Identificational Sentences

Friederike Moltmann, Institut d’Histoire et de Philosophie des Sciences et des Techniques

Abstract

In this talk I will propose a semantic analysis of what Higgins calls identificational sentences, sentences of the sort in (1a) and (1b):

    1. This is Mary.

    2. This is a beautiful woman.

Identificational sentences contain an exceptionally neutral bare demonstrative in subject position, even if the object ‘identified’ is a person. On the proposed analysis, bare demonstratives as subjects of identificational sentences never refer to persons in fact, but rather involve reference to perceivable features, or tropes, the objects of direct perception, as some philosophers have argued. An identificational sentence then serves to identify the bearer of the trope referred to. The subject of an identificational does not have a trope as its actual denotation, though, but rather has a derived functional denotation, unlike trope-referring bare demonstratives as in (2):

  1. Did you see that? (That might have been Mary.)

Identificational sentences are related to, though distinct from specificational sentences. But there are connections between the two sentence types, and I argue that at least some specificational sentences should receive the very same analysis, namely sentences with exceptionally neutral relative clauses describing the object of perception:

  1. What John saw was Mary.

I will also suggest a similar analysis of sentences describing phenomenal experiences such as (4):

  1. This looks like Mary.