

Expressives and Beyond

An introduction to varieties of conventional non-truth-conditional meaning

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Formal semanticists, as is well known, have found it useful to make certain simplifying assumptions in approaching the vast field of natural language meaning.¹ Thus, following the lead of logicians, they have concentrated on rigidly stating truth-conditions for declarative sentences in a quest for clarifying notions like *entailment*, *synonymy*, and *contradiction* (cf., for example, [Dowty et al. 1981](#) or [Gamut 1991](#)). However, it was recognized right from the start that much work would remain to be done once the truth-conditional story was told. Again, it is well known that Frege himself directed attention to various lacunae (cf. [Horn 2007](#)). (i) the treatment of presupposition, which has oscillated between truth-conditional and »pragmatic« approaches ever since the seminal »Russell-Strawson debate« ([Russell, 1905](#); [Strawson, 1950](#)).²; (ii) the necessity for envisaging something like speech acts (cf. Frege's *Urteilsstrich*, which is called *assertion sign* by [Geach 1965](#)), which it took [Austin \(1962\)](#) and [Searle \(1969\)](#) to give theoretical shape; and (iii) the phenomenon of expressivity, which Frege discussed under the term *Färbung* »colouring« (see [Horn](#), this volume, Chapter 5, as well as [Dummett 1978](#), 93 and [Green and Kortum 2007](#)).³

At the same time, researchers conceiving of language as a tool for communication (in the broadest sense possible) have always taken expressivity to constitute one of language's major functions ([Bühler, 1934](#); [Jakobson, 1960](#)).⁴

¹ A very good overview over that field is still provided by [Lyons \(1977\)](#). Among the many other sources are [von Stechow and Wunderlich 1991](#), [Lappin 1996](#), and, more recently, [Maienborn et al. 2011](#).

² See ([Beaver and Geurts, 2011](#)), and references cited there.

³ Many philosophers, disenchanted with the positivist undercurrents of 20th century philosophy of language, have pointed out the relevance of *emotive meaning* for the study of ethics and aesthetics ([Hare 1952](#); [Stevenson 1937](#)). [Stevenson \(1937, 23\)](#) credits [Ogden and Richards \(1923\)](#) with the term *emotive meaning*. Likewise, [Jakobson \(1960\)](#), who uses the term for a function of language, credits [Marty \(1908\)](#) for it.

⁴ Concern with this aspect of language use can be traced back – at least – to Aristotle's study of rhetoric.

Although the need for unification was perhaps in the back of the minds of a lot of people, it took until the development of the field of pragmatics, beginning sometime in the late 1960s, that (one of) the missing link(s) between formalist and functionalist approaches to meaning was forged.⁵ Pragmatics, of course, started out as an extremely heterogeneous enterprise, sometimes considered a »wastebasket« (Bar-Hillel, 1971) or whatever »meaning minus truth conditions« (Gazdar, 1979) amounts to. However, the conception that semantics focusses only on those aspects that are truth-conditionally relevant, leaving the rest to pragmatics, has been questioned.⁶ At least, as Kaplan (1999, 42) notes, semantics should also deal with those »non-descriptive features of language that are associated with certain expressions by linguistic convention«. As I hope to show in this survey, the empirical domain of conventional non-truth-conditional meaning proves to be very rich.

And even if non-truth-conditional meaning has more or less been neglected or at least excluded from formal studies of natural language meaning from the very beginning, expressions that are associated with non-truth-conditional meaning by linguistic convention have increasingly found their way into formally or analytically orientated literature since the »pragmatic turn,« and recent decades have seen considerable steps toward integrating those aspects of meaning into semantic theory. In particular, building on previous efforts by Kaplan (1999), Chris Potts (2005, 2007b) managed to develop the formal tools to analyze expressive like *damn*, which have been well studied since then.

The following survey shall convince the skeptical reader that conventional non-truth-conditional meaning goes beyond expressives and is by no means a marginal phenomenon. Indeed, it can be found across all layers of language, from the word level down to the phonological level and up to the syntactic one, and even beyond that. That this may seem surprising to many formal semanticists only shows how deep the focus on truth-conditions is rooted in our perspective. In contrast, functionally orientated linguists may be astonished that the diversity of conventional non-truth-conditional expressions is presented as something noteworthy. The fact that such content comes in so

⁵ Still one of the most useful introductions to pragmatics is the one by Levinson (1983). For further work, see, among other things, Horn and Ward 2004.

⁶ The most famous deviation, emerging in the 1980s, is the development of dynamic semantic theories like discourse representation theory (DRT, e.g. see Beaver and Geurts 2007; Kamp and Reyle 1993, Heim's (1982) file change semantics or dynamic semantics (Groenendijk and Stokhof, 1991).

many varieties should not be any more surprising than the fact that ordinary truth-conditional meaning can be found at all levels of linguistic analysis as well, since there are no *a priori* reasons why the non-truth-conditional domain should not be as diverse as the truth-conditional one. Furthermore, I will try to highlight the different ways in which conventional non-truth-conditional content interacts with truth-conditional meaning and, orientating myself on Potts (2007b), discuss a couple of special properties of expressions that conventionally convey non-truth-conditional meaning.

Before going on, a few terminological remarks are in order. The phenomenon of meaning that is contributed by the conventional meaning of expressions but that nevertheless does not become part of the truth-conditional content of an utterance, has been given many different names over the years. For instance, it has been called *affective*, *coloured* (Frege, 1979), *connotational*, *emotive* (Jakobson, 1960), *evaluative*, *expressive* (Potts, 2007b), *non-cognitive*, *non-descriptive*, *non-ideational*, *procedural* (Bezuidenhout, 2004), *subjective* or *use-conditional* (Recanati, 2004) meaning. Since, for the purposes of this overview article, I do not want to commit to some of the theoretical implications that might be associated by some of those terms, I suggest the more neutral attribute *conventional non-truth-conditional*. As this is rather cumbersome, I will often employ *use-conditional* as a shorthand, which seems relatively neutral as well. I will abbreviate it as UC and contrast it with *truth-conditional* (TC) or *descriptive* content. In the same vein, expressions or constructions that contribute use-conditional content, will be referred to as UCIs (for *use-conditional items*).

1.1 The word level

The majority of conventional non-truth-conditional meanings studied so far come from lexical items, mostly words. The UCIs at the word level can be divided into different subgroups, depending on what kind of non-truth-conditional meaning they display. The resulting categorization is, of course, not clear-cut and serves primarily the function of providing structure to the following overview of the varieties of non-truth-conditional expressions.

1.1.1 Expressives in the narrow sense

The group of UCIs that has received the most attention in formal semantics are what I refer to as *expressives in the narrow sense*, i.e. expressions that express

some emotional and evaluative attitude with a high degree of affectedness. Thanks to the work of Potts (2005, 2007a, 2007b), who picks up the theme as laid out by Kaplan (1999), expressives have received a lot of attention during the last few years. Standard examples include pejorative epithets and attributive adjectives.⁷

(1) *Epithets*

- (a) That **bastard** Kresge is famous. (Potts, 2007b, 168)
 (b) That **idiot** Kresge dropped the bottle again.⁸

(2) *Expressive attributive adjectives*

- (a) I hear your **damn** dog barking. (Potts, 2005, 18)
 (b) My **friggin'** bike tire is flat again.

Both epithets and expressive attributive adjectives contribute use-conditional content and no truth-conditional meaning. From a truth-conditional point of view, such expressions are therefore optional. Adding or omitting them does not alter the truth-conditions of a sentence. Accordingly, all the variants of (2a) in (3) are truth-conditionally equivalent.

- (3) I hear your $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \emptyset \\ \text{blasted} \\ \text{bloody} \\ \text{damn} \\ \text{fucking} \end{array} \right\}$ dog barking.

Following Cruse (2004, 57), I call expressives and other items that do not contribute anything to the descriptive dimension of meaning *expletive UCIs*.⁹

Of course, the expressive attitude conveyed by expletive UCIs like *damn* or *bastard* is lost if they are omitted; or a different emotion may be displayed when you use *awesome* instead of *damn*, but the truth-conditional content remains

⁷ Throughout this text, I will use bold face to highlight relevant aspects of the examples.

⁸ The use of the demonstrative *that* instead of the plain definite determiner enhances the expressive nature of the epithet, cf. Lakoff 1974; Potts and Schwarz 2010 for the expressive function of demonstratives in English and Section 1.1.3 for further expressive uses of pronouns.

⁹ Such semantic expletives must not be confused with syntactic expletives like *it* in *It's raining*, which are semantically empty but are syntactically obligatory.

unaffected. I will write this informally in a fraction-like fashion with the use-conditional content on top of the truth-conditional one.¹⁰

$$(4) \text{ I hear your damn dog barking} = \frac{\text{damn dog}}{\text{I heard your dog barking}}$$

The entire meaning of (2) consists of its truth-conditions that equal the ones of the variants in (3) – that the speaker hears the addressee’s dog barking, plus whatever expressive content is expressed by applying *damn* to *dog*, e.g. that the speaker has a negative attitude towards the addressee’s dog.

Further examples of expressives in the narrow sense are interjections (Ameka, 1992) such as *ouch* and *oops* as famously discussed by Kaplan (1999). In addition, some otherwise truth-conditional expressions like *man* or the already expressively loaded *shit* can be used as expressive interjections. Expressive adjectives like *damn* regularly can be used interjectively as well.¹¹

(5) *Interjections*

- | | |
|--------------------------------------|------------------|
| (a) Ouch , I’ve hit my thumb! | (Kaplan, 1999) |
| (b) Oops ! | (Kaplan, 1999) |
| (c) Oh , I have another suit. | (Ameka, 1992) |
| (e) It’s hot, man . | (McCready, 2009) |
| (e) Shit , I’ve lost my keys! | |
| (f) Damn , I’ve lost my keys! | |

Like expressive adjectives and epithets, interjections like these are expletive UCIs and do not add anything to the truth-conditions of the sentence. However, what makes many interjections interesting is that they do not seem to interact with the truth-conditional content at all (*man* being an exception, see below). In contrast to the expressives discussed above, interjections do not need a truth-conditional argument – they are already satisfied and convey an expressive attitude without further ado. Therefore, just like interjections can be omitted without effect on truth-conditions, the rest of the sentence can be dropped, leaving the expressive attitude intact.

¹⁰ For the purposes of this survey, this kind of representation serves only illustrative purposes and has no theoretical implications, even if the majority of the approaches to expressive content take such multidimensionality seriously (Potts, 2005).

¹¹ There are also interjections like *by god* that transcend the »word level.«

- (6)(a) Damn!
(b) Ouch!
(c) Oops!
(d) Oh!

That is, even without any truth-conditional content, the examples in (6) express attitudes of anger, pain, awkwardness, or surprise respectively. Semantically, they are more isolated from the rest of the sentence than expressive adjectives or epithets are. This is mirrored by the syntactic fact that they appear only in peripheral positions.

- (7)(a) *I've lost my oops keys.
(b) *It's man hot!

Following Potts (2005, 65), I call such examples *isolated* UCIs. In contrast to the informal description of the meaning of a sentence containing an argument-seeking expressive like *damn* given in (4), the composition for (5a) looks like (8). That is, the descriptive meaning of a sentence containing an already satisfied, isolated interjection consists of the semantic content of sentence without the interjection, while its expressive part is given solely by the use-conditional content of the interjection itself.

- (8) Ouch, I've hit my thumb = $\frac{\text{ouch}}{\text{I've hit my thumb}}$

A further group I want to subsume under the caption of expressives in the narrow sense are what could be called *expressively coloured* expressions (after Frege's *Färbung* »colouring«). These kinds of expressives differ crucially from the expressions discussed so far. They are lexical items that have an ordinary truth-conditional denotation but in addition, have an expressive component that displays some (in most cases negative) attitude towards the denotation. A classic example comes from Frege (1979, 140):

- (9) *Coloured expression*
(a) This **dog** howled the whole night.
(b) This **cur** howled the whole night.

The difference between *dog* and *cur* is that while the former is expressively neutral and just refer to the set of dogs, the later additionally expresses a negative attitude towards members of the set or the set as a whole. A systematic set of expressively coloured expressions are ethnic slurs. By this label, I mean expressions that, beside denoting some kind of nationality or ethnic group, convey a derogative racist attitude.¹² As examples, I use the antiquated *Boche* and *Kraut*, both being derogative variants of *German*.

(10) *ethnic slurs*

- (a) Lessing was a **Boche**. (Williamson, 2009, 149)
 (b) Hitler was a **Kraut**. (Saka, 2007, 39)

The composition of coloured items is therefore very different from all the other kinds of expressions discussed in this section so far, because in contrast to expletive UCIs, they do make a truth-conditional contribution. In the case of *Kraut*, the truth-conditional relevant part equals that of *German*, and for *cur*, it equals that of *dog*. Following McCready (2010), I will call UCIs that conventionally contribute both truth-conditional and non-truth-conditional meaning *mixed UCIs*.

As shown above, expletive UCIs can be omitted from a sentence without altering its descriptive content. Since they also contribute descriptive content, this does not hold for mixed UCIs. The following example illustrates this point.¹³

- (11)(a) That Kraut Lessing wrote a lot of books. → Lessing was a German.
 (b) Lessing wrote a lot of books. → Lessing was a German.

The sentence (11a) containing *that Kraut* implies that Lessing was a German. If the mixed expressive is omitted as in (11b), that entailment is lost, since the property of being German is contributed by the descriptive dimension of *Kraut*.

¹² Amongst many others, cf. Green and Kortum 2007; Hom 2008; Hom 2010; Hornsby 2001.

¹³ Note that we have to change the example to one in which the mixed expressive is used attributively, because otherwise, omitting it would render the sentence ungrammatical.

(i) *Lessing was a.

If you want to get rid of the negative attitude conveyed by ethnic slurs or another expressively-coloured expression without altering the truth-conditions of the sentence, you have to substitute the racist slur by the corresponding neutral expression.

- (12)(a) Lessing was a German.
(b) Hitler was a German.
(c) This dog howled the whole night.

What the truth-conditionally equivalent equivalent, but expressively neutral, expression for a mixed UCI is, cannot be directly read off from the expression. This has to be encoded in the lexicon.¹⁴

The informal schema used above to illustrate the composition of the meaning of a sentence containing UCIs therefore need some lexical knowledge for coloured expressions. For (10a) for instance, the use-conditional part of the sentence consists of the negative attitude expressed by it, while the truth-conditional part corresponds to the same sentence with *German* substituted for *Kraut*.

- (13) Lessing was a Kraut = $\frac{\text{Kraut}}{\text{Lessing was a German}}$

This already shows some interesting facts about the semantic composition of mixed UCIs, namely that while their descriptive component may fall under the scope of some semantic operator – like the past tense in the example – its expressive component does not (Potts, 2005; Potts, 2007b). That is, whereas the truth-conditional part of *Lessing was a Kraut* means that there is some time prior to the utterance time for which *Lessing is a German* is true, the negative or jocular attitude against Germans displayed by *Kraut* is not evaluated with respect to that point in the past but is attributed to the utterance time and speaker. The same holds for other semantic operations like negation or questions (Cruse, 2004, 57). Even the negated variant of *Lessing was a Kraut* and the corresponding question convey the anti-German sentiment. This is shown by the fact that the following discourse continuations are impossible.

¹⁴ Diachronically, ethnic slurs may have some connection to what they denote truth-conditionally. Arguably, many slurs come into existence by some kind of metaphorical or metonymical process by which something that is in some relation to the intended referent – like the *Kraut* eaten by Germans – is used to refer to it, thereby conveying some expressive attitude. For the expressive power of metaphorical and metonymic transfers and their role in semantic change, cf. amongst others Claudi and Heine 1986; Traugott and Dasher 2001.

(14) Descartes was not a Kraut. #But I like Germans.

(15) A: Was Descartes a Kraut?

B: # No, Germans are nice.

Using again the informal fraction notation, the negation and question operators only show up at the lower descriptive level but not on the UC-layer on top of it.

(16) Descartes was not a Kraut = $\frac{\text{Kraut}}{\neg(\text{Descartes was a German})}$

(17) Was Descartes a Kraut? = $\frac{\text{Kraut}}{?(\text{Descartes was a German})}$

This feature may be called *scopelessness* (Potts, 2005, 41) and it is the reason why ethnic slurs cannot be denied by a simple negation or used in a question without enfolding their offending content. This corresponds to a feature that Potts (2007b, 167) calls *immediacy*, by which he means that like »performatives, expressives achieve their intended act simply by being uttered.«

A further observation to be made is that the coloured expressions discussed so far can be regarded as being *isolated* UCIs as well. On the one hand, they are of course more integrated than expletive UCIs because they also contribute to the descriptive tier and hence cannot be omitted without affecting the truth-conditions or grammaticality of a sentence. But, on the other hand, their UC-content is isolated because the negative attitude does not apply to a specific argument in the sentence. That is, while the descriptive part of *Kraut* predicates over Lessing in the example, the negative attitude does not apply to Lessing, but to Germans in general (cf. McCready 2010). Using an informal paraphrase of *Kraut* to make this explicit, we have the following characterization of the sentence's descriptive and expressive content.

(18) Lessing was a Kraut = $\frac{\text{Generally, I don't like Germans}}{\text{Lessing was a German}}$

A negative attitude towards Lessing is not directly expressed by the ethnic slur. However, it can be inferred if the two levels of meaning are taken together. This is supported by the observation that a negative attitude towards Lessing can be cancelled, whereas this is not possible for the negative evaluation of Germans.

(19)(a) Lessing was a Kraut, but he was fine guy.

(b) # Lessing was a Kraut, but generally, I like Germans.

(c) # Generally, I like Germans, but Lessing was a Kraut.

Before we leave the descriptive survey of expressives in the narrow sense, let me briefly mention a problem that holds for many of those expressions. As we have seen, a UCI like *damn* that can be used as an expressive attributive adjective or as an expressive interjection. In the same vein, many UCIs are multifunctional. For instance, I have characterized *fucking* and *bloody* as expressive adjectives, in which case they are expletive UCIs that contribute nothing to the truth-conditional level of meaning. However, many expressive adjectives can also be used to modify or intensify another adjective, as discussed by Geurts (2007) and Morzycki (2010).

(20) Rufus is $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{fucking} \\ \text{goddamn} \end{array} \right\}$ tall.

In such environment, *fucking* or *goddamn* cannot be considered as expletive but as mixed UCIs, because they make a contribution to the descriptive dimension by graduating the adjective they modify. Therefore, *fucking* cannot be omitted without changing the descriptive content. This is illustrated by the following examples.

- (21)(a) Ringo is tall, but Rufus is *fucking* tall.
(b) #Ringo is tall, but Rufus is tall.

To study the relations between different functions of expressives in order to find generalizations regarding their shiftability is an interesting research question that, to my knowledge, has not been addressed so far.

1.1.2 Particles

Beside all the different types of expressives in the narrow sense, there are many classes of expressions in different languages that arguably contribute to the use-conditions of an utterance instead of affecting its truth-conditional meaning.

An entire part of speech that seems to have some kind of affinity to the use-conditional domain are *particles*.¹⁵ This is illustrated by the fact that five out of the eight contributions to this volume deal with particles. In general, many of the different kinds of particles found around the world's languages do not have any influence on the truth-conditions of a sentence but, rather,

¹⁵ I use the term in a non-technical sense here. Regarding particles as a formal category is not without problems, cf. Zwicky 1985.

impose appropriateness conditions on its use. For instance, modal particles in German have been regarded as conveying non-truth-conditional meaning since the early functional studies (Helbig, 1977; Weydt, 1969) and even in a formal semantics framework, there are some early attempts to relate them to use-conditional meaning (Kratzer, 1999). German modal particles are a small, more or less closed set of specific lexical items that convey information about the discourse participants' beliefs and attitudes towards the propositional content. For instance, in rough approximation, *wohl* expresses that the speaker merely assumes that the propositional content is true and *ja* roughly conveys that the hearer may already know the proposition.¹⁶

- (22)(a) *Hein ist wohl auf See.*
 Hein is MP at sea
 »(As I assume) Hein is at sea« (Zimmermann, 2004, 543)
- (b) *Webster schläft ja.*
 Webster sleeps MP
 »(As you may know) Webster sleeps.« (Kratzer, 1999, 4)

Like expressive attribute adjectives or epithets, modal particles are expletive UCIs, as they are optional and leaving them out does not alter a sentence's truth condition. That is, all the variants in (23) are true iff Webster sleeps regardless of what kind of attitude is conveyed by the modal particles.

- (23) Webster schläft $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \emptyset \\ \text{doch} \\ \text{halt} \\ \text{ja} \\ \text{wohl} \end{array} \right\}$. »Webster sleeps \emptyset /MP.«

While all being true if Webster sleeps, the variants in (23) are, of course, not appropriate in the same contexts. For instance, using *ja* in a context like in (24) in which the hearer cannot reasonably be assumed to have already known what the speaker is telling her renders sentence (24a) infelicitous. In the same context, the utterance becomes felicitous if the modal particle is left out, as shown in (24b).

- (24) [Context: A happy father rushes out of the delivery room]

¹⁶ In order to reconcile the clause-medial position of German modal particles with their taking scope over the entire proposition, Zimmermann (2004) postulates LF-movement while Bayer and Obenauer (2011) rely on an Agree operation.

- (a) #*Es ist ja ein Mädchen!*
It is MP a girl
»It's a girl!«
- (b) *Es ist ein Mädchen!*
It is a girl
»It's a girl!«

Furthermore, modal particles mirror expressive attributive adjectives and epithets insofar as they are not saturated and hence not as isolated as the interjections discussed in the previous section. What distinguishes modal particles from the attributive use of *damn* and the like is that they take the entire propositional content of the sentence as their argument.¹⁷

- (25) Webster schläft ja = $\frac{\text{ja(Webster sleeps)}}{\text{Webster sleeps}}$

Modal particles exhibit a lot of interesting syntactic and semantic features and, as discussed by Gutzmann (2008, 2009), these can plausibly be derived from their expressive character. The contributions by Döring (Chapter 3), Egg (Chapter 4), and Repp (Chapter 7) all address various issues connected with this class of particles.

Of course, German modal particles are not the only class of use-conditional particles. There are far too many cases to go through all of them here. But for two further examples, consider the following Japanese particles which are studied in the contributions of Sudo (this volume, Chapter 8) and McCready and Takahashi (this volume, Chapter 6) respectively.

- (26) *Japanese particles*

- (a) *ima ame futteru no?*
now rain is.falling PART

¹⁷ This is, however, arguably also possible for expressive adjectives like *damn*, even if they still take a DP as their argument in the syntax.

- (i) I've spilled that damn bottle again.

The most natural reading of (17) is one in which the speaker has a negative emotion regarding his spilling of the bottle, not regarding the bottle or bottles in general.

Note that there are usages of some modal particles that syntactically seem to take a more narrow scope over a DP.

- (ii) *der wohl größte Bankenskandal aller Zeiten*
the MP biggest bank scandal of all time

»Is it raining now?«

- (b) A: *dooshite ookikunat-tara pairotto-ni naritai no?*
 why get.big-when pilot-ACC want.become Q
 »Why do you want to be a pilot when you grow up?«

B: *datte, kakkoi mono.*
 come.on cool MONO
 »Well, because it's cool.«

Sudo (this volume, Chapter 8) discusses the Japanese question particles *no* in polar questions. Adding the particle changes the bias involved in a positive polar question entirely, but not its descriptive content. While the positive polar question without a particle does not presuppose any positive evidence, using *no* imposes such a requirement on a felicitous utterance of the question.¹⁸

(27) *Positive polar questions with -no*

- (a) *Neutral Context*: We're looking for a left-handed person. I'm wondering about John, who is not around.

#John-wa hidarikiki-na no?
 John-TOP lefty-COP Q
 »Is John lefty?«

- (b) *Negative Context*: My friend has just entered our windowless office wearing a dripping wet raincoat.

#ima hareteru no?
 now sunny Q
 »Is it sunny now?«

- (c) *Positive Context*: Same context as (27b).

ima ame futteru no?
 now rain is.falling Q
 »Is it raining now?«

¹⁸ This can be related to the bias induced by »rising declaratives« (Gunlogson, 2003).

Another case of a Japanese particles that conveys non-truth-conditional content is *mono*, illustrated in (26b) and examined in the contribution by [McCready and Takahashi](#) (this volume, Chapter 6). As they argue, *mono* is a mixed expressive that conventionally contributes descriptive as well as UC-content. At the descriptive tier, it has the meaning of a causal connective, roughly equivalent to English *because*. In addition, it carries the expressive content that the speaker is not neutral about the propositional content expressed by the proposition *mono* attaches to, but that she is personally affected by it. In this respect, *mono* resembles [Grice's \(1975\)](#) decomposition of *therefore* into a conjunctive and causal part.

1.1.3 Pronouns

UCIs can not only be attested in the specialized class of particles. Beside expressive adjectives and nouns which are almost always expressives in the narrow sense, pronouns can also carry non-truth-conditional meaning in many languages. The prototypical example of pronouns that have an expressive function can be found in languages that have a distinction between formal and familiar pronouns. This is, amongst many others, the case in German and French.

(28) *Formal vs. familiar pronouns*

- (a) *Ich rufe dich/Sie an.*
 I call you.FAMILIAR/FORMAL on
 »I'll give you a call.« (Potts, 2007b, 190)
- (b) *Tu es / Vous êtes soûl.*
 you.FAMILIAR are / you.FORMAL are drunk
 »You are drunk.« (Horn, 2007, 49)

Like expressively-coloured nouns, such pronouns are mixed UCIs. On the truth-conditional layer, their meaning is just their referent, that is, the addressee of the context this case. Hence, they cannot be dropped entirely as expletive UCIs. The distinction between *formal* and *familiar* resides on the use-conditional layer. Choosing the wrong pronoun can never make an otherwise true sentence false, but it may result in a high degree of social infelicity.

- (29) $du = \frac{\text{informal relationship between speaker and hearer}}{\text{the addressee}}$

Another case of personal pronouns contributing use-conditional meaning are free personal dative pronouns that can have an expressive function in some languages. For English, Horn (2008, this volume, Chapter 5) argues that dative pronouns may have such an UC-use like in (30). Other languages which have a more systematic system of free datives, like German (Gutzmann, 2007; Lambert, 2007; Wegener, 1989) or Hebrew (Borer and Grodzinsky, 1986), exhibit a pattern known as *ethical dative*.

(30) *Personal datives*

- (a) I want **me** an iPod. (Horn, 2008, 175)
- (b) *Dass du mir ja nicht zu spät kommst.*
 that you me.DAT MP not too late come
 »Don't you be late.« (Lambert, 2007, 5)
- (b) *hem kol ha-zman mitxatnim li*
 they all the-time marry to-me
 »They are getting married on me all the time (and it bothers me)«
 (Borer and Grodzinsky, 1986, 179)

Common to these three free personal datives is that they all express some affection of the speaker towards the fact or event described by the sentence. That is, the speaker of (30a) expresses that she is somehow affected by her wanting an iPod. In a similar vein, the speaker (30b) expresses that she has some personal interest in the hearer not being late (Gutzmann, 2007, 277). In contrast, the Hebrew ethical dative in (30c) expresses the speaker's negative affection with all the marrying. However, all this is expressed solely in a use-conditional way. The presence of the personal datives does not alter the descriptive content of the sentence. They are all instances of expletive UCIs and could be dropped without any change in grammaticality or descriptive meaning.

$$(31) \text{ I want me an iPod} = \frac{\text{me(I want an iPod)}}{\text{I want an iPod}}$$

Like modal particles, the free datives are not isolated since they take the propositional content of the sentence as their argument.

1.2 UCIs beyond and below the word level

Up to this point, every UCI we have presented has been a single word. However, there are also use-conditions beyond and below the word level. By this,

I mean use-conditional content that stems from intonation, syntactic constructions, morphological operations, the pragmatics of speech acts, or even from orthographic devices.¹⁹ All the examples which I discuss in the following show that the phenomenon of conventional-non-truth-conditional content is widespread and not restricted to some fancy words but pervades every layer of natural language.

1.2.1 Expressive intonation

Intonation may be one of the most prominent and obvious means of expressivity.²⁰ By intonation, one can express all kinds of emotions and attitudes, ranging from joy to anger, interest and boredom.²¹ Furthermore, intonation can be used to signal special communicative functions, like irony, sarcasm, or hyperbole, that may guide the pragmatic interpretation of a sentence. Used to indicate emotions or other rhetorical means, intonation is said to be paralinguistic, as it sits on top of the ordinary linguistic signs without being signs in themselves. However, there are cases in which intonation actually is a genuine part of the language system and is reflected in the structure of grammatical constructions and their semantic interpretation. For instance, intonation has linguistic impact in focus-sensitive constructions. A focus particle like *only* associates with an accented expression yielding different readings for different placements of the focus accent.

(32)(a) Piet only wears a PINK tie at work.

(b) Piet only wears a pink tie at WORK.

While (32a) is falsified if Piet wears a non-pink tie to work, (32b) allows Piet to wear any tie at work as long as he does not wear a pink tie anywhere else than at work. Different accents lead to different semantic interpretations. Focus-sensitive construction like these are, by far, the best-studied phenomena in

¹⁹ Another source for expressive meaning may be speech-accompanying gestures (Ebert *et al.*, 2011). Interestingly, many UCIs share important properties of gestures, for instance the nondisplaceability which is typical of gestural communication; cf. the discussion below in Section 1.4.2.

²⁰ Cf. for instance Ladd (1990), who reviews earlier work by Bolinger. »[T]he unifying idea of B's work is [...] the general claim that intonational features, including accent placement, are beyond grammar and are directly linked to emotion.« (Ladd, 1990, 806)

²¹ For an overview over the linguistic encoding of emotions, cf. Fries 2007; Fries 2009. For general considerations regarding the role of emotion in language, cf. Jay and Janschewitz's (2007) reply to Potts 2007b.

which intonation cannot be merely paralinguistic but must be reflected in the syntactic or semantic representation of a sentence. However, there is still some dispute on which meaning-level the difference between (32a) and (32b) is located.²² Some of the various approaches to the meaning of focus are couched in use-conditional rather than truth-conditional terms. For instance, [Kratzer \(2004\)](#) proposes that what seems like the presupposition of the backgrounded material may in fact be rendered more adequately as expressive meaning. In his contribution to this volume, [Zeevat](#) (this volume, Chapter 9) argues for an analysis that combines elements from presuppositional and expressive approaches, and tries to derive the main properties of focus particles like *only* from their emotive component. In any case, it is clear that, in the absence of any focus-sensitive expression, the focus accent does not contribute truth-conditional content but, rather, influences the conditions on the felicity of an utterance. This is most obvious in the case of question-answer pairs.

- (33) A: Who likes Bruce?
 B: #Rachel likes BRUCE.
 B': RACHEL likes Bruce.

In the context of the question in (33A), an utterance of (33B) is infelicitous since it bears the focus accent at a given constituent ([Schwarzschild, 1999](#)). If the accent pattern is changed to the expected one in (33B'), the sentence can be felicitously uttered.

Beside the use-conditions imposed by focus accentuation, there are some other cases of intonation that – unlike the patterns signaling delight or sarcasm, for instance – show some reflections in the grammar. Take, for instance, the intonation pattern that can be called exclamative or *unexpectedness* intonation ([Castroviejo Miró, 2008](#)) that is typical for exclamative sentences across different languages ([d'Avis, 2002](#); [Rett, 2008](#); [Zanuttini and Portner, 2003](#)).

- (34) *Exclamative or unexpectedness intonation*

- (a) How TALL Michael is!
 (b) Wie GROSS Michael ist!

²² For approaches to the syntax and semantics of focus sensitive particles and various focus sensitive constructions, cf. amongst many others, [Altmann 1976](#); [Beaver and Clark 2008](#); [Büring and Hartmann 2001](#); [Jacobs 1983](#); [Horn 1969](#); [Horn 1996](#); [König 1991](#); [Kratzer 2004](#); [Rooth 1985](#); [Rooth 1992](#); [Schmitz 2008](#); [Sudhoff 2010](#).

Exclamative sentences like these express that the speaker is surprised or astonished about the degree of Michael's height. That unexpectedness intonation (»UI« henceforth) is really part of language system of English and German is not only shown by the fact that its realization is very constant from a phonological point of view (Oppenrieder, 1989), but that it is also directly reflected in their grammars. They are introduced by a word which usually introduces a question and therefore licenses the inversion of the subject and the verb in (standard) main clauses.

- (35)(a) How tall is Michael?
(b) Wie groß ist Michael?

In *how*-exclamatives however, no inversion takes place. Rather they look like embedded questions. Without unexpectedness intonation, the sentences become ungrammatical as they are either exclamatives lacking the needed intonation or questions lacking the needed inversion.²³

- (36)(a) *How tall Michael is. (without UI)
(b) *Wie groß Michael ist. (without UI)

What is special about *how*-exclamatives is that they only have use-conditional meaning but no truth-conditional content. Utterances like (34) are not a statement about or an assertion of Michael's height. For instance, they cannot serve as an answer to a query about Michael's height. In contrast, an assertion that Michael has a surprisingly high degree of tallness is perfectly fine.

- (37) A: How tall is Michael?
B1: # How tall Michael is!
B2: Surprisingly tall.

Furthermore, the unexpectedness is also not part of the truth-conditional content. This is shown by the fact that it can neither be denied nor even affirmed.

- (38) A: How tall Michael is!

²³ Of course, both sentences are grammatical, if they are interpreted as a special kind question, for instance as a kind deliberative or reflective question or as a echoic clarification question. Furthermore, both sentences are possible in book titles or the like, in which case they are akin to embedded questions.

B1: # That's not true. I don't think this is unexpected at all.

B2: # You're completely right. That is unexpected.

In *how*-exclamatives, no descriptive content seems to be left behind. If this is the case, there would be an empty lower level in the informal fraction notation.

(39) How tall Michael is! = $\frac{\text{It is unexpected how tall Michael is}}{\emptyset}$

This raises the question of whether UI or the corresponding semantic operator it realizes is different from all the other expressive items presented so far. If it is, then UI is a new kind of expressive insofar as it affects the descriptive content. Informally, it takes its descriptive argument with it to the expressive layer and does not leave it behind as all the other expressives do. In a paper on various kind of expressive content, [McCready \(2010\)](#) calls such items *shunting* UCIs. However, it might be the case that the impression that *how*-exclamatives have no descriptive content is only superficial. An argument for this comes from exclamatives that have a more declarative structure instead of being introduced by *how* ([Castroviejo Miró, 2008](#)).

(40) Obama won the Nobel Prize!

In contrast to *how*-exclamatives, declarative exclamatives can be used to assert their propositional content.

(41) A: What happened?

B: Obama won the Nobel Prize!

Like in *how*-exclamatives, UI is not part of the descriptive content of a declarative exclamative either. That is, they do not make an assertion about the speaker's attitude regarding the propositional content.

(42) A: How do you feel about Obama's current situation?

B1: #He won the Nobel Prize!

B2: I'm surprised that he won the Nobel Prize.

The behavior of UI in declarative exclamative thus parallels that of other expletives like modal particles, and accordingly, there are two levels of meaning involved in declarative exclamatives.

(43) Obama won the Nobel Prize! = $\frac{\text{It is unexpected that Obama won the Nobel Prize}}{\text{Obama won the Nobel Prize}}$

Given this analysis of declarative exclamatives, it can be argued that UI does makes the same contribution in *how*-exclamatives. That the latter cannot be used to assert anything must then follow from the fact that their descriptive content corresponds to a question meaning and is thus not suitable for being asserted. For an elaboration of this argument and a formalization, see [Castroviejo Miró \(2008\)](#), from whom I have borrowed the arguments in this short discussion.²⁴

Another kind of intonation that does not alter the descriptive content of a sentence and which could be analyzed as contributing use-conditional content is *verum focus*. As coined by [Höhle \(1992\)](#), the term *verum focus* refers to a special kind of non-contrastive focus in German that is realized on the finite verb or a complementizer, both located in C in German. Informally, the contribution of *verum focus* is that it puts emphasis on the propositional content it scopes over.

(44) *Verum focus*

A: Peter is supposed to have written a book.

B: Peter **HAT** ein Buch geschrieben.

Peter has a book written

»Peter has indeed written a book.«

([Höhle, 1992](#))

[Höhle \(1992, 112\)](#) assumes that *verum focus* is a means to realize a semantic operator he calls *VERUM*. The working paraphrase he uses as the meaning of the *verum* operator in his paper ([Höhle, 1992, 112](#)) is simply that of a matrix sentence that states that the embedded proposition is true.

VERUM is not restricted to German. Cross-linguistically, it can be realized in many different ways. As we have seen, *VERUM* is realized by *verum focus* in German. In contrast, both in English and in Spanish, we find special kinds of lexical insertions to instantiate the *verum* operator ([Gutzmann and Castroviejo Miró, 2011](#)).

(45) A: I wonder whether Carl has finished his book.

B1: Karl **HAT** sein Buch beendet.

(German \Rightarrow *verum focus* in C)

B2: Carl **did** finish his book.

(English \Rightarrow *do* insertion)

²⁴ From the conclusion that UI is not a shunting UCI, it does not, of course, follow that there are no such items, cf. Section 1.3 below.

B3: Carlos *sí* acabó su libro. (Spanish \Rightarrow *sí* insertion)

The verum operator realized by these different constructions behaves like other expletive UCIs as it does not alter the descriptive content of the sentence. All the answers in (45) are true if the person in question has finished his book. The contribution of VERUM is in the use-conditional layer. Its argument is the propositional content of the sentence.

(46) Carl did finish his book \approx $\frac{\text{It is true that Carl finished his book}}{\text{Carl finished his book}}$

Things are not that straightforward with VERUM since it is also possible in a variety of non-declarative sentence types (cf. Höhle 1992 for an overview). This brings up the interesting question of how VERUM interacts with the sentence mood of the different sentence types in which it is allowed. For instance, in a polar question with VERUM (Romero, 2005; Romero and Han, 2004), the expressive meaning of the interrogative cannot simply be that the content of the question is true, as in (48).

(47) *Verum focus in polar question* (Höhle, 1992, 112)

A: I have heard that Carl kicked the dog.

B: *HAT er den Hund denn getreten?*
has he the dog MP kicked?
»HAS he kicked the dog?«

(48) HAS he kicked the dog? \neq $\frac{\text{It is true that he kicked the dog?}}{\text{Has he kicked the dog}}$

Verum focus and VERUM are therefore an interesting subject to study the interaction between UCIs and sentence mood.²⁵ Furthermore, as a means of information structure, verum focus is governed by the discourse structure and can therefore also provide insights into the dynamics of UC-content. In her detailed study, Repp (this volume, Chapter 7) shows that VERUM interacts in delicate ways not only with the information structure of a sentence, but also with modal operators, negation, and – highly relevant for this volume – modal particles.

²⁵ Sentence mood itself has been argued to contribute use-conditional content. See Steinius (1967) for an early outline, and Portner (2007) or Gutzmann (2008) for more recent implementations.

I have used unexpectedness intonation and verum focus as two phenomena of intonation that conventionally express use-conditional content. However, there are certainly many others. Arguably, the alternative invoking function of ordinary information focus could be understood as being use-conditional. Only if there are focus sensitive operators like *only* present in the sentence, does it have an impact on the descriptive content of a sentence.

1.2.2 Expressive syntax

Besides intonation, another way to alter the use-conditions of a sentence without affecting its descriptive content is by using certain, often non-canonical syntactic structures. Many of those are associated with specific functions of information structuring which commonly have no influence of the truth-conditions of a sentence.

Of the syntactic constructions that do not affect the truth-conditions of a sentence, non-restrictive relative clauses as in (49a) and other supplements like *as*-appositives (49b), nominal appositives (49c), and parentheticals (49d) are the most prominent ones in the literature on multidimensionality in semantics (Jaye and Rossari, 2004; Nouwen, 2007; Potts, 2002; Potts, 2005).

(49) *Appositives & parentheticals*

- (a) Ames, **who was a successful spy**, is now behind bars. (Potts, 2005, 90)
- (b) Ames was, **as the press reported**, a successful spy.
- (c) Ames, **a former spy**, is now behind bars.
- (d) Ames – **and you will never believe this** – is now behind bars.

All these kinds of unintegrated syntactic supplements are semantically independent of the rest of the sentence. Using them leads to a very intuitive form of semantic multidimensionality as there are two sentences, presented as one. The contents of these two sentences are transparently distinct from each other, except for the anchor of the supplement.

- (50) Ames, a former spy, is now behind bars = $\frac{\text{Ames is a former spy}}{\text{Ames is now behind bars}}$

However, even if all the phenomena in (49) involve straight multidimensionality, they differ crucially from other UCIs. In contrast to them, it is not obvious that supplements convey conventional non-truth-conditional content. Instead,

it is reasonable to assume that they primarily have descriptive content. While it may be mistaken in the first place to ask what the truth-conditions for the interjection *ouch* or the modal particle *ja* are, this is an easy question when it comes to appositives and their kin. For a supplement, we can easily give the truth conditions if it is applied to its anchor. For instance, the content of the nominal appositive *a former spy* combined with its anchor *Ames* is given by the top layer in (50). Obviously, this is true, if Ames is a former spy. In the same vein, the *as*-appositive in (49b) is true, if the press reported that Ames was a successful spy. That is, what we have on the top layer in (50) is truth-conditional rather than UC-content. This is also shown by the possibility of denying the content of an appositive, even if doing this is not as straightforward as for the primary, asserted content.

(51) A: Ames, a former spy, is now behind bars.

B: Yes, but he was not a spy but a corrupted politician.

However, the truth-conditional content of the supplement is independent of the truth-conditional content at the lower level. We can judge whether it is true that Ames was a former spy independently of the question of whether he is now behind bars, and *vice versa*. Informally, we can thus give the following truth conditions for (49).

(52) $\frac{\text{Ames was a former spy}}{\text{Ames is now behind bars}} = \frac{\text{true, iff Ames was a former spy}}{\text{true, iff Ames is now behind bars}}$

That is, even if appositives and other syntactic supplements express descriptive instead of UC-content, they mirror expletive UCIs insofar as they convey their content independently of the content of the main clause, thereby leading to multidimensional content.

There are other syntactic constructions that, unlike the supplements in (49), are more likely to contribute use-conditional instead of truth-conditional content. Take, for instance, topicalization (Birner and Ward, 1998; Frey, 2010).

(53) *Topicalization*
John, Mary loves.

Whatever the exact use-conditions imposed by topicalization may be,²⁶ it is clear that they do not have any influence on the truth-conditions of the sentence, which are the same as the truth-conditions of the corresponding sentence with canonical word order. That is, both (54a) and (54b) are true iff Mary loves John.

(54)(a) John, Mary loves.

(b) Mary loves John.

The use-conditional contribution of topicalization has to be given in information structural terms. Of course, giving a paraphrase for such functions means leaving aside many of the details of the use conditions for topics. But for the sake of illustration, let us adopt Portner's (2007, 418) formulation that the speaker's »mental representation« of the topical element is active. We thus have the following truth and use conditions for (53):

(55) John, Mary loves = $\frac{\text{The speaker's mental representation of John is active}}{\text{Mary loves John}}$

That the contribution of topicalization puts such a requirement on the discourse context can be illustrated by the following examples.

(56) [Rushing into the room:]

#John, Mary loves.

(57) A: What's up with Mary?

B: #John, Mary loves.

In (56), there is a neutral context in which there is nothing active in the mental representation. In (57), A asks a question about Mary and thereby activates the B's mental representation of Mary but not of John. Therefore, topicalizing *John* is infelicitous in such contexts.

That the semantics of topicalization behave very differently from that of appositives can be shown by trying to deny them, as in (51) for appositives. As expected this is impossible like it is for the other expressives.

(58) A: John, Mary loves.

²⁶ Büring (1997, 2003), for instance, provides accounts of topics in general, relating them to the management of the question under discussion. For various use-conditional ways to manage the common ground, cf. Repp (this volume, Chapter 7).

B: #Yes, but I haven't thought about John.

Apart from topicalization, there are many more non-canonical syntactic constructions that may be used to expressively convey something about the discourse role of a moved constituent, like right and left dislocation or »free-topic« constructions in German (cf. e.g., Altmann 1981). The so-called *preprefield* in German, i.e., the position before the ordinary first position before the main verb in non-subordinated clauses, seems to be systematically associated with the function of framing and integrating the truth-conditional content of the sentence into the discourse structure, thereby affecting the use-conditions of the utterance.

1.2.3 Expressive morphology

The UCIs discussed so far are all lexical words or – in case of intonation of syntactic constructions conventionally associated with UC-meaning – something beyond or above the word level. But use conditions can also be imposed below the word level on a regular basis, as many languages employ a subsystem that may be called *expressive morphology* (Zwicky and Pullum, 1987; Stump, 1993; Bauer, 1997).²⁷ Even if expressive morphology is »associated with an expressive, playful, poetic, or simply ostentatious effect of some kind« (Zwicky and Pullum, 1987), it is still part of the language system, as it is governed by regularities, even if the rules for expressive morphology may differ from what Zwicky and Pullum (1987) call *plain morphology*. In the following, I will present a small selection of the phenomena that can be found in this huge terrain. To keep the presentation somewhat focussed, I will concentrate on use-conditional phenomena in the morphology of German (cf. Dressler and Merlini-Barbaresi 1994 for an overview).

One kind of phenomenon of expressive morphology that is common across many languages is expressive derivation. In particular, diminutive suffixes are capable of conveying affective, use-conditional meaning when used with expressions referring to persons. For instance, there is systematic usage of the suffix *-i* in German to derive affective nicknames from ordinary proper names.

(59) *Expressive diminutives*

²⁷ Alternative notions are *evaluative* or *affective morphology*.

Guten Morgen, Hans-i
 good morning Hans-DIM.FAMILIAR
 »Good morning, Hans.«

Like the familiar second-person pronoun *du* discussed in (28), the suffix *-i* expresses a familiar relationship. In contrast with the pronoun, this relationship does not necessarily involve the speaker and the addressee but the speaker and the referent of the stem to which the suffix attaches.²⁸ The expression of familiarity does not alter the truth-conditions of a sentence. But, unlike the familiar pronoun *du*, expressive *-i* arguably has no descriptive content at all. Accordingly, we can give the following representation for *-i* suffixed to a proper name like *Hans*.

(60) Hans-i = $\frac{\text{familiar relationship between the speaker and Hans}}{\text{Hans}}$

Another instance of expressive morphology as discussed in the paper by [Bücking and Rau](#) (this volume, Chapter 2) is a morpho-syntactic construction involving non-inflected verbal stems. These verb forms can be used – primarily in electronic chat or forum texts – to transform the meaning of the verbal stem into a kind of performative. For instance, the verb stem *grins-* »smile« in (61a) counts as a substitute for performing the act of smiling.

(61) *Non-inflected verbs*

- (a) *grins*
 smile.STEM
- (b) *dich in den Arm nehmen*
 you.ACC in the arm take.STEM

As in (61b), such non-inflected verbs need not to be bare forms, but can also take further arguments. That shows that it is not a purely morphological phenomenon. Interestingly, it can take the same arguments as its inflected forms.²⁹

²⁸ Of course, this still may be the addressee as in (59), where *-i* is affixed to the vocatively used proper name *Hans*.

²⁹ The subject is an exception, as it is hardly ever realized, which [Bücking and Rau](#) show in their contribution. In this respect, the non-inflected constructions mirror infinitives, to which [Bücking and Rau](#) relate them. For a thorough treatment of (adult) »root infinitives,« and speculations on why adding a »subject« to them leads to directive interpretations only, see [Reis \(1995, 2003\)](#) or [Truckenbrodt \(2006a, 2006b\)](#).

convey only use-conditional meaning. Mixed UCIs, on the other hand, also express content that is truth-contentionally relevant. They include ethnic slurs (cf. (10)), which contribute descriptive content that equals that of their neutral, non-racist counterparts. The familiar/formal pronouns *du/tous* vs. *Sie/vous* (cf. (28)) are a further case of mixed expressives. They refer to the addressee at the descriptive tier, while expressing a familiar or formal relationship between speaker and addressee at the expressive one.

The feature of dimensionality is, however, not sufficient to account for all differences that can be attested between various UCIs. For instance, we have seen that the use-conditional component of interjections behaves differently than that of modal particles for instance, even if both are expletive UCIs. Likewise, amongst mixed UCIs, the expressive content of ethnic slurs behaves differently from the content conveyed by the mixed UCI *man* when used with a gradable adjective inside the sentence. These differences do not concern what content an expressive delivers but what it needs. Interjections and ethnic slurs have use-conditional content that comes already satisfied. By this, I mean that they do not need any further argument to unfold their meaning; that is, they come with complete use-conditions and are not any kind of function from (an) argument(s) to use-conditions. As illustrated in (8), the interjection *ouch* directly expresses the emotion of pain without needing an argument. The same holds for the slur *Kraut* in (18). The negative attitude it expresses towards Germans does not depend on any argument, even if it needs an argument in the truth-conditional dimension.

In contrast, other UCIs seek an argument to which their content can apply. For example, modal particles like *ja* display an attitude towards a propositional argument, and expressive adjective attributes like *damn* express an attitude towards a nominal argument. This is informally described in (4) and (25). This is the second aspect with respect to which expressives can differ, which I call their *functionality*. I use the binary feature [\pm functional] to distinguish what I label *isolated* UCIs (after Potts 2005, 65) from *functional* UCIs.

Given the two binary features of dimensionality and functionality, we can distinguish at least four different types of UCIs (a further distinction will be motivated below). Table 1.1 gives the matrix for the different kinds of UCIs and provides a label for each type.

However, this is a simplification since I have left out of the picture those expressions that I have called *shunting UCIs* (McCready, 2010). Those are functional UCIs that do not leave their descriptive argument unmodified in the truth-conditional dimension like functional expletive UCIs do. Instead, they shunt

	<i>-functional</i>	<i>+functional</i>
<i>-2-dimensional</i>	isolated UCIs	functional UCIs
<i>+2-dimensional</i>	isolated mixed UCIs	functional mixed UCIs

TABLE 1.1 Types of use-conditional items

their argument over to the use-conditional dimension. Unexpected intonation, as discussed in (34), could be understood as an example of a shunting UCI. McCready (2010) discusses the Japanese adverbial *yokumo*, that transfers an assertion into a use-conditional speech act of negative attitude and unexpectedness. Finally, as discussed by Bücking and Rau (this volume, Chapter 2), the non-inflected constructions discussed above also only contribute use-conditional meaning, too. Since both functional expletives and shunting UCIs need an argument and contribute only to the use-conditional dimension, they have the same features. Therefore, we need an additional feature to distinguish between functional UCIs that shunt and those that do not. Because, as McCready (2010) points out, shunting UCIs consume their argument whereas functional expletives do not such that it can be reused in a semantic derivation, we can use resource-sensitivity [$\pm r$ -sensitive] as a distinguishing feature.³⁰ However, this feature only makes sense for one-dimensional functional UCIs. On the one hand, isolated UCIs do not take any argument and therefore, the question whether an application is resource-sensitive or not does not arise. On the other hand, functional mixed UCIs always map their argument to both dimensions of meaning and hence, we cannot meaningfully distinguish between two variants of functional mixed UCIs.³¹ Taking the distinction between expletive and shunting functional UCIs, we end up with five different types of UCI.

Depending on their feature structure, these five types of UCIs can be ordered hierarchically. The simplest type are isolated expletive UCIs as they have a negative specification for dimensionality and functionality. The next level of complexity consists of both functional UCIs and isolated mixed UCIs. These two structures cannot be related to each other, since they are derived from isolated expletives by the addition of a different feature. In the case

³⁰ Resource-sensitivity figures prominently in linear logic (Girard, 1987) and has been adopted in certain varieties of natural language semantics (Asudeh, 2005; Barker, 2010).

³¹ In one sense, functional mixed expressives are [$+r$ -sensitive], because they do not give back their argument unmodified. In another sense, they are [$-r$ -sensitive], since their argument appears in both dimensions.

of functional UCIs, there is a positive specification for being functional, in contrast to isolated expletives. Here, we can distinguish between shunting and expletive functional UCIs, depending on the specification for resource-sensitivity. When a positive specification for dimensionality is added to the simple case of isolated expletives, we arrive at isolated mixed UCIs. Functional mixed UCIs, the fifth and most feature-rich type, share one feature with each functional and isolated mixed UCIs. We can arrive from the latter two types at functional mixed UCIs if we add the feature that they are missing. Figure 1.1 illustrates the relations between the five types of UCIs with respect to their feature structure.




FIG. 1.1 Relations between the five types of use-conditional items

When comparing the informal fraction representations I have used throughout this paper to illustrate the truth- and use-conditional content of sentences containing UCIs, we can abstract a schematic representation for each of the four types of UCIs.

The simplest schema is that for isolated expletives, since they do not interact with the rest of the sentence in any non-trivial way. When an interjection like *ouch* is used together with a sentence, the truth-conditional content of the sentence is not affected by the presence of that interjection, whereas its use-conditional content is given by the emotion conveyed by *ouch* itself. To be a bit more precise, I make use of the following notational conventions.

The variable S ranges over sentences, and ε over use-conditional expressions. I use brackets to denote that something is included in a sentence. That is, $S[\dots\varepsilon\dots]$ denotes a sentence that includes an UCI in a not-specified position. For isolated expletives, we thus arrive at the following scheme.

(63) *Scheme for isolated expletives*

$$S[\dots\varepsilon\dots] = \frac{\varepsilon}{S}$$

From isolated expletives we get to the type of functional expletives by adding the feature [+functional]. In contrast to the former, the meaning of the latter is a use-conditional function which, as such, needs an argument, for which I use the variable α . A functional expletive UCI, like the adjective *damn* for instance, needs a nominal argument to which the negative attitude conveyed can apply. All functional UCIs do not modify their argument at the descriptive layer. However, depending of whether the application is [-resource-sensitive] or not, we have to distinguish between two schemes for functional UCIs. Functional expletives like *damn* pass their argument back to the descriptive layer. Truth-conditionally, *the damn dog* makes the same contribution as *the dog*. Therefore, the argument α has to show up at the lower level of the fraction representation in addition to being the argument for the UCI at the use-conditional layer on top of it.

(64) *Scheme for expletive functional UCIs*

$$S[\dots\varepsilon(\alpha)\dots] = \frac{\varepsilon(\alpha)}{S[\dots\alpha\dots]}$$

This contrasts with the scheme for shunting functional UCIs, for which the application is [+resource-sensitive], because their argument is not reused at the truth-conditional level. Therefore, the shunting application removes the argument α from the truth-conditional tier.

(65) *Scheme for shunting functional UCIs*

$$S[\dots\varepsilon(\alpha)\dots] = \frac{\varepsilon(\alpha)}{S}$$

The difference between functional UCIs and isolated mixed UCIs is that the former contribute only to the use-conditional meaning component, whereas isolated mixed UCIs carry also truth-conditionally relevant meaning; they are [+2-dimensional]. However, the use-conditional component of isolated mixed

UCIs is [*-functional*] since it does not depend on an argument. An ethnic slur like *Kraut*, for instance, descriptively predicates *German* to a nominal argument α while expressing a negative attitude towards Germans in the use-conditional dimension. To indicate the 2-dimensionality of a UCI, I make use of subscripted t and u to label the truth- and use-conditional content of a mixed expressive. Since the negative attitude conveyed by *Kraut* does not need an argument at the descriptive tier, the argument α does not show up at the top layer of the following representational scheme for isolated mixed expressives:

(66) *Scheme for isolated mixed expressives*

$$S[\dots \varepsilon(\alpha) \dots] = \frac{\varepsilon_u}{S[\dots \varepsilon_t(\alpha) \dots]}$$

The fourth type, functional mixed UCIs, differs from the last two types insofar as it is both [*+functional*] and [*+2-dimensional*]. The use-conditional component of a functional mixed UCI is a use-conditional function and therefore needs an argument α . And since it has mixed content, such an item contributes something to the truth-conditional dimension as well. An example of a functional mixed UCI is given by the interjectional use of English *man* when combined with a sentence that contains a gradable adjective. On the truth-conditional layer, *man* intensifies the property predicated in the propositional content, i.e., *Man, it's hot!* means that it is very hot (McCready, 2009). On the use-conditional layer, *man* expresses that the speaker is somehow affected by that high degree of heat. The scheme for functional mixed UCIs hence involves an argument α that is present in both dimensions of meaning. In the truth-conditional tier, it is modified by ε_t , the truth-conditional meaning component of the mixed expressive, while on the use-conditional level on top of it, α serves as the argument for the use-conditional content ε_u .

(67) *Scheme for functional mixed expressives*

$$S[\dots \varepsilon(\alpha) \dots] = \frac{\varepsilon_u(\alpha)}{S[\dots \varepsilon_t(\alpha) \dots]}$$

These five schemes are useful for illustrating the differences and similarities between the four types of expressives. They could serve as a good starting point for anyone aiming to develop a formal model for dealing with expressive items.

1.4 Characteristics of conventional use-conditional meaning

So far, I have given an overview of the richness of expressions and constructions that convey use-conditional meaning, and distinguished between four different types of UCIs. However, I have not yet given a description of the main characteristics and properties of expressions that convey use-conditional meaning. That will be the topic of this section.

One feature that ties all UCIs together is trivial insofar as it follows from their definition. UCIs convey meaning that does not contribute to the truth conditions of a sentence, but instead, they affect the conditions in which the sentence can felicitously be uttered. However, even if this is what defines UCIs, one may ask whether there are further properties common to all UCIs. If there are no additional similarities between the different expressions and constructions sketched in this chapter, wouldn't the notion of UCIs just be an artificial cover term to lump together various phenomena that are not really related to each other? This question becomes especially prominent when considering the broad range of phenomena that I have characterized as being use-conditional. Although I will show that there are certain characteristics that are shared by all UCIs, I should briefly address this worry directly.

I think that even if there were no properties common to all UCIs (of course, beside being use-conditional), this should not be considered as problematic. First, when speaking of UCIs, I do not want to presuppose that all expressions that contribute use-conditional instead of truth-conditional content form a natural class of *expressions*. Rather, I would say that use-conditional meaning is a class of *meaning*, just as truth-conditional meaning is another. Secondly, finding common properties beside use-conditionality should be considered as a bonus and not as a necessary condition, as it should not even be expected. When considering all expressions that contribute truth-conditional content, it is very hard to find properties that are shared by all of them. For instance, what is a property that verbs, quantifiers like *many*, or conjunctions share? Truth-conditional content is contributed by expressions of a large variety of parts of speech or constructions, yet we speak of truth-conditional expressions. What unites them is that they help to determine the conditions under which a sentence is true. In the same vein, I think that we should not be worried if expressions that convey use-conditional meaning exhibit the same diversity as truth-conditional expressions.

This worry therefore may not be as problematic as it seems, at first sight. And it becomes even less worrying, since there actually are some characteristic properties that are common to UCIs. These, however, follow more or less from

the fact that UCIs are not part of the truth conditions of the sentence in which they are used. But this does not make these criteria less useful; quite the contrary. They can be used as a tool to check whether an alleged UCI does indeed contribute use-conditional content rather than just rely on our intuition that it does not affect the truth-conditions of an utterance.

In the following, I present and discuss some properties that have been ascribed to expressives in the literature. I then check how these can be used to test the non-truth-conditional of an expression that is supposed to contribute use-conditional meaning. As a starting point, I will take the following list of properties that [Potts \(2007b\)](#) suggests as being essential to expressives (in the narrow sense) in his influential paper.

(68) *Potts's properties of expressives* ([Potts, 2007b](#), 166f)

- (a) Independence
- (b) Nondisplaceability
- (c) Perspective dependence
- (d) Descriptive ineffability
- (e) Immediacy
- (f) Repeatability

I will now sketch out [Potts's \(2007b\)](#) aims with these properties, and whether they apply to all of the five types of UCIs.

1.4.1 Independence

The most important property on [Potts's](#) list is that use-conditional content is independent of the truth-conditional content. Here is how [Potts \(2007b, 166\)](#) formulates this property:

(69) **Independence** Expressive content contributes a dimension of meaning that is separate from the regular descriptive content.

The independence of use-conditional from truth-conditional content should directly follow from this distinction. Use-conditional content affects the conditions under which a sentence can be uttered felicitously, not the conditions that have to be fulfilled in order to make a sentence true. Hence, using a UCI that is not licensed by the utterance context leads to infelicity, but does not render a

sentence false that would be true if the expressive were left out or – in the case of mixed expressives – were substituted by a non-expressive counterpart (see below). We are dealing with two separate criteria to evaluate a sentence. The independence from the regular truth-conditional content is also what distinguishes use-conditional content from presuppositions, because presupposed content can affect truth-conditional content, at least if it is not satisfied.

Since independence follows directly from the fact that use-conditional content is not truth-conditional content, it holds for all kinds of UCIs. The first way to test independence is by giving the truth-conditions of a sentence that contains an alleged UCI and comparing it with the same sentence without it, or with a sentence containing a different UCI. If the truth-conditions are the same, then the content of the UCI in question does not contribute descriptive content. I have already employed such a test in the preceding survey to illustrate that an expression does not contribute to the truth-conditions of a sentence. In (23) for instance, I gave the truth-conditions for an utterance of the sentence *Webster schläft* { \emptyset /doch/halt/ja/wohl}, all the variants of which are true, if Webster sleeps, regardless of whether or which modal particle is used. As we saw in (??), modal particles can also be used to illustrate that the use-conditional content of an utterance can lead to infelicity even if its descriptive content is true. Since the modal particle *ja* expressively ascribes potential previous knowledge of the truth-conditional content to the addressee, using *ja* in the context of (24) in an utterance of *Es ist ein Mädchen!* »It's a girl!« makes the utterance infelicitous, even if the sentence is still true.

Before I provide some more procedures to use the independence property to derive further characteristics of UCIs, let me add a qualification to this property and Potts's formulation of it. Even if Potts is right by saying that *expressive content* is independent of the descriptive content, it is important to keep in mind that it does neither generally hold that the *content of an expressive* is independent of the descriptive content nor that the descriptive content is independent of the content of an expressive. This is so because, as we have seen, there are what I have called mixed expressives that contribute both, expressive as well as descriptive content. This is illustrated schematically in (66) and (67). Mixed UCIs like *Kraut* or the German familiar pronoun *du* cannot be omitted from a sentence without also removing their descriptive contribution.³²

³² However, they can be viewed as multidimensional lexical items whose two dimensions of meaning are nonetheless independent.

Besides giving the truth-conditions of a sentence, there are other tests that can be used to argue for the non-truth-conditional status of the content of an expression. The first one involves negation. If an expression contributes truth-conditional content, it should be possible to target that content by ordinary negation. For instance, an ordinary adverb can be negated directly, as (70) shows.

(70)(a) Peter is running **fast**.

(b) Peter is not running **fast**.

For the negated sentence to be true, it should not be the case that Peter runs fast. However, that is still compatible with a situation in which Peter runs and therefore, a continuation that states that the rest of the sentence holds, without the negated adverb, is coherent.

(71) Peter is not running fast, even if he is running.

This contrasts with use-conditional content. Take modal particles again. Even if negation can be used in a sentence containing *ja*, it cannot target the modal particle. Consider the following examples, which is a negation of (22).

(72) *Webster schläft ja nicht.*

Webster sleeps MP not

»(As you may know) Webster is not sleeping.«

In this example, the negation cannot target *ja* – it has to target the entire proposition. But crucially *ja* is still not part of the negated proposition but itself scopes over the entire negated proposition. Therefore, a discourse continuation that tries to establish the truth of the corresponding sentence without the negation and the modal particle is not possible. In fact, trying to do this is just leads to a plain contradiction.

(73) #*Webster schläft ja nicht, auch wenn er schläft.*

Webster sleeps MP not even if he sleeps

#»Webster is not *ja* sleeping, even if he is sleeping.«

(intended: »As you may not have known, Webster sleeps.«)

A related way to employ negation to test the non-truth-conditionality of an expression is by denial in dialogue (cf. [Jayez and Rossari 2004](#)). Instead of trying to negate UC-content in the same sentence, one can try to deny it by a reacting utterance in a discourse.

(74) A: Webster schläft ja.
 »Webster is *ja* sleeping.«

B1: No, he does not.

B2: #No, I didn't know that.

B3: #No, even if he is sleeping.

B's answer in (74B1) shows that it is perfectly fine to deny the descriptive content that Webster is sleeping. However, (74B1) does not say anything about the contribution of *ja*. The acceptability of (74B1) contrasts with B's possible reactions in (74B2) and (74B3), which are both infelicitous. In (74B2), the speaker is trying to deny the use-conditional contribution of *ja* in A's utterance by negating the knowledge that A attributed to her by the use of *ja*. This is infelicitous. The same holds if B tries to negate the UC-content while asserting that the descriptive content holds, which is possible for truth-conditional expressions as shown in (71).

Maybe the infelicity of (74B2) and (74B3) is related to the presence of the answer particle *no* that seems to inevitably target the descriptive content. When *no* is omitted and B asserts that she did not know what A has asserted, we get a felicitous utterance in which B, at first sight, seems to target the knowledge-ascribing content of *ja*.

(75) A: Webster schläft ja.
 »Webster is *ja* sleeping.«

B: I didn't know that.

In this form, B's denial is felicitous. However, it only seems as if B's response is denying the content of *ja*, but in fact, it is not. This is shown by the following dialogue in which B can also assert that she did not know that Webster sleeps, but A has not even used *ja*.

(76) A: Webster is sleeping.

B: I didn't know that.

That shows that B's reaction in (75B) does not deny the use-conditional content contributed by *ja* but just makes explicit how A's utterance fits into her discourse model, even if her utterance contradicts what is displayed by A's usage of the modal particle.

Besides negation and denial, there are other tests to show that the meaning of UCIs does not contribute to the truth-conditional content of an utterance.

For instance, UC-content does not become part of the content of a question. Consider first an example that shows that a descriptive expression like *fast* is indeed part of a question.

(77) A: Is Peter running fast?

B1: No, but he is running.

B2: #Yes. However, he isn't fast.

As (77B1) illustrates, giving a negative answer to A's question is still compatible with Peter running. Furthermore, one cannot give a positive answer to the question without committing to the contribution of *fast*, as shown in (77B2). For use-conditional content, it is the other way round. In the following example, B cannot give a negative answer to A's question on the grounds that she rejects only the contribution of the UCI but not the truth-conditional content.

(78) A: Have you ever met that bastard Kresge?

B1: #No. But I have met him.

B2: Yes. However, I like him.

The answer in (78B2) furthermore shows that committing to the descriptive content of a sentence does not commit oneself to the use-conditional content of the preceding question, at least if one makes oneself sufficiently clear.

That use-conditional meaning is not part of what is questioned by an interrogative and that it can neither be the target of negation nor of denial in dialogue follows directly from the fact that it contributes a dimension of meaning that is independent from the regular truth-conditional dimension. Hence, I add them as subproperties to the property of independence.

(79) **Independence** Expressive content contributes a dimension of meaning that is separate from the regular truth-conditional content.

- (a) Use-conditional content cannot be negated by ordinary negation.
- (b) Use-conditional content cannot be denied directly in dialogue.
- (c) Use-conditional content is not part of what is questioned by an interrogative.
- (d) Use-conditional content does not affect the descriptive content if not fulfilled.

These properties can therefore function as diagnostics to establish the independence of the content of an expression. However, they alone are not sufficient to

show that an expression contributes use-conditional content since other kinds of meaning, like presuppositions, show the same behavior with respect to negation and questions. The distinction between presupposed and use-conditional content can be motivated in more detail,³³ but as we saw above, the independence holds in both directions for UCIs. While a main characteristic of presuppositions is that the truth-conditional content depends on the satisfaction of its presuppositions, the truth-conditional content is not affected if an expressive is used infelicitously. Therefore, I have added (79d) as a further subproperty of independence.

1.4.2 Nondisplaceability

By saying that use-conditional content is nondisplaceable, Potts (2007b, 169) means that even inside linguistic contexts like speech or attitude reports, modal or conditionalized statements, or reports of past events, the expressive content cannot be evaluated in that semantic context but always conveys something about the context of the utterance itself (Potts, 2007b, 166):

(80) **Nondisplaceability** Expressives predicate something of the utterance situation.

The nondisplaceability of the content of UCIs is a further property that sets them apart from ordinary descriptive elements. The truth-conditional meaning of regular non-expressive language does not have to be about the utterance situation but may easily be shifted in order to refer to things, events, or attitudes that are not present in the actual utterance situation. This is mostly not possible for UCIs. Displacement, as Hockett (1958, 579) calls it, is often assumed to be one of the »design features« of human languages, setting them apart from other forms of communication (Coleman, 2006; Hockett and Altmann, 1968). According to Cruse (1986), use-conditional meaning therefore shows similarities to non-verbal communication like gestures or mimic.³⁴

»Another characteristic distinguishing expressive meaning from propositional meaning is that it is valid only for the utterer, at the time and place of utterance. This limitation it shares with, for instance, a smile, a frown, a gesture of impatience [...].« (Cruse, 1986, 272)

³³ For arguments for this distinction, cf. Potts (2005, 32-36) and Gutzmann (2008, 53-57). For an opposing position, cf. Schlenker (2007).

³⁴ Also cited by Potts (2007b, 169).

Since UCIs lack the possibility to be displaced – at least to some extent, as we will see – they have in this respect more in common with non-verbal communication or the direct signaling nature of non-human communicative systems found in animal communication, which are lacking the property of displacement.

»Animal communication seems to be designed exclusively for this moment, here and now. It cannot effectively be used to relate events that are far removed in time and place. When your dog says *GRRR*, it means *GRRR, right now*, because dogs don't seem to be capable of communicating *GRRR, last night, over in the park*. In contrast, human language users are normally capable of producing messages equivalent to *GRRR, last night, over in the park*, and then going on to say *In fact, I'll be going back tomorrow for some more.*« (Yule, 2006, 9)

Besides the past tense that Yule uses in his example, common linguistic means to displace the interpretation of an expression include speech or attitude reporting verbs, modal elements, or conditional clauses, amongst many others. In the following examples (81b)–(81f), the propositional content that Peter's Porsche is pink, expressed by (81a), is displaced to the semantic context created by these constructions.

- (81)(a) Peter's Porsche is pink.
- (b) Peter's Porsche **was** pink.
- (c) **Penny says that** Peter's Porsche is pink.
- (d) **Penny believes that** Peter's Porsche is pink.
- (e) Peter's Porsche **may** be pink.
- (f) **If Penny loves Peter,** Peter's Porsche is pink.

In all derived variants of (81a), the proposition that Peter's Porsche is pink does not have to hold in the actual situation, but in the context to which it is displaced.³⁵

When trying to do the same with use-conditional content, we see that this is indeed hardly possible. Building on Yule's (2006) examples from the quotation above, example (82) shows that an expressive interjection like *ouch* behaves more like the *GRRR* of a dog with respect to displacement than its descriptive counterpart in (83).

³⁵ Semantically, each of (81b)–(81f) is, of course, compatible with Peter's Porsche being pink.

- (82)(a) Ouch!
 (b) # Ouch, last night, over in the kitchen!

- (83)(a) I feel pain!
 (b) I felt pain, last night, over in the kitchen.

Interjections are an extreme example since they are very isolated from the linguistic context. However, nondisplaceability holds also for use-conditional content that is more integrated into the syntax of a sentence than interjections are. The expressive attitude expressed by *bastard*, for instance, escapes all attempts to displace it to a non-actual context as shown by the infelicity of continuing the utterance with a sentence that contradicts the negative attitude of *bastard* (cf. Potts 2007b, 170f).

- (84)(a) That bastard Kresge is late for work.
 (b) That bastard Kresge was late for work yesterday. #But he's no bastard today, because today he was on time.
 (c) Sue says that that bastard Kresge should be fired. #I think he's a good guy.
 (d) Sue believes that that bastard Kresge should be fired. #I think he's a good guy.
 (e) Maybe that bastard Kresge will be late again. #But if not, he's a good guy.
 (f) #If that bastard Kresge arrives on time, he should be fired for being so mean.

The negative attitude towards Kresge that is expressed by *bastard* in these examples is interpreted with respect to the context of the entire utterance. That is, even if *bastard* is syntactically embedded, semantically it nevertheless conveys that the speaker bears a negative attitude towards Kresge in the actual utterance context.

However, nondisplaceability seems to be not as strong a constraint on use-conditional meaning as Potts's formulation in (80) suggests. At least for speech and attitude reports, there are instances in which a UCI is interpreted with respect to the context of the reported speech or attitude – at least, if the right conditions apply. In particular, the use-conditional content can be ascribed to the subject of the reported context and not the speaker of the utterance context, contrary to what is demanded by (80). Potts (2007b, 172) provides an example which he adopts from Kratzer (1999).

- (85) My father screamed that he would never allow me to marry that **bastard** Webster.

The negative attitude towards Webster conveyed by *bastard* is obviously not attributed to the speaker of (85), but to her father. This can be made more obvious by the following two continuations.

- (86)(a) My father screamed that he would never allow me to marry that bastard Webster.
But I love him so much that I don't care about my father's opinion.
- (b) My father screamed that he would never allow me to marry that bastard Webster.
#He thinks that I do not deserve such a decent guy.

For further examples of displaced expressives, see amongst others [Amaral et al. \(2007\)](#) or [Anand \(2007\)](#). Interestingly, not all UCIs seem to behave the same way. Some are relatively easy to shift while others may never be displaced. In her contribution to this volume, [Döring](#) discusses the displacement potential of different German modal particles and shows that even in this special class of UCIs, variation with respect to shiftability can be attested.

However, even if there are cases in which a UCI can receive a shifted interpretation, [Potts \(2007b, 173\)](#) argues that they do not challenge the nondisplaceability argument. Instead they point to the *perspective dependence* of expressives.

1.4.3 Perspective dependence

The function of using expressives and use-conditional language in general is not to make objective statements about facts in the world nor to convince the hearer that some state of affairs holds. Instead, they are used to display emotions, feeling or attitudes in a more direct way than any descriptive statement would do. By default, UCIs display the emotions or attitudes of the speaker. However, this does not need to be the case, as shown by example (85) above, in which the emotional attitude is ascribed to the reported subject. [Potts \(2007b, 173\)](#) argues that this shifted interpretation does not show that UCIs can be displaced after all, but that they generally depend on a perspective from which they are evaluated ([Potts, 2007b, 166](#)):

- (87) **Perspective dependence** Expressive content is evaluated from a particular perspective. In general, the perspective is the speaker's, but there can be deviations if conditions are right.

The idea is that the interpretation of UCIs is not shifted to the context introduced by an attitude or speech report predicate like *scream* in (85), but that they are nonetheless interpreted at the utterance level. However, they are evaluated

with respect to the perspective of a salient individual. Following Lasersohn's (2005) influential account of predicates of personal taste, Potts (2007b, 173) calls this individual the contextual *judge*. Like the speaker, the judge appears as a parameter of the utterance context. In many if not most contexts, the two parameters are set to the same individual, that is, in most contexts, the speaker is also the judge, according to which perspectival expressions are evaluated. However, there are cases in which an individual other than the speaker is so salient that it counts as the judge of the utterance, even if – for obvious reasons – it cannot count as the speaker.³⁶ In (85), »my father picks out an agent that is so salient and so powerful in the context of the sentence that he becomes not only the attitudinal and deontic judge but also the contextual one« (Potts, 2007b, 175).

According to this view on the interpretation of use-conditional content, UCIs are not actually shifted, even if they are not interpreted with respect to the speaker. Instead, they are interpreted always root level, but can be evaluated with respect to an individual other than the speaker if the contextual conditions are such that the judge parameter is set to a different individual. The intuition that, in cases like (85), a UCI is interpreted in a shifted context can however be explained as well by this view. Since the subject matrix speech or attitude report can be salient enough to become the contextual judge – like in (85) – one may get the impression that a UCI is interpreted in the shifted context.

A prediction that this approach to seemingly-shifted UCIs makes is that a non-speaker evaluation of a UCI should not depend on the presence of any linguistic context-shifter like propositional attitude predicates or reported speech. Instead, they should be freely shiftable, as long as the right circumstances apply to establish a non-speaker judge. This prediction is indeed affirmed by examples like the following – borrowed from Potts 2007b – in which there is already enough sarcasm involved to set the judge parameter to the authors of the CPJ report instead of to the blogger.

- (88) A CPJ report on Venezuela tells us how problems have »escalated« in Venezuela under Chavez, i.e. the physical attacks against journalists under previous presidents have »escalated« to Chavez calling the opposition, which includes the media, names. This is very, very serious, but I don't think another coup attempt is called for until Chavez resorts to dramatic irony or sarcasm. But if **that vicious bastard** uses litotes, then

³⁶ Direct quotations being an obvious exception, of course.

there's no other rational choice than an immediate invasion. (Potts 2007b, 175f, my emphasis, DG)

In two recent papers, Harris and Potts (2009a, 2009b) try to pin-point the circumstances under which UCIs can be interpreted in a shifted context by empirical experiments.

If the view on the »shiftability« of expressive content just sketched is sound, then examples like (85) or (88) do not challenge the nondisplaceability of use-conditional content but instead highlight its perspective dependence. This perspectivity is what makes them shiftable in a non-technical sense. However, they convey something about the utterance situation, namely about the contextual judge, which does not need to equal the speaker under the right conditions.

1.4.4 Descriptive ineffability

By *descriptive ineffability*, Potts (2007b, 166) means that it is hard, if not impossible, to completely translate expressive content into purely descriptive language.

(89) **Descriptive ineffability:** Speakers are never fully satisfied when they paraphrase expressive content using descriptive, i.e., nonexpressive, terms.

The theoretical status of descriptive ineffability as a sound property of use-conditional content is not clear. Geurts (2007, 211) criticizes it as a special property since it does not »draw the line between descriptive and expressive language«, because it can be found all over the lexicon, not just with expressives. Clear examples are provided by grammatical expressions or function words like articles, conjunctions, or even prepositions, for which speakers, if »pressed for definitions, they resort to illustrating where the words would be appropriately used« (Potts, 2007b, 176). But also for adjectives like *languid*, *green*, or *pretty*, many speakers would have difficulties giving a satisfying paraphrase without resorting to contexts of application (Geurts, 2007, 211). Finally, even for simple nouns like *house* or *dog* it is not easy to give a precise definition that covers all aspects of their use, not to mention complex expressions like *knowledge* or *truth* for which literally thousands of pages have been spent to develop a definition that account for all of their uses. In this respect, I agree with Geurts (2007). The impossibility to be paraphrased in a satisfactory way is not something that is unique to use-conditional content alone.

However, I think that Potts (2007b) is right about descriptive ineffability in another respect. Using use-conditional language is really different from using truth-conditional expressions. That is, even if we can find a perfect paraphrase for a UCI in purely truth-conditional terms and even if they *mean* (in a non-technical sense) the same, they do not *express* the same. So, let us follow Kaplan (1999, 17) and assume that the use-conditional meaning of the interjection *oops* corresponds to the truth-conditional meaning of *I just observed a minor mishap*. And, for the sake of the argument, let us suppose that this is a perfect paraphrase.

(90)(a) Oops!

(b) I just observed a minor mishap.

Then, even if they both *mean* the same, they *express* this differently. (90a) expresses that meaning in a use-conditional way, i.e., it is felicitously used in a context in which the speaker just observed a minor mishap. It is a direct expression of the speaker's pain, rather than a statement about it. This contrasts with an utterance of (90b) which is an actual statement about a fact in the world, which could therefore be challenged.³⁷

(91) A: Oops!

B: # That's not true. That was intentional!

(92) A: I just observed a minor mishap.

B: That's not true. That was intentional!

Hence, even if (91A) and (92A) depict the same situation, namely one in which the speaker has just observed a minor mishap, they express this content in a fundamentally different way. Following Kaplan (1999, 8), use-conditional content *expresses* or *displays*, while truth-conditional content *describes*. These differences in the *modus of expressing* are of course the reason why use-conditional and descriptive content are independent from each other and cannot be merged into a single dimension of meaning, not even a conjoined one.³⁸ And it is also the rationale behind Potts's descriptive ineffability. Hence, I

³⁷ That does not mean however, that UCIs are error prone and cannot characterize a situation incorrectly. However, infelicitously used UCIs are not apt to be judged as false.

³⁸ In some sense, then, the distinction between displayed and described content mirrors Strawson's (1950) disentanglement of asserted and presupposed content, which were merged into a single (conjoined) dimension by Russell (1905).

suggest to modify Potts's (2007b) original statement of descriptive ineffability to focus more on this aspect than on the fact that it is hard to come up with a satisfying paraphrase.

- (93) **Descriptive ineffability** (modified): It is impossible to paraphrase expressive content using only descriptive expression without changing the modus of expressing.

Thinking about descriptive ineffability in this way captures the intuition that use-conditional content functions differently from regular truth-conditional content, and that the two kinds of meaning cannot be exchanged freely for each other.

1.4.5 Immediacy

With the property of immediacy, Potts (2007b, 167) draws a parallel between expressives and performative speech acts.

- (94) **Immediacy**: Like performatives, expressives achieve their intended act simply by being uttered; they do not offer content so much as inflict it.

Potts (2007b, 180) provides promises as an example. By just uttering a performative construction like (95), one performs the named speech act and expresses that one is doing so.

- (95) I promise that I will be back tonight.

Hence, it is not intelligible to say that one is not going to fulfill what one has just promised, as shown in (96a). Furthermore, (96b) shows that one can also not take back that one has just made a promise.

- (96) I promise that I will be back for dinner.

- (a) # But I plan to be back tomorrow.
(b) # But I made no promises that I will.

UCIs behave in the same way, as we have already seen from some examples. For instance, (84) shows that it is infelicitous to take back the negative attitude conveyed by *bastard* by continuing with *But he's no bastard today* (Potts, 2007b, 180). Moreover, as for the performative promise, it is also not possible to deny that one has just expressed a negative attitude.

(97) That bastard Kresge was late for work yesterday.

- (a) #But he's no bastard today, because today he was on time.
- (b) #But I expressed no negative feelings towards Kaplan by saying this.

Interestingly, the restriction that one cannot deny one's own speech act holds also for speech acts that are not explicitly performative, like the promise in (95), but also for more structurally determined speech acts like assertions or questions.³⁹

(98)(a) David is a zombie. #But I did not assert that he is a zombie.

- (b) Is David a zombie? #But I did not ask you whether he is a zombie.

Potts (2007b, 180) argues that performatives and other direct speech acts also mirror the behavior of UCIs with respect to their inability to be denied in discourse. Just as one cannot deny the negative attitude of an expressive UCI, one cannot deny that your interlocutor has just performed an assertion, for instance.

(99) A: That bastard Kresge was late for work yesterday.

B: #No, you like him.

(100) A: David is a zombie.

B: #No, you didn't just assert that.

The parallelism between use-conditional content and speech acts can be pushed even further. In fact, it could be argued that sentence mood (that is, the structurally encoded speech act potential in, e.g., a declarative or interrogative) is a UCI – a view that is suggested by Portner (2007), and that I have developed in Gutzmann 2008. Instead of conveying something truth-conditionally, sentence mood imposes use-conditions on an utterance. Therefore, an analysis that accounts for UCIs and denial may also work for assertions or questions.

³⁹ This is inline with what Austin (1962) already had in mind. Once we think of utterances as speech *acts*, it seems to be a matter of (virtual) conceptual necessity that one cannot »take back« those actions. This not only holds for the illocutionary act but obviously also for the phatic and rhetic act.

- (i) David is a zombie. #But I did not say »David is a zombie«.
- (ii) David is a zombie. #But I did not say that he is a zombie.

The property of immediacy is also a consequence of the fact that use-conditional content behaves differently from truth-conditional content. That UCIs achieve their intended effect just by being uttered suggests that they are closely related to the utterance context. This also fits their nondisplaceability. To account for this, the context-relatedness must somehow be built directly into the semantics of UCIs.

1.4.6 Repeatability

The last property Potts (2007b, 167) lists is that expressives can be repeated without redundancy. Instead, the repetition of an expressive intensifies the expressed emotion.

- (101) **Repeatability:** If a speaker repeatedly uses an expressive item, the effect is generally one of strengthening the emotive content, rather than one of redundancy.

To illustrate this, Potts (2007b, 182) uses the following list of examples, which contain more and more repetitions of the same expressive.

- (102)(a) **Damn**, I left my keys in the car.
(b) **Damn**, I left my **damn** keys in the car.
(c) **Damn**, I left my **damn** keys in the **damn** car.

The more instances of *damn* are used, the stronger the emotional attitude of the speaker or judge gets, with no redundancy at all. According to Potts, this contrasts with descriptive content that cannot be repeated in the same way without becoming redundant. Even if Potts (2007b) notes that, due to the descriptive ineffability of expressive content, it is hard to find a minimal contrasting example that only involves descriptive language, he illustrates this with the following example (Potts, 2007b, 182):

- (103) #I'm angry! I forgot my keys. I'm angry! They are in the car. I'm angry!

However, as already observed by Geurts (2007), repeatability is not a good candidate for a characteristic property of expressive content. First, there are also descriptive expressions that do not lead to redundancy but whose regular semantic effect is strengthened if used repetitively. Potts (2007b) himself mentioned the case of (104), but dismisses it as a counter example since such examples can be analyzed compositionally. He argues that the first *big* can be analyzed as modifying *big big apple*, while the second modifies *big apple* and

the last one just *apple*. Therefore, we are not repetitively applying the adjective to the same argument but to an already modified argument. This reasoning should also apply to descriptive intensifiers like *very* if used more than once.

- (104)(a) Peter ate a big big big apple.
 (b) David is very very very large.

However, Potts's (2007b) aim is to finally give a compositional analysis for the intensifying effect of the repetition of expressives like *damn* in (102b) and (102c) and, therefore, I do not see any reason for not counting examples like the ones in (104) as instances of descriptive repetition without redundancy.⁴⁰

Given this data, it can already be concluded that repeatability is not a distinctive property of use-conditional content. Moreover, this generalization does not even transfer to other kinds of UCI besides expressives in the narrow sense. For instance, interjections and other isolated UCIs are not repeatable without sounding odd.

- (105)(a) #Oops! I forgot my keys. Oops! They are in the car. Oops!
 (b) #Ouch! I've hit my thumb. Ouch! It was the hammer. Ouch!

Contra Potts (2007b), I think that repeatability is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for expressive content and therefore, it cannot be used to differentiate between truth-conditional and use-conditional content.

1.5 Summary

Conventional non-truth-conditional content comes in many different varieties and from many empirical domains of language. This is what the survey of this chapter has shown, even if it could only touch upon a small selection of all kinds of use-conditional meaning that can be found across natural languages. While the majority of use-conditional content is bound to words, there are also constructions below and beyond the word level that are conventionally associated with non-truth-conditional meaning.

⁴⁰ Geurts (2007, 214) mentions a further problem for Potts's line of reasoning. According to Potts's (2007b) approach, the instances of *damn* in (102c) apply to different arguments and hence express emotional attitudes towards different objects, which means there should be no intensification effect at all. Another way of analyzing (102c) would be to say that all instances of *damn* apply to the entire event. Then, however, (102c) is not very different from (104a) to (??c).

The description of the different items by which use-conditional content can be conveyed has shown that not every UCI behaves in the same way with respect to how it interacts with the truth-conditional dimension of meaning. I distinguish these different types of UCIs by means of some binary features, which allows us to differentiate between five types of UCIs, as summarized in Table 1.1. The purest form of use-conditional content is provided by isolated expletives. These are interjections like Kaplan's *ouch* and *oops* that contribute use-conditions by themselves, without needing any argument (*-functional*), and which do not contribute anything to the descriptive dimension of meaning (*-2-dimensional*). They contrast with functional expletives like *damn* in *that damn dog*, which also convey no descriptive content (*-2-dimensional*) but which need an argument in order to express a proper use-condition (*+functional*). What I have called isolated mixed UCIs differ from isolated expletives in the other feature. Examples are ethnic slurs like *Kraut* or other coloured expressions like *cur*. They are also isolated, because their use-conditional content needs no argument (*-functional*), but in contrast to isolated expletives, they have an additional descriptive meaning component (*+2-dimensional*). The fourth type – functional mixed UCIs – is the most complex one from an interactional point of view. These UCIs need an argument for their use-conditional component (*+functional*) and contribute to the truth-conditional tier (*+2-dimensional*) at the same time. In (63)–(66), I have given informal composition schemes for the four types of UCI that illustrate how they interact with the descriptive content.

Despite the different types of use-conditional content and the variety of linguistic means to express it, there are some characteristic properties that can be attributed to UCIs, which can function as a heuristic to detect them. I have reviewed the list of features developed by Potts (2007b), in order to check whether they are characteristic of use-conditional content. The most important and identifying feature of UCIs is, of course, that they do not affect the truth-conditions of a sentence, but instead, impose use-conditions on the felicity of the utterance of that sentence. This different modus of expressing content is responsible for the majority of the distinctive properties of UCIs. It is what Potts calls *independence*, by which he means that the two modi of expressing contribute to two different dimensions of meaning. The truth-conditions of a sentence do not depend on its use-conditional content, and *vice versa*.

The nondisplaceability of UCIs is also closely connected to their use-conditional nature. Use-conditions are mostly imposed on the actual utterance and evaluated in the current context, and not on a semantic context created

by the linguistic environment. The nondisplaceability of UCIs renders them similar to non-verbal forms of communication like gestures or to animal communication, both of which lack the ability to be interpreted in a non-actual context. And even if UCIs are (of course) arbitrarily and by convention connected with the content they express, their nondisplaceability makes it reasonable to think of them as being more like *indices/signals* instead of *symbols* in semiotic terms. There are obvious counterexamples to nondisplaceability, but according to Potts (2007b) they stem from the *perspective dependence* of UCIs. That is, the evaluation of use-conditional content always depends on a contextual judge which, by default, is the speaker but who could be a different individual if it is salient enough in the actual utterance context. Another aspect of the observation that use-conditional content is closely tied to the utterance context, is what Potts (2007b) calls *immediacy*. Like performatives, UCIs alter the context directly when uttered.

One of the properties from Potts's (2007b) list, that does not prove to be very helpful in distinguishing expressive from descriptive content, is descriptive ineffability. Finding satisfying and correct paraphrases for use-conditional content is very difficult, but so it is for many descriptive terms. However, if understood more broadly, descriptive ineffability means that one cannot substitute expressive content with descriptive content – even if has the same content – without changing the modus of expressing that content. Repeatability is also not a good candidate for a characteristic of expressive content as there are both UCIs that cannot be repeated without redundancy and descriptive expressions that can.

1.6 The individual papers

The UCIs that have received, by far, the most attention, are what I have called expressives in the narrow sense. However, as this survey has shown, use-conditional content comes in a great variety of forms. The papers in this collection address some of those.

In their contribution *German non-inflectional constructions as separate performatives*, Sebastian Bücking and Jennifer Rau study the form and interpretation of German non-inflectional constructions like those presented in (61). Making use of Portner's (2007) modification of Potts's (2005) logic, they analyze the special syntax and semantics of these morphological UCIs and argue that they can be viewed as separate performatives.

As discussed in §1.4.2, nondisplaceability has been questioned as a defining feature of use-conditional content. However, as **Sophia Döring** shows in her empirical investigation of the relation between *Modal particles and context shift*, not all UCIs can be context-shifted in the same way. Presenting new data on modal particles drawn from German corpora, she shows that modal particles show variation regarding the linguistic contexts that can induce a shifted interpretation.

Modal particles are also dealt with in **Markus Egg**'s paper *Discourse particles, common ground, and felicity conditions*. Instead of discussing their shiftability, Egg builds on the vast descriptive literature on modal particles in German to develop a formal approach to their meaning. In order to capture their use-conditional nature, he relates them to the common ground and analyzes them as expressions imposing felicity conditions on the relation an utterance bears to the previous one. More radically, he argues that even the felicity conditions of the two utterances can serve as the semantic argument of a particle.

Besides particles, personal pronouns seem to be well suited to express use-conditional content on the word level, as we have seen in §1.1.3. In his contribution *I love me some datives: Expressive meaning, free datives, and F-implicature*, **Laurence R. Horn** presents a detailed analysis of the personal dative in English, relating it to other variants of free datives in different languages and to other UCIs like modal particles. Moreover, going back to the writings of Frege, he embeds his investigation into a historical and theoretical discussion of how conventional non-truth-conditional content fits into the division of labour between semantics and pragmatics, reaching back to the writings of Frege.

In some respect, **Eric McCready and Yohei Takahashi** step into Grice's shoes and take up his original example of a conventional implicature, when they divide the meaning the Japanese connective *mono* into a truth-conditional, asserted component on the one hand, and a non-truth-conditional but nevertheless conventional dimension of meaning on the other hand. Besides discussing the notion of *Good reasons*, they show how the formal logic developed in **McCready 2010** can be used deal with mixed UCIs.

In her detailed investigation, **Sophie Repp** examines various means of *Common ground management: modal particles, illocutionary negation and VERUM*. She argues that modal particles, illocutionary negation as expressed by the operator *FALSUM*, and the operator *VERUM* are common-ground managing operators, which indicate the status of a proposition relative to the common ground (newness, expectedness, speaker commitment etc.). Although they are

non-truth-conditional, common-ground managing operators can nevertheless influence the truth-conditional meaning of a sentence, as Repp argues. She illustrates this in detail for the scopal interaction of negation and epistemic modal verbs in German. The observed effects are argued to be due to the negative marker denoting either propositional negation or the operator *FALSUM*, and to common-ground managing operators determining to a large degree the discourse appropriateness of the utterance they occur in.

Yasutada Sudo's deals with the use-conditions of *Biased Polar Questions in English and Japanese*. Starting with English and the classical distinction between negative and positive bias, Sudo uses data from Japanese to show that this distinction is too coarse-grained. Accordingly, he extends the distinction by adding the notion of evidential and epistemic bias. Sudo examines how these attitudes – which are not part of the truth-conditionally relevant question meaning but impose use-conditions on the proper use of the question – can be expressed in Japanese by the conventional means of different intonation patterns and certain question particles.

Concluding this collection, **Henk Zeevat** examines the borderline between expressive meaning and presuppositions in his paper *Expressing Surprise by Particles*, in which he develops a new approach to the meaning of focus particles. In contrast to the vast majority of accounts of such expressions, his approach is non-truth-conditional in nature and is based on the idea that emotions like surprise should play a major role in linguistic semantics. He furthermore argues that focus particles are a case in which the use-conditional and the truth-conditional dimension of meaning cannot be fully separated, shedding doubt on the property of independence discussed in §1.4.1 above.

Acknowledgements I would like to thank all the contributors to this volume and the speakers of the Osnabrück workshop for inspiring ideas. My co-editor Hans-Martin Gärtner provided plenty helpful comments and references during various stages of this paper and contributed the brief historical introduction. Furthermore, Antonio Fortin also gave insightful remarks as well as helping with correcting the final manuscript. All remaining infelicities are my own.

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