' take on applied pragmatics (Simon 1762; Faucouner 1979). One expert, Sanchez [1614], instructs his charges on how to promise: A debtor can make a promise by reciting the formula 'I promise to pay what I owe' while silently adding that he will pay it not to his creditor, but rather to his confederate. More generally, the accused can avail himself of the doctrine of mental restriction, as expounded by Fillius [1633] (Faucouner 1979: 20; translation mine):

[L]orsqu'on commence à dire je jure, il faut ajouter tout bas cette restriction mentale, qu'aujourd'hui, & continue tout haut, je n'ai pas mangé telle chose

When you begin to say 'I swear...', you must add under your breath this mental restriction, 'that today...', and continue out loud, 'I have not eaten such and such'

In the same way, advises Tolet, the accused can truthfully swear 'I have not killed anyone' as long as 'sa pensée soit de dire qu'il ne l'a pas fait depuis qu'il est en prison' (see Faucouner 1979: 17); this is legitimate since, as noted in the Fillius passage above, such enrichments are entirely natural.
Nor is it only the (justly) accused who deserve recourse to such methods of hiding the truth: ‘La manière de cacher la vérité doit être à la portée de tout le monde’ (Casnedi 1719 [in Simon 1762]). But hiding the truth is not tantamount to lying: crucially, ‘Il est licite d’employer toute ces manières de cacher la vérité non pas dans l’intention express de tromper les autres, mais seulement de les laisser se tromper eux-mêmes’ (Fegeli 1750 [in Simon 1762], emphasis added).

The distinction between lying and hiding the truth – along with that between deceiving others and allowing them to deceive themselves – was artfully employed by the Jesuit-trained Bill Clinton in twentieth-century Washington, DC, who in turn transmitted his understanding of these methods to his disciple Monica Lewinsky. Asked under oath whether her testimony in re Paula Jones was false, Lewinsky truthfully testified that this testimony was ‘incomplete and misleading’, implicating (falsely) that it wasn’t false. In recounting this exchange, New York Times reporter Francis X. Clines describes Lewinsky as ‘exhibiting a Clintonian way with words’ (6 Feb. 1999), but as we can see, the skill involved might be indirectly attributed to seminary training.8

We now move from the Oval Office to the O.R./operating theatre, observing the exploitation of the difference between what is said vs. what is meant in twenty-first-century TV hospital dramas. First, a bit of background. The Jesuits’ disingenuous parallel between (27a, b) parallels our sense of the contrast between (28a) [see (19a) above], which favours a natural temporal restriction, as we have noted, and (28b), which does not:

(27) a. I have not eaten such-and-such.
   b. I have not killed anyone.

(28) a. Have you eaten breakfast?
   b. Have you had sex?

This minimal pair is revisited by Taylor (2001: 46), who elucidates the distinction between having sex and having breakfast and contexts in which an utterance of [28b] amounts to a “so far today” question. Taken on its own, independently of context and of the speaker’s communicative intentions, [28a], for example, expresses neither the question “have you ever in your life eaten breakfast?” nor the question “have you eaten breakfast yet this morning?” Moreover, neither the meaning of the word ‘sex’ nor the meaning of the word ‘breakfast’ forces one rather than the other temporal import on the relevant question. Indeed, without changing the meanings of either word, we can cook up contexts in which an utterance of [28a] amounts to an ‘ever’ question.

Now consider a scenario developed in the 29 Sept. 2006 episode of ‘Grey’s Anatomy’ (ABC-TV). Young Benjamin, a patient who has a brain tumour causing him to blurt out his thoughts without restraint, is in his hospital bed beginning to undergo an examination by Dr. Meredith Grey, the intern who he has earlier witnessed exchanging smouldering glances with Dr Derek Shepherd (a.k.a. Dr McDreamy):

Benjamin: ‘Did you have sex with that brain surgeon?’
Benjamin’s sister: ‘Benjamin!’
Meredith: ‘It’s OK. Nope, I haven’t. [PAUSE.] Not today, anyway.’

Moving from eros in Seattle to thanatos in New Jersey, we enter the domain of ‘House’ (FOX, 21 Nov. 2006). Once more we find a young (but doomed) male patient, his young (but precocious) sister, and the examining doctor (House’s associate Eric Foreman). Kama is grilling Dr Foreman about her brother Jack’s serious but as yet undiagnosed mystery disease from which he is suffering.9

Kama: ‘Is he gonna die?’
Dr. Foreman: ‘No, no one’s gonna die.’
Kama: ‘In the whole world? Ever? That’s so great!’
Dr. Foreman: ‘I meant...’
Kama: ‘I know what you meant.’

Resetting the dialect of our time machine back to fourth-century Egypt, we join Saul (2006) in borrowing a page from Alisdair MacIntyre that recounts an episode from the life of St. Athanasius to illustrate the distinction between lying (entailing the falsity of what is said) and misleading (allowing the falsity of what is implicated):

Persecutors, dispatched by the emperor Julian, were pursuing [Athanasius] up the Nile. They came on him travelling downstream, failed to recognise him, and enquired of him: “Is Athanasius close at hand?” He replied: “He is not far from here.” The persecutors hurried on and Athanasius thus successfully evaded them without telling a lie. (MacIntyre 1994: 336, cited in Saul 2006: 3)

This is all well and good, but given the content infallibly provided by wikipedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Athanasius_of_Alexandria) revealing that St. Athanasius, ‘along with excommunication...used beatings, intimidation, kidnapping and imprisonment to silence his theological opponents’, one wonders whether he really would have been all that bothered by the occasional outright lie. With due deference to Professor MacIntyre, we must seek our patron saint of truth concealment elsewhere.

Some centuries after the trials and devices of St. Athanasius, Tristan and Isult find themselves the quarry of the jealous Cornish lords Denoalen,
Andret, and Gondoine, who are determined to trap the lovers in adultery and betray them to King Mark, Isolde's husband and Tristan's uncle. These 'felons', seizing their chance when Tristan is (supposedly) abroad in service to the King of Frisía, convince Mark to subject his queen to the Ordeal by Red-Hot Iron, as a result of which she will either clear her name forever or—as the villains confidently expect—burn to death for falsely swearing her fidelity. Before being put to the Ordeal by King Mark and his retainers, with King Arthur and his knights as warrantors, Isolde secretly sends word to Tristan instructing him to appear at the muddy river bank on the Day of Judgment in the garb of a miserable pilgrim. All proceeds accordingly, and now—at the ragged man carries her safely to shore before stumbling and collapsing into the mud—Queen Isolde addresses the nobles assembled by the river:

In the words of Béroul, the twelfth-century Norman poet who first transcribed the Tristan legend of Tristan and Isolde, 'Dieus i a fait vertuz' (Bédier 1946: 129). Rendering the sentiment loosely in modern language, it can only be concluded that God Himself is a semantic minimalist with an austere neo-Grician conception of what is said.

5. Concluding remarks

Like WD-40, the lubricant with over 2000 uses (cf. http://www.wd40.com/), WJ-40 – Paul Grice’s doctrine of conversational implicature that recently celebrated the fortieth anniversary of its unveiling in the William James lectures on logic and conversation – has displayed an impressive versatility along with a slippery reputation. Grice’s attempt to reconcile the logical elegance of the Russelians with the ordinary language insight of the Oxonians (see the valuable discussion in Chapman 2005) has won both converts and sceptics, often in the very same individual. Despite recent attacks on Grician and neo-Grician premises and modes of argumentation, the heart of his programme for meaning—indeed, in particular, the posing of a systematic (if often underdetermined) range of implications deriving from the interaction of opposed maxims grounded not just in cooperation but in rationality, retains its powerful explanatory force. The speaker’s and hearer’s joint (though tacit) recognition of the tendency to avoid unnecessary effort, and the inferences S expects H to draw from S’s efficient observance of this tendency, are more explicable directly from rationality than from cooperation as such. While Grice (1989: 28) recognizes that the maxims apply to cooperative ventures outside of language (baking a cake, fixing a car), cooperation is not a necessary condition, much less communication. It is plausible to take generalized forms of both Q and R Principles – ‘Do enough; Don’t do too much’ – to govern any goal-oriented rational activity: a person brushing her hair, a dog digging a hole to bury a bone. In this way, the maxim of Quantity, in both its opposed (Q and R) subforms, is a linguistic instantiation of these rationality-based constraints on the expenditure of effort. Of course, as Grice recognized, the shared tacit awareness of such principles to generate conversational implicatures is a central property of speaker-meaning within the communicative enterprise.

We have surveyed some of the ways in which Grice’s account of implicature leads to a simplification of the overall picture of meaning by transferring much of the burden of explanation from logical semantics to a general, independently motivated pragmatic theory that preserves the Modified Occam’s Razor principle and provides an explanatory treatment of the relation between the subcontraries. In sections 1 and 2, we addressed issues arising in the characterization of the epistemic conditions on scalar implicature and the two notions of informative and rhetorical strength within a Manichaean model of natural language inference that reconceptualizes the Grician picture of maxim interaction. In addition to
rebutting some of the premises of Chierchia’s (2004) non-Gricean view of scalar implicature, I have made the case for a relatively orthodox Gricean notion of what is said, directly linked to the linguistic properties of the utterance, as an integral component of sentence meaning. Evidence for the utility of this notion ranges from the limited nature of pragmatic intrusion, as seen in section 3, and the need to invoke minimal meanings to account for intuitions of lying and misleading, as seen from our grand tour in section 4.

Since the ancient rhetoricians first distinguished between what is said and what is meant – or, as the French put it, between ce qu’on dit and ce qu’on veut dire – the theory of meaning in natural language has focused on just where to draw the line separating the two and just how to draw the lines connecting them. My goal in this chapter has been to look at some of the ways in which a minimally modified Gricean model might provide a natural and intuitively satisfying approach to phenomena within this domain.

Notes

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1. As stressed by Hirschberg (1985) and Geurts (to appear), entailment-based scalar implicature represents just one variety of quantity implicature. The prevalence of ad hoc (non-lexically generated) scales and the implicatures derived therefrom must also be taken into account in any comprehensive treatment of quantity.

2. Similarly, Chierchia et al. (2001: 160) observe that while John saw many students will normally implicate that he didn’t see all of them, no such implicature arises in e.g. There aren’t many students. From such observations follows the descriptive generalization:

(i) Scalar implicatures do not arise in downward entailment environments. 
But in fact There aren’t many students does normally induce a scalar implicature, viz. that there are some students. Interestingly, it is noted in the same paper (Chierchia et al. 2001: 162) that ‘DE operators reverse canonical entailments’, but it is for precisely this reason that they also reverse scales and SI, rendering the generalization in (i) untenable.

3. The generalization linking SI ‘blocking’ and NPI licensing is open to challenge on other grounds. Empirical work since Ladusaw (1980) has demonstrated that DE-ness is neither necessary nor sufficient for the occurrence of NPIs. Polarity-licensing environments (including subjunctives, imperatives, generics, and modals) are not always DE, and while some environments are subsumable under
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